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In sequential decision making, an algorithm interacts with an environment,
where it can learn from the feedback of its past actions. A model for sequen-
tial decision making with partial feedback is the multi-armed bandit problem.
This model has also found applications to a very diverse set of problems such as
sequential design of experiments including medical decision-making, learning
click-through rates in search engines, economic theory, network routing, etc.
We study a fundamental feature in many of these applications, which is the
presence of one or more limited-supply resources that are consumed during the
decision process. Existing literature lacked general models for this feature and
offered very limited treatment of such problems. We propose models which
capture many of these applications and give tight performance guarantees.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
How should a decision maker manage his/her resources when making deci-
sions in a sequential manner? The focus of this thesis is in addressing this chal-
lenge. In sequential decision making, an agent interacts with the environment in
a sequential manner. While the environment is assumed to behave in a certain
way, the agent lacks some of the information about other aspects of the environ-
ment. This uncertainty is the main source of difficulty and the agent strives to
learn the missing information based on the feedback of its past actions.
For more than fifty years, the multi-armed bandit problem (henceforth,
MAB) has been one of the predominant theoretical models for sequential de-
cision making. It embodies the tension between exploration and exploitation,
“the conflict between taking actions which yield immediate reward and taking
actions whose benefit (e.g. acquiring information or preparing the ground) will
come only later,” to quote Whittle’s apt summary [54]. Owing to the universal
nature of this conflict, it is not surprising that MAB algorithms have found di-
verse applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to
Web search and advertising.
A common feature in many of these application domains is the presence of
one or more limited-supply resources that are consumed during the decision
process. For example, scientists experimenting with alternative medical treat-
ments may be limited not only by the number of patients participating in the
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study but also by the cost of materials used in the treatments. A website experi-
menting with displaying advertisements is constrained not only by the number
of users who visit the site but by the advertisers’ budgets. A retailer engag-
ing in price experimentation faces inventory limits along with a limited num-
ber of consumers. The literature on MAB problems lacks general models that
encompass these sorts of decision problems with supply limits. In this thesis
we introduce and study various models to address this issue and present algo-
rithms with provable performance guarantees. In fact, we prove that for many
of the addressed situations the algorithms have provably optimal performance
guarantees.
The rest of the introduction is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we give
the motivating examples for the problems we study. Then, in section 1.3 we
give the formal models which model these problems. In section 1.4 we note the
related work, following which we state our contributions in 1.5. Finally, we end
the section by an outline of the thesis in 1.6 along with bibliographic notes in 1.7.
1.2 Motivating Examples
The presence of resources which can be consumed in a limited quantity is quite
common in many applications. Hence, it is no surprise that a lot of problems
fall under the umbrella of sequential decision making with resource constraints.
We list a couple of such examples below.
Dynamic pricing. Consider an airline which is interested in selling a limited
number of seats on a flight. The airline wants to maximize its revenue and is
2
offering tickets on a website (e.g. expedia). Buyers appear one by one and are
interested in purchasing a ticket if the price quoted to them is smaller than their
value for the ticket. The airline presents a take-it-or-leave-it price to each buyer.
Additionally, the airline can update its price dynamically to take into account
the number of seats left, number of buyers who are yet to arrive, and the history
of transactions so far.
While the basic version of dynamic pricing is a stylized model, we will in-
corporate many extensions of the problem as special cases of the problem that
we study. These include buyers interested in more than one item (non-unit de-
mand), limited inventory of multiple types of products, multiple products made
from limited inventory of common raw materials, bundling, and buyer target-
ing. We will make all of these models formal as special cases of two very general
models that we consider in sections 3.7 and 4.7.
Dynamic procurement. The dynamic procurement problem is the dual of the
dynamic pricing problem, where there is one buyer of goods and multiple sell-
ers appear one by one. Consider the example where a requester (buyer of ser-
vices) wants to spend at most B dollars to get as many images labelled as pos-
sible. To achieve it the requester uses Amazon’s mechanical turk platform, in
which workers (sellers of services) arrive one by one and are offered a take-it-
or-leave-it price for doing the work. The requester can adjust the price dynam-
ically to take into account the money spent so far, number of workers who are
yet to arrive, and the history of transactions to far.
Similar to dynamic pricing we will also consider other variants of dynamic
procurement. These include workers who can do more than one job (non-unit
supply), multiple-types of jobs, complicated menus of jobs, etc. We will make
3
all of these models formal as special cases of two very general models that we
consider in sections 3.7 and 4.7.
Pay-per click ads. Consider a search engine such as Google which wants to
learn the click through rates of advertisements. But, the search engine is con-
strained to not charge each advertiser more than the budget constraint set by the
advertiser. Here the search engine can show advertisements adaptively based
on the budget remaining for each advertiser, the number of queries yet to ap-
pear, and the history of clicks for each advertisement.
Other applications. Along with the above three examples we will also consider
many other applications in section 3.7. These include setting reserve prices in
repeated auctions with limited inventory, adjusting a routing protocol with lim-
ited bandwidth resources, and adjusting a scheduling policy with limited ma-
chine resources.
All the above examples have many variants which are interesting. While the
basic case is interesting in itself, when applying models to answer queries over
a web server one has to consider cookie data of users to get targeted results. We
consider the applications without the contextual data in section 3.7 and with the
contextual data in 4.7. We will also consider a special case of these applications
in chapter 5 where we can consider more general models of utility, where the
total utility of the algorithm is not a sum of the utilities in each round, but a
more complicated function.
4
1.3 Problem formulation
1.3.1 Existing models
We will first define the existing models in the literature on which we will build
upon. We will discuss the relevant literature along with related models in the
next section 1.4.
Definition 1.3.1 (Stochastic multi-armed bandit). There are a fixed and known,
finite set of m arms (possible actions), denoted A. In each round t, an algorithm
ALG picks an arm at ∈ A and receives reward rt ∈ [0, 1]. The reward rt is revealed
to the algorithm after the round and is assumed to be drawn from an unknown
distribution D(at). The goal of the algorithm is to maximize the expected total
reward. The benchmark to evaluate any algorithm ALG at any time step T will
be comparing the reward of ALG to what is the best achievable reward if the
distributions {D(a)|a ∈ A} are known, i.e. comparing it to T ·maxa∈A E[r(a)].
Definition 1.3.2 (Contextual stochastic bandit). There are a fixed and known,
finite set of m arms (possible actions), denoted A. In each round t, a context xt
is picked at random from distribution DX over possibly infinite known set of
possible contexts X. Then an algorithm ALG observes a context xt and then picks
an arm at ∈ A. After picking the arm ALG receives reward rt ∈ [0, 1]. The reward
rt is revealed to the algorithm after the round and is assumed to be drawn from
an unknown distribution D(xt, at). The goal of the algorithm is to maximize the
expected total reward.
ALG also has access to a finite set Π of policies – mappings from contexts to
actions. The benchmark to evaluate any algorithm ALG at any time step T will be
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comparing the reward of ALG to the maximum achievable reward by following
the recommendations of a fixed policy pi ∈ Π from beginning to time step T, i.e.
comparing it to T ·maxpi∈Π Ex∼DX [r(x, pi(x))].
While the input to the above two models is chosen stochastically, in section 5
we will also consider an input model where the complete input is chosen by an
adversary, but the input appears in a random order.
1.3.2 Performance guarantees
For different problems we use different benchmarks. Consider any algorithm
ALG which has reward rt at time t, then to show performance guarantees we
define the following two metrics.
Definition 1.3.3 (Regret). An algorithm ALG has a regret γ with respect to bench-
mark BENCH if the expected reward of ALG differs from BENCH by at most γ, i.e
BENCH − E
 T∑
i=1
rt
 ≤ γ
Definition 1.3.4 (Competitive ratio). An algorithm ALG has a competitive ratio
γ with respect to benchmark BENCH if the expected reward of ALG is at least a γ
factor of BENCH, i.e
BENCH
E
[∑T
i=1 rt
] ≤ γ
1.3.3 Bandits with Knapsacks
Henceforth we will call this model as BwK.
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Problem formulation. There is a fixed and known, finite set of m arms (possible
actions), denoted A. There are d resources being consumed. In each round t, an
algorithm picks an arm at ∈ A, receives reward rt ∈ [0, 1], and consumes some
amount ct,i ∈ [0, 1] of each resource i. The values rt and ct,i are revealed to the
algorithm after the round. There is a hard constraint Bi ∈ R+ on the consumption
of each resource i; we call it a budget for resource i. The algorithm stops at the
earliest time τ when one or more budget constraint is violated; its total reward
is equal to the sum of the rewards in all rounds strictly preceding τ. The goal of
the algorithm is to maximize the expected total reward.
The vector (rt; ct,1, ct,2 , . . . , ct,d) ∈ [0, 1]d+1 is called the outcome vector for round
t. We assume stochastic outcomes: if an algorithm picks arm a, the outcome vector
is chosen independently from some fixed distribution D(a) over [0, 1]d+1. The
distributions D(a), a ∈ A are latent. The tuple (D(a) : a ∈ A) comprises all latent
information in the problem instance. A particular BwK setting (such as “dynamic
pricing with limited supply”) is defined by the set of all feasible tuples (D(a) :
a ∈ A). This set, called the BwK domain, is known to the algorithm.
We will assume that there is a fixed time horizon T , known in advance to the
algorithm, such that the process is guaranteed to stop after at most T rounds.
One way of assuring this is to assume that there is a specific resource, say re-
source 1, such that every arm deterministically consumes B1/T units whenever
it is picked. We make this assumption henceforth. Without loss of generality,
Bi ≤ T for every resource i.
For technical convenience, we assume there exists a null arm: an arm with
0 reward and 0 consumption. Equivalently, an algorithm is allowed to spend a
unit of time without doing anything.
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Benchmark. We compare the performance of our algorithms to the expected to-
tal reward of the optimal dynamic policy given all the latent information, which
we denote by OPT. Note that OPT depends on the latent structure µ, and therefore
is a latent quantity itself. Time-invariant policies — those which use the same
distribution D over arms in all rounds — will also be relevant to the analysis
of one of our algorithms. Let REW(D, µ) denote the expected total reward of the
time-invariant policy that uses distributionD.
Uniform budgets. We say that the budgets are uniform if Bi = B for each re-
source i. Any BwK instance can be reduced to one with uniform budgets by
dividing all consumption values for every resource i by Bi/B, where B = mini Bi.
(That is tantamount to changing the units in which we measure consumption
of resource i.) Our technical results are for BwK with uniform budgets. We will
assume uniform budgets B from here on.
Useful notation. Let µa = Eλx∼D(a)[λa] ∈ [0, 1]d+1 be the expected outcome vector
for each arm a, and denote µ = (µa : a ∈ A). We call µ the latent structure of a
problem instance. The BwK domain induces a set of feasible latent structures,
which we denoteMfeas.
For notational convenience, we will write µa = ( r(a, µ); c1(a, µ) , . . . , cd(a, µ) ).
Also, we will write the expected consumption as a vector c(a, µ) =
( c1(a, µ) , . . . , cd(a, µ) ).
If D is a distribution over arms, let r(D, µ) = ∑a∈AD(a) r(a, µ) and c(D, µ) =∑
a∈AD(a) c(a, µ) be, respectively, the expected reward and expected resource
consumption in a single round if an arm is sampled from distributionD.
When discussing one of our algorithm, it will be useful to represent the latent
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values and the algorithm’s decisions as matrices and vectors. For this purpose,
we will number the arms as a1, . . . , am and let r ∈ Rm denote the vector whose
jth component is r(a j, µ). Similarly we will let C ∈ Rd×m denote the matrix whose
(i, j)th entry is ci(a j, µ).
1.3.4 Resourceful contextual bandits
Henceforth we will call this model as RCB. We consider an online setting where
in each round an algorithm observes a context x from a possibly infinite known
set of possible contexts X and chooses an action a from a finite known set A. The
world then specifies a reward r ∈ [0, 1] and the resource consumption. There are
d resources that can be consumed, and the resource consumption is specified
by numbers ci ∈ [0, 1] for each resource i. Thus, the world specifies the vector
(r; c1 , . . . , cd), which we call the outcome vector; this vector can depend on the
the chosen action a and the round. There is a known hard constraint Bi ∈ R+
on the consumption of each resource i; we call it a budget for resource i. The
algorithm stops at the earliest time τ when any budget constraint is violated; its
total reward is the sum of the rewards in all rounds strictly preceding τ. The
goal of the algorithm is to maximize the expected total reward.
We are only interested in regret at a specific time T (time horizon) which is
known to the algorithm. Formally, we model time as a specific resource with
budget T and a deterministic consumption of 1 for every action. W.l.o.g., Bi ≤ T
for every resource i.
For technical convenience, we assume there exists a null action: an action
with 0 reward and 0 consumption except for time. That is, an algorithm can
9
spend one round without doing anything.1
Stochastic assumptions. We assume that there exists an unknown distribution
D(x,~r, ~ci), called the outcome distribution, from which each round’s observations
are created independently and identically, where the vectors are indexed by in-
dividual actions. In particular, context x is drawn from the marginal distribution
DX(·), and the observed reward and resource consumptions for each action a are
drawn from the conditional distribution D(~ra, ~cia|x). For clarity, we assume that
the marginal distribution over contexts D(x) is known.
Policy sets and the benchmark. An algorithm is given a finite set Π of policies –
mappings from contexts to actions. Our benchmark is a hypothetical algorithm
that knows the outcome distribution D, and makes optimal decisions given this
knowledge. The benchmark is restricted to policies in Π: before each round, it
must commit to some policy pi ∈ Π, and then choose action pi(x) upon arrival
of any given context x. The expected total reward of the benchmark is denoted
OPT(Π). Regret of an algorithm is OPT(Π) minus the algorithm’s expected total
reward.
Uniform budgets. We say that the budgets are uniform if Bi = B for each re-
source i. Any problem instance can be reduced to one with uniform budgets by
dividing all consumption values for every resource i by Bi/B, where B = mini Bi.
(That is tantamount to changing the units in which we measure consumption of
resource i.) We assume uniform budgets B from here on.
Notation. Let r(pi) = E(x,~r)∼D[~rpi(x)] and ci(pi) = E(x,~ci)∼D[~cipi(x)] be the expected per-
1The null action is needed to ensure the existence of an “LP-perfect distribution” (defined in
Section 4.1.1).
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round reward and the expected per-round consumption of resource i for policy
pi. Similarly, define r(P) = Epi∼P[r(pi)] and ci(P) = Epi∼P[ci(pi)] as the natural exten-
sion to a distribution P over policies.
The tuple µ = ( (r(pi); c1(pi) , . . . , cd(pi)) : pi ∈ Π ) is called the expected-outcomes
tuple.
For a distribution P over policies, let P(pi) is the probability that P places over
policy pi. By a slight abuse of notation, let P(a|x) = ∑pi(x)=a P(pi) be the probabil-
ity that P places on action a given context x. Thus, each context x induces a
distribution P(·|x) over actions.
1.3.5 Dynamic procurement
In Chapter 5 we also consider a special case of BwK (specifically Dynamic pro-
curement) and its generalizations. In this model there are n agents, denoted N ,
each offering a service for which they associate a private cost ci ∈ R+. The buyer
has a public (known to the mechanism designer and maybe known to all agents)
budget B ∈ R+ and a public nondecreasing utility function f : 2N → R+ over the
subsets of agents. The sellers arrive one by one and are offered a take-it-or-
leave-it price. The seller sells the item iff the price offered is above the seller’s
cost, otherwise he/she leaves forever. We consider the following two special
cases.
1. The function f is a normalized monotone positive submodular function
and the function f and costs ci are adversarially chosen. Further the agents
appear in random order. A set function f is said to be normalized mono-
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tone positive submodular if it satisfies the following four properties.
(a) It is normalized if f (∅) = 0
(b) It is positive if for each set S ⊆ N it satisfies f (S ) ≥ 0.
(c) It is monotone if for each pair of sets S ⊆ T ⊆ N it satisfies f (S ) ≤
f (T ).
(d) It is submodular if for each pair of sets S ,T ⊆ N and for any element
e ∈ N with e < T it satisfies f (S ∪ {e}) − f (S ) ≥ f (T ∪ {e}) − f (T ).
In the rest of the thesis we will overload the notation and call any normal-
ized monotone positive submodular function as a submodular function.
We will also call this case as a submodular procurement market.
2. The function f is a symmetric submodular function and the costs ci are
drawn i.i.d from an unknown distribution. A set function f is said to be
symmetric submodular function if it is a submodular function and it sat-
isfies the following property.
• For any pair of sets S ,T ⊆ N with |S | = |T |we have f (S ) = f (T )
We will call this case as a symmetric submodular procurement market.
1.4 Related work
The work on sequential decision making with resource constraints is at the in-
tersection of many well studied problems and builds on a lot of existing work
which we discuss below.
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Multi-armed bandits. The stochastic multi-armed bandit problem was pro-
posed and studied by Thompson in [50]. Thompson also proposed a heuristic
algorithm known as Thompson’s sampling. The first series of works to give al-
gorithms for stochastic MAB with provable guarantees was initiated by [39, 4].
While [39] proposed the algorithm UCB to achieve the best asymptotic regret
guarantees, [4] further refined it to the algorithm UCB1 to achieve similar re-
gret guarantees for finite time bound. Subsequent work supplied algorithms
for stochastic MAB problems in which the set of arms can be infinite and the
payoff function is linear, concave, or Lipschitz-continuous; see a recent survey
[16] for more background. Confidence bound techniques have been an integral
part of this line of work, and they remain integral to ours.
Special cases of BwK and related models. Stochastic MAB problems constitute
a very special case of bandits with knapsacks, in which there is only one type
of resource and it is consumed deterministically at rate 1. Several papers have
considered the natural generalization in which there is a single resource, with
deterministic consumption, but different arms consume the resource at different
rates. Guha and Munagala [30] gave a constant-factor approximation algorithm
for the Bayesian case of this problem, which was later generalized by Gupta et
al. [31] to settings in which the arms’ reward processes need not be martingales.
Tran-Thanh et al. [51, 52, 53] presented prior-free algorithms for this problem;
the best such algorithm achieves a regret guarantee qualitatively similar to that
of the UCB1 algorithm.
As discussed above, several recent papers studied dynamic pricing with lim-
ited supply [13, 7, 14] and dynamic procurement on a budget [9, 47] which, in
hindsight, can be cast as special cases of BwK featuring a two-dimensional re-
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source constraint. We significantly improve over their results. Another recent
paper [18] considers a special case of adjusting a repeated auction (albeit with-
out inventory constraints).
Online primal dual. While BwK is primarily an online learning problem, it also
has elements of a stochastic packing problem. The literature on prior-free algo-
rithms for stochastic packing has flourished in recent years, starting with prior-
free algorithms for the stochastic AdWords problem [20], and continuing with a
series of papers extending these results from AdWords to more general stochas-
tic packing integer programs while also achieving stronger performance guar-
antees [2, 21, 26, 43]. A running theme of these papers (and also of the primal-
dual algorithm in this thesis) is the idea of estimating of an optimal dual vector
from samples, then using this dual to guide subsequent primal decisions. Par-
ticularly relevant to our work is the algorithm of [21], in which the dual vector
is adjusted using multiplicative updates, as we do in our algorithm. However,
unlike the BwK problem, the stochastic packing problems considered in prior
work are not learning problems: they are full information problems in which
the costs and rewards of decisions in the past and present are fully known.
(The only uncertainty is about the future.) As such, designing algorithms for
BwK requires a substantial departure from past work on stochastic packing. Our
primal-dual algorithm depends upon a hybrid of confidence-bound techniques
from online learning and primal-dual techniques from the literature on solv-
ing packing LPs; combining them requires entirely new techniques for bound-
ing the magnitude of the error terms that arise in the analysis. Moreover, our
Mixture Elimintation algorithm manages to achieve strong regret guarantees
without even computing a dual solution.
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Contextual bandits. Contextual bandits with arbitrary policy sets were intro-
duced and studied by Langford and Zhang [40]. The model is a reinterpretation
of the Experts setting studied by [5] along with the use of a new oracle to pro-
pose a new algorithm with improved running time. We build upon a follow up
work [23] and give an algorithm for Resourceful Contextual bandits (albeit with
running time which is not necessarily polynomial).
Secretary problems. One form of limitation for an algorithm is due to the online
arrival of the agents. The most general model to capture this is the adversarial
model, where an adversary chooses the arrival sequence of the agents and their
cost in a manner that yields the worst possible outcome for the mechanism. Al-
though in principle we would like mechanisms to be robust to such input, such
a strong assumption leaves little hope for making formal performance guaran-
tees. A popular alternative is the secretary model which assumes the values are
chosen adversarially, though the arrival order is chosen uniformly at random
from the set of all possible permutations of the agents. This is the model consid-
ered by [24] for choosing the element with the highest value from an online se-
quence, and has been widely used since then in various other problem domains
(see e.g. [8]). Another slightly stronger assumption is that each agent is indepen-
dently drawn from some unknown common distribution (see e.g. [38, 6, 13]).
Concurrent and independent work. Agrawal and Devanur [1] study a model
for contextual bandits with resource constraints that is incomparable with ours.
The dependence of expected rewards and resource consumptions on contexts
and arms is more restrictive, namely linear. Whereas the model for resource
constraints is more general, e.g., allowing diminishing returns. They also gen-
eralize our model of Bandits with Knapsacks to included concave rewards and
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convex constraints.
1.5 Our contributions
1.5.1 Bandits with Knapsacks
In analyzing MAB algorithms one typically expresses the regret as a function of
the time horizon, T . The regret guarantee is considered nontrivial if this func-
tion grows sublinearly as T → ∞. In the BwK problem a regret guarantee of the
form o(T ) may be unacceptably weak because supply limits prevent the opti-
mal policy from achieving a reward close to T . An illustrative example is the
dynamic pricing problem with supply k  T : the seller can only sell k items,
each at a price of at most 1, so bounding the regret by any number greater than
k is worthless.
We instead seek regret bounds that are sublinear in OPT, the expected re-
ward of the optimal policy, or (at least) sublinear in MLP, the maximal possible
value of OPT given the budget constraints. To achieve sublinear regret, the algo-
rithm must be able to explore each arm a significant number of times without
exhausting its resource budget. Accordingly we also assume, for some B ≥ 1,
that the amount of any resource consumed in a single round is guaranteed to be
no more than 1/B fraction of that resource’s budget, and we parameterize our
regret bound by B. We present an algorithm (called PD − BwK) whose regret is
sublinear in OPT as both OPT and B tend to infinity. More precisely, denoting the
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number of arms by m, our algorithm’s regret is
O˜
(√
m OPT + OPT
√
m/B
)
. (1.1)
In particular, if all budget constraints (including the time horizon) are scaled up
by the factor of α > 1, regret scales as
√
α. The algorithm is computationally effi-
cient, in a strong sense: the per-round running time is polynomial in the number
of arms and the number of resources. We also present another algorithm (called
Mixture Elimintation) whose regret bound is qualitatively similar; instead of
depending on OPT it depends on MLP. The two algorithms use quite different
techniques.
Algorithm PD − BwK is a primal-dual algorithm based on the multiplicative
weights update method. It maintains a vector of “resource costs” that is ad-
justed using multiplicative updates. In every period it estimates each arm’s
expected reward and expected resource consumption, using upper confidence
bounds for the former and lower confidence bounds for the latter; then it plays
the most “cost-effective” arm, namely the one with the highest ratio of esti-
mated resource consumption to estimated resource cost, using the current cost
vector. Although confidence bounds and multiplicative updates are the bread
and butter of online learning theory, we consider this way of combining the two
techniques to be quite novel. In particular, previous multiplicative-update algo-
rithms in online learning theory — such as the Exp3 algorithm for MAB [5] or
the weighted majority [41] and Hedge [28] algorithms for learning from expert
advice — applied multiplicative updates to the probabilities of choosing dif-
ferent arms (or experts). Our application of multiplicative updates to the dual
variables of the LP relaxation of BwK is conceptually quite a different usage of
this technique.
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Theorem 1.5.1. For any instance of the BwK problem, the regret of Algorithm PD − BwK
satisfies
OPT − REW ≤ O
( √
log(dmT )
) (√
m OPT + OPT
√
m
B
+ m
√
log(dmT )
)
. (1.2)
Algorithm Mixture Elimintation explicitly optimizes over mixtures of
arms, based on a very simple idea: balanced exploration inside confidence
bounds. The design principle underlying confidence-bound based algorithms
for stochastic MAB (including the famous UCB1 algorithm [4] and our algorithm
PD − BwK) is generally, “Exploit as much as possible, but use confidence bounds
that are wide enough to encourage some exploration.” Our algorithm’s design
principle, in contrast, could be summarized as, “Explore as much as possible,
but use confidence bounds that are narrow enough to eliminate obviously sub-
optimal alternatives.” In fact, Mixture Elimintation balances its exploration
across arms, so that (essentially) each arm is explored as much as possible. More
precisely, for each arm, there are designated rounds when, once the obviously
suboptimal mixtures of arms are eliminated, the algorithm picks a mixture that
approximately maximizes the probability of choosing this arm. Intriguingly, the
algorithm matches the logarithmic regret bound of UCB1 for stochastic MAB
(up to constant factors) and achieves qualitatively similar bounds to PD − BwK
for BwK, despite being based on a design principle that is the polar opposite of
those algorithms. We believe that the “balanced exploration” principle under-
lying Mixture Elimintation is a novel and important conceptual contribution
to the theory of MAB algorithms that is likely to find other applications.
Theorem 1.5.2 (BwK: Mixture Elimintation). Consider an instance of BwK with d
resources, m = |X| arms, and the smallest budget B = mini Bi. Let MLP be the maximum
of OPTLP, for given time horizon and budgets, over all problem instances in a given BwK
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domain. Algorithm Mixture Elimintation achieves total expected regret
OPT − REW ≤ O(log(dmT ) log(T/m))
√dm MLP + MLP 
√
dm
B
+
dm
B
 + dm . (1.3)
Further, we provide a matching lower bound: we prove that regret (1.1) is
optimal up to polylog factors. Specifically, we show that any algorithm for BwK
must incur regret
Ω
(
min
(
OPT, OPT
√
m/B +
√
m OPT
))
, (1.4)
in the worst-case over all instances of BwK with given (m, B, OPT). We derive this
lower bound using a simple example in which all arms have reward 1 and 0-1
consumption of a single resource, and one arm has slightly smaller expected
resource consumption than the rest. To analyze this example, we apply the KL-
divergence technique from the MAB lower bound in [5]. Some technical diffi-
culties arise (compared to the derivation in [5]) because the arms are different in
terms of the expected consumption rather than expected reward, and because
we need to match the desired value for OPT.
Theorem 1.5.3. Informally, any algorithm for BwK must incur regret
Ω
(
min
(
OPT, OPT
√
m
B
+
√
m OPT
))
, (1.5)
where m = |X| is the number of arms and B = mini Bi is the smallest budget.
More precisely, fix any m ≥ 2, d ≥ 1, OPT ≥ m, and (B1 , . . . , Bd) ∈ [2,∞). Let F be
the family of all BwK problem instances with m arms, d resources, budgets (B1 , . . . , Bd)
and optimal reward OPT. Then any algorithm for BwK must incur regret (3.29) in the
worst case over F .
Applications and special cases. Due to its generality, the BwK problem admits
applications in diverse domains such as dynamic pricing, dynamic procure-
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ment, ad allocation, repeated auctions, network routing, and scheduling. These
applications are discussed in Section 3.7; below we provide some highlights.
The BwK setting subsumes dynamic pricing with limited supply, as studied
in [15, 35, 13, 7, 14].2 Specializing our regret bounds to this setting, we obtain the
optimal regret O˜(k2/3) with respect to the optimal policy, where k is the number
of items. The prior work [7] achieved the same regret bound with respect to the
best fixed price, which is a much weaker benchmark, and proved a matching
lower bound. Further, our setting allows to incorporate a number of generaliza-
tions such as selling multiple products (with a limited supply of each), volume
pricing, pricing bundles of goods, and profiling of buyers according to their
types. In particular, we improve over the result in [14] for multiple products.
A “dual” problem to dynamic pricing is dynamic procurement [9, 47], where
the algorithm is “dynamically buying” rather than “dynamically selling”. (The
budget constraint now applies to the amount spent rather than the quantity of
items sold, which is why the problems are not merely identical up to sign re-
versal.) This problem is particularly relevant to the emerging domain of crowd-
sourcing: the items “bought” then correspond to microtasks ordered on a crowd-
sourcing platform such as Amazon Turk. We obtain significant improvements
for the basic version of dynamic procurement studied in [9, 47]. In particular, [9]
achieves a constant-factor approximation to the optimum with a prohibitively
large constant (at least in the tens of thousands), whereas our approximation
factor 1 + O˜((T/OPT)B−1/4) is typically much smaller. The regret bound in [47] is
against the best-fixed-price benchmark, which may be much smaller than OPT
2The Bayesian version of this problem has a rich literature in Operations Research, see [13]
for an overview. The earlier papers [15, 35] on the regret-minimizing version focus on the special
case of unlimited supply.
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(see Section 3.9).3 Furthermore, the generality of BwK allows to incorporate gen-
eralizations such as multiple types of items/microtasks, and the presence of
other, competing algorithms.
Further, BwK applies to the problem of dynamic ad allocation, in the con-
text of pay-per-click advertising with unknown click probabilities. It allows to
extend a standard (albeit idealized) model of ad allocation to incorporate ad-
vertisers’ budgets. In fact, BwK allows advertisers to specify multiple budget
constraints on possibly overlapping subsets of ads.
Discussion. If the BwK instance includes multiple, different budget constraints,
our regret bounds are with respect to the smallest of these constraints. This,
however, is inevitable for the worst-case regret bounds.
Algorithm Mixture Elimintation is domain-aware, in the sense that it ex-
plicitly optimizes over all latent distributions that are feasible for a given BwK
domain (such as dynamic pricing with limited supply). We do not provide a
computationally efficient implementation for this optimization. In fact, it is not
clear what model of computation would be appropriate to characterize access
to the domain knowledge. Efficient implementation of Mixture Elimintation
may be possible for some specific BwK domains, although we do not pursue
that direction in this thesis. (Recall that PD − BwK, on the other hand, is very
computationally efficient.)
It is worth noting that our regret bounds for PD − BwK are stronger than that
of Mixture Elimintation. But, we are able to generalize the second algorithm
3The paper [47] is simultaneous with respect to our paper. One cannot directly compare our
regret bound and theirs (benchmarks aside), because [47] does not derive a worst-case regret
bound.
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to more general settings in the next model we study.
1.5.2 Resourceful contextual bandits
We note that the model of RCB is a generalization of BwK. Hence,
any algorithm we develop form RCB should be also applicable for BwK.
We generalize the algorithm Mixture Elimintation for BwK to algorithm
Contexutal Mixture Elimination for RCB.
The algorithm at a very high level can be described as follows. At each step
we maintain a estimates along with confidence bounds similar to other algo-
rithms based on confidence bounds. We avoid/eliminate obviously sub-optimal
strategies subject to confidence bounds. Subject to the previous constraint we
pick strategies which explores as much as possible. We make the algorithm
Contexutal Mixture Elimination formal in chapter 4.
Theorem 1.5.4. For all RCB problems with K actions, d resources, time horizon T , and
for all policy sets Π. Algorithm Contexutal Mixture Elimination achieves regret
O
(
1 + 1B OPT(Π)
) √
dKT log (dKT |Π|),
where B = mini Bi is the smallest resource constraint.
There are several interesting aspects to the regret bound of theorem 1.5.4
which we note here.
• The regret bounds is not dependent on the size of the context space. This
allows us to consider very high dimensional context spaces. Such a prop-
erty is very useful because it can model problems where we need to track
cookie information of users in a browser with several variables.
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• The regret bound is only logarithmically dependent on the number of poli-
cies. One can think of these policies as the setting of parameters in a ma-
chine learning model and we can throw in a lot of these models because
of the logarithmic dependence.
• Unlike Mixture Elimintation the regret bound for Contexutal Mixture
Elimination depends on T . This is not very desirable because when B <
√
kT we get no non-trivial regret guarantees. Unfortunately, we show in
theorem 1.5.5 that such a dependence is in fact necessary.
Theorem 1.5.5. No algorithm for RCB can achieve regret o(OPT(Π)) for all problem
instances such that OPT(Π) ≤ B ≤ √KT/2 (using the notation from Theorem 1.5.4).
1.5.3 Dynamic procurement
While our models for BwK and RCB are very general and capture many settings,
they have two drawbacks. One is the fact that they consider the rewards which
add up over rounds and another is that they only achieve an additive regret
guarantee. For the special case of dynamic procurement we are able to over-
come these and achieve the desired results.
Our first result is for the special case of symmetric submodular procurement
market. For this purpose we introduce a novel random walk based algorithm
which achieves a constant factor approximation.
Theorem 1.5.6. For symmetric submodular procurement market where the agents ar-
rive from an unknown distribution the mechanism RAND WALK outputs a solution with
an expected utility which is a constant factor approximation to the expected optimal
solutions which knows the true values of agents in advance.
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Our second result is to get a more general result when the buyer has a gen-
eral submodular function. We propose an algorithm which uses binning and
guessing to get a O(log n) approximation for this problem.
Theorem 1.5.7. For submodular procurement market where the agents arrive in a
random order the mechanism GUESS POST outputs a solution with an expected util-
ity which is a O(log n) factor approximation to the expected optimal solutions which
knows the true values of agents in advance.
1.6 Outline of this thesis
The thesis is divided into three main chapters. In chapter 2 we give the neces-
sary preliminaries. In chapter 3 we introduce the model of Bandits with Knap-
sacks and give tight upper and lower bounds. In chapter 4 we introduce re-
source constrained contextual bandits. In chapter 5 we study the special case of
dynamic procurement and give multiplicative approximations to this problem.
1.7 Bibliogrpahic Notes
The results of this thesis appeared in the following papers: Badanidiyuru,
Kleinberg and Slivkins [10](FOCS 2013), Badanidiyuru, Langford and Slivkins
[12](COLT 2014) and Badanidiyuru, Kleinberg and Singer [9](EC 2012). The re-
sults in chapter 3 are from [10], in chapter 4 are from [12] and in chapter 5 are
from [9].
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND MATERIAL
In this chapter we will cover some of the background material which will be
useful for us.
2.1 Analysis of the Hedge Algorithm
In this section we analyze the Hedge algorithm, also known as the multiplicative
weights algorithm. It is an online algorithm for maintaining a d-dimensional
probability vector y while observing a sequence of d-dimensional payoff vectors
pi1, . . . , piτ. The algorithm is initialized with a parameter  ∈ (0, 1).
Algorithm 1: The algorithm Hedge()
1: v1 = 1
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , τ do
3: yt = vt/(1ᵀvt).
4: vt+1 = Diag{(1 + )piti}vt.
The performance guarantee of the algorithm is expressed by the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.1.1. For any 0 <  < 1 and any sequence of payoff vectors pi1, . . . , piτ ∈
[0, 1]d, we have
∀y ∈ ∆[d]
τ∑
t=1
yᵀt pit ≥ (1 − )
τ∑
t=1
yᵀpit − ln d

.
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Proof. The analysis uses the potential function Φt = 1ᵀvt. We have
Φt+1 = 1ᵀDiag{(1 + )piti}vt
=
d∑
i=1
(1 + )pitivti
≤
d∑
i=1
(1 + piti)vti
= Φt
(
1 + yᵀt pit
)
ln(Φt+1) ≤ ln(Φt) + ln(1 + yᵀt pit) ≤ ln(Φt) + yᵀt pit.
On the third line, we have used the inequality (1+ )x ≤ 1+ x which is valid for
0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Now, summing over t = 1, . . . , τ we obtain
τ∑
t=1
yᵀt pit ≥ 1 (lnΦτ+1 − lnΦ1) = 1 lnΦτ+1 −
ln d

.
The maximum of yᵀ
(∑τ
t=1 pit
)
over y ∈ ∆[d] must be attained at one of the extreme
points of ∆[d], which are simply the standard basis vectors of Rd. Say that the
maximum is attained at ei. Then we have
Φτ+1 = 1ᵀvτ+1 ≥ vτ+1,i = (1 + )pi1i+···+piτi
lnΦτ+1 ≥ ln(1 + )
τ∑
t=1
piti
τ∑
t=1
yᵀt pit ≥
ln(1 + )

τ∑
t=1
piti − ln d

≥ (1 − )
τ∑
t=1
yᵀpit − ln d

.
The last line follows from two observations. First, our choice of i ensures that∑τ
t=1 piti ≥
∑τ
t=1 y
ᵀpit for every y ∈ ∆[d]. Second, the inequality ln(1 + ) >  − 2
holds for every  > 0. In fact,
− ln(1 + ) = ln
(
1
1 + 
)
= ln
(
1 − 
1 + 
)
< − 
1 + 
ln(1 + ) >

1 + 
>
(1 − 2)
1 + 
=  − 2.
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2.2 High probability events
All of our models are based on stochastic assumptions. Under these assump-
tions any repeated event has good concentration properties and we can take
advantage of this. We state here the specific lemmas which we will using in our
results.
We will first state three lemma in increasing order or generality to deal with
independent random variables. These are standard inequalities and can be
found in [22]. Then we will state a lemma to handle dependent random vari-
ables.
Lemma 2.2.1 (Markov’s inequality). Let X be a random varibale which takes values
in [0,∞] and has expectation µ. Then, for any w > 0
Pr
[
X ≥ w µ
]
≤ 1
w
Lemma 2.2.2 (Chebyshev’s inequality). Let X be a random varibale which takes val-
ues in [0,∞] and has expectation µ and variance σ2. Then, for any w > 0
Pr
[
|X − µ| ≥ w σ
]
≤ 1
w2
Lemma 2.2.3 (Chernoff Bound). Let X1, . . . , X` be independent random variables
where Xi take values in [0,wi] and let µ = E[
∑`
i=1 Xi]. Then, for any δ > 0 we have
that:
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Pr
[ ∑`
i=1
Xi ≥ (1 + δ)µ
]
≤ ( eδ(1+δ)(1+δ) )
µ
maxiwi (2.1)
Pr
[ ∑`
i=1
Xi ≤ (1 − δ)µ
]
≤ e −δ
2µ
2·maxiwi (2.2)
The next concentration bound is to handle dependent events. This is Bern-
stein’s inequality for martingales [27], via the following formulation from [17]:
Lemma 2.2.4. LetG1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Gn be a filtration, and X1, . . . , Xn be real random variables
such that Xt is Gt-measurable, E(Xt|Gt−1) = 0 and |Xt| ≤ b for some b > 0. Let Vn =∑n
t=1 E(X
2
t |Gt−1). Then with probability at least 1 − δ it holds that
∑n
t=1 Xt ≤
√
4Vn log(nδ−1) + 5b2 log2(nδ−1).
2.3 Kullback-Leibler Divergence
The proof of Lemma 3.6.5 relies on the concept of KL-divergence. Let us provide
some background to make on KL-divergence which will be used in chapter 3 to
prove lowerbound. We use a somewhat non-standard notation that is tailored
to the needs of our analysis.
The KL-divergence (a.k.a. relative entropy) is defined as follows. Consider two
distributions µ, ν on the same finite universe Ω. Assume µ  ν (in words, µ is
absolutely continuous with respect to ν), meaning that ν(w) = 0 ⇒ µ(w) = 0 for all
w ∈ Ω. Then KL-divergence of µ given ν is
KL(µ ‖ ν) , E
w∼(Ω, µ)
log
(
µ(w)
ν(w)
)
=
∑
w∈Ω
log
(
µ(w)
ν(w)
)
µ(w).
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In this formula we adopt a convention that 00 = 1. We will use the fact that
KL(µ ‖ ν) ≥ 12 ‖µ − ν‖21. (2.3)
Henceforth, let µ, ν be distributions on the universe Ω∞, where Ω is a fi-
nite set. For ~w = (w1,w2, . . .) ∈ Ω∞ and t ∈ N, let us use the notation
~wt = (w1 , . . . ,wt) ∈ Ωt. Let µt be a restriction of µ to Ωt: that is, a distribution on
Ωt given by
µt(~wt) , µ
({~u ∈ Ω∞ : ~ut = ~wt}) .
The next-round conditional distribution of µ given ~wt, t < T is defined by
µ
(
wt+1 | ~wt) , µt+1(~wt+1)
µt(~wt)
.
Note that µ(· |~wt) is a distribution on Ω for every fixed ~wt.
The conditional KL-divergence at round t + 1 is defined as
KLt+1(µ ‖ ν) , E
~wt∼(Ωt , µt)
KL(µ(· |~wt) ‖ ν(· |~wt)).
In words, this is the KL-divergence between the next-round conditional distri-
butions µ(· |~wt) and ν(· |~wt), in expectation over the random choice of ~wt according
to distribution µt.
We will use the following fact, known as the chain rule for KL-divergence:
KL(µT ‖ νT ) =
T∑
t=1
KLt(µ ‖ ν), for each T ∈ N. (2.4)
Here for notational convenience we define KL1(µ ‖ ν) , KL(µ1 ‖ ν1).
2.4 Useful lemmas
We will prove useful facts which will be used in the later sections.
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Fact 2.4.1. Let S t be the sum of t i.i.d. 0-1 variables with expectation q. Let τ be the
first time this sum reaches a given number B ∈ N. Then E[τ] = B/q. Moreover, for each
T > E[τ] it holds that
∑
t>T Pr[τ ≥ t] ≤ E[τ]2/T. (2.5)
Proof. E[τ] = B/q follows from the martingale argument presented in the proof
of Claim 3.6.3. Formally, take q = p −  and Nτ = τ.
Assume T > E[τ]. The proof of Equation (2.5) uses two properties, one being
that a geometric random variable is memoryless and other being Markov’s in-
equality. Let us first bound the random variable τ − T conditional on the event
that τ > T .
E[τ − T |τ > T ] = ∑Bt=1 Pr[S T = t] E[τ − T |τ > T, S T = t]
=
∑B
t=1 Pr[S T = t] E[τ − T |S T = t]
≤ ∑Bt=1 Pr[S T = t] E[τ − T |S T = 0]
≤ E[τ − T |S T = 0] = E[τ].
By Markov’s inequality we have Pr[τ ≥ T ] ≤ E[τ]T . Combining the two in-
equalities, we have
∑
t>T Pr[τ ≥ t] = ∑t>T Pr[τ ≥ T ] Pr[τ ≥ t|τ > T ]
= Pr[τ ≥ T ] E[τ − T |τ > T ]
≤ E[τ]2/T. 
Fact 2.4.2. Assume p ≤ 12 and p ≤ 12 . Then
p log
(
p
p − 
)
+ (1 − p) log
(
1 − p
1 − p + 
)
≤ 2
2
p
.
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Proof. To prove the inequality we use the following standard inequalities:
log(1 + x) ≥ x − x2/2 ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
log(1 − x) ≥ −x − x2 ∀x ∈ [0, 12 ].
It follows that:
p log
(
p
p − 
)
+ (1 − p) log
(
1 − p
1 − p + 
)
= −p log
(
1 − 
p
)
− (1 − p) log
(
1 +

1 − p
)
≤ p
(

p
+
2
p2
)
+ (1 − p)
(
− 
1 − p +
2
(1 − p)2
)
=
2
p
+
2
1 − p ≤
22
p

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CHAPTER 3
BANDITS WITH KNAPSACKS
In this chapter we consider the BwK problem. We propose a pair of
algorithms for solving the problem: a “balanced exploration” algorithm
(Mixture Elimintation) that prioritizes information acquisition, exploring
each arm as frequently as possible given current confidence intervals, and a
primal-dual algorithm (PD − BwK) that chooses arms to greedily maximize the
estimated reward per unit of resource cost. We further show that the perfor-
mance guarantees of both the algorithms are near optimal. While PD − BwK has
a better regret guarantee with respect to certain parameters and has a polyno-
mial running time, we will show in the chapter 4 that Mixture Elimintation is
generalizable to the contextual setting.
In section 3.1 we introduce the tools needed for our result. Then in section 3.2
we will give the first algorithm PD − BwK and then present its analysis in sec-
tion 3.3. In section 3.4 we will give the second algorithm Mixture Elimintation
and present its analysis in section 3.5. We complement the algorithms by show-
ing a nearly tight lowerbound in section 3.6. We end the section with showing
how the applications fit formally in the model in section 3.7.
3.1 Tools
In the classic stochastic multi-armed bandit problem without resources the
benchmark is the maximum total expected reward of any fixed arm. But as
we will show examples in section 3.9 this is not the case with BwK. So in order to
get a handle on the OPT we will need tools that we introduce in this section.
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3.1.1 LP-relaxation
The expected reward of the optimal policy, given foreknowledge of the distri-
bution of outcome vectors, is typically difficult to characterize exactly. In fact,
even for a time-invariant policy, it is difficult to give an exact expression for the
expected reward due to the dependence of the reward on the random stopping
time, τ, when the resource budget is exhausted. To approximate these quan-
tities, we consider the fractional relaxation of BwK in which the stopping time
(i.e., the total number of rounds) can be fractional, and the reward and resource
consumption per unit time are deterministically equal to the corresponding ex-
pected values in the original instance of BwK.
The following LP (shown here along with its dual) constitutes our fractional
relaxation of the optimal policy. We denote by OPTLP the value of the linear
max rᵀξ
s.t. Cξ  B1
ξ  0
(P)
min B1ᵀη
s.t. Cᵀη  r
η  0
(D)
program (P).
Lemma 3.1.1. OPTLP is an upper bound on the value of the optimal dynamic policy.
Proof. One way to prove the lemma is to define ξ j to be the expected number
of times arm a j is played by the optimal dynamic policy, and argue that ξ is
primal-feasible and that rᵀξ is the expected reward of the optimal policy. We
instead present a simple proof using the dual LP (D), since it introduces ideas
that motivate the design of our primal-dual algorithm.
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Let η∗ denote an optimal solution to (D). By strong duality, B1ᵀη∗ = OPTLP.
Interpret η∗i as a unit cost for resource i. Dual feasibility implies that for each
arm a j, the expected cost of resources consumed when a j is pulled exceeds the
expected reward produced. Thus, if we let Zt denote the sum of rewards gained
in rounds 1, . . . , t plus the cost of the remaining resource endowment after round
t, then the stochastic process Z0,Z1, . . . ,ZT is a supermartingale. Note that Z0 =
B1ᵀη∗ is the LP optimum, and Zτ−1 equals the algorithm’s total payoff, plus the
cost of the remaining (non-negative) resource supply at the start of round τ. By
Doob’s optional stopping theorem, Z0 ≥ E[Zτ−1] and the lemma is proved. 
In a similar way, the expected total reward of time-invariant policy D is
bounded above by the solution to the following linear program in which t is
the only LP variable:
Maximise t r(D, µ) in t ∈ R
subject to t ci(D, µ) ≤ B for each resource i
t ≥ 0.
(3.1)
The solution to (3.1), which we call the LP-value, is
LP(D, µ) = r(D, µ) min
i
(
B
ci(D, µ)
)
. (3.2)
Observe that t is feasible for LP(D, µ) if and only if ξ = tD is feasible for (P), and
therefore
OPTLP = sup
D
LP(D, µ).
A distribution D∗ ∈ argmaxD LP(D, µ) is called LP-optimal for latent structure µ.
Any optimal solution ξ to (P) corresponds to an LP-optimal distribution D∗ =
ξ/ ‖ξ‖1.
Claim 3.1.2. For any latent structure µ, there exists a distributionD over arms which
is LP-optimal for µ and moreover satisfies the following three properties:
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(a) ci(D, µ) ≤ B/T for each resource i.
(b) D has a support of size at most d + 1.
(c) IfD has a support of size at least 2 then for some resource i we have ci(D, µ) =
B/T .
(Such distributionD will be called LP-perfect for µ.)
Proof. Fix the latent structure µ. It is a well-known fact that for any linear pro-
gram there exists an optimal solution whose support has size that is exactly
equal to the number of constraints that are tight for this solution. Take any
such optimal solution ξ for linear program (P), and take the corresponding LP-
optimal distributionD = ξ/‖ξ‖1. Since there are d + 1 constraints in (P), distribu-
tionD has support of size at most d + 1. If it satisfies property (a), we are done.
Note that suchD also satisfies property (c).
Suppose property (a) does not hold forD. Then there exists a resource i such
that ci(D, µ) > B/T . It follows that ∑i ξi < T . Therefore, at most d constraints in
(P) are tight for ξ, which implies that the support ofD has size at most d.
Now, let us modify D to obtain another LP-optimal distribution D′ which
satisfies both (a) and (b-c). Namely, let D′(a) = αD(a) for each non-null arm a,
for some α ∈ (0, 1) that is sufficiently low to ensure property (a) (with equality
for some resource i), and place the remaining probability inD′ on the null arm.
Then LP(D′, µ) = LP(D, µ), so D′ is LP-optimal; D′ satisfies properties (a,c) by
design, and it satisfies property (b) because it adds at most one to the support
ofD. 
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3.1.2 High-probability events
We will use the following expression, which we call the confidence radius.
rad(ν,N) =
√
Crad ν
N
+
Crad
N
. (3.3)
Here Crad = Θ(log(d T |A|)) is a parameter which we will fix later; we will keep it
implicit in the notation. The meaning of Equation (3.3) and Crad is explained by
the following tail inequality from [36, 7].1
Theorem 3.1.3 ([36, 7]). Consider some distribution with values in [0, 1] and expecta-
tion ν. Let ν̂ be the average of N independent samples from this distribution. Then
Pr
[ |ν − ν̂| ≤ rad(̂ν,N) ≤ 3 rad(ν,N) ] ≥ 1 − e−Ω(Crad), for each Crad > 0. (3.4)
More generally, Equation (3.4) holds if X1, . . . , XN ∈ [0, 1] are random variables, ν̂ =
1
N
∑N
t=1 Xt is the sample average, and ν =
1
N
∑N
t=1 E[Xt | X1, . . . , Xt−1].
If the expectation ν is a latent quantity, Equation (3.4) allows us to estimate ν
by a high-confidence interval
ν ∈ [̂ν − rad(̂ν,N), ν̂ + rad(̂ν,N)], (3.5)
whose endpoints are observable (known to the algorithm). For small ν, such es-
timate is much sharper than the one provided by Azuma-Hoeffding inequality.2
Our algorithm uses several estimates of this form. For brevity, we say that ν̂ is
an N-strong estimate of ν if ν, ν̂ satisfy Equation (3.5).
It is sometimes useful to argue about any ν which lies in the high-confidence
interval (3.5), not just the latent ν = E[̂ν]. We use the following claim which is
implicit in [36].
1Specifically, this follows from Lemma 4.9 in the full version of [36] (on arxiv.org), and The-
orem 4.8 and Theorem 4.10 in the full version of [7] (on arxiv.org).
2Essentially, Azuma-Hoeffding inequality states that |ν − ν̂| ≤ O(√Crad/N), whereas by Theo-
rem 3.1.3 for small ν it holds with high probability that rad(̂ν,N) ∼ Crad/N.
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Claim 3.1.4 ([36]). For any ν, ν̂ ∈ [0, 1], Equation (3.5) implies that rad(̂ν,N) ≤
3 rad(ν,N).
3.2 Algorithm: PD − BwK
This section develops an algorithm that solves the BwK problem using a very nat-
ural and intuitive idea: greedily select arms with the greatest estimated “bang
per buck,” i.e. reward per unit of resource consumption. One of the main dif-
ficulties with this idea is that there is no such thing as a “unit of resource con-
sumption”: there are d different resources, and it is unclear how to trade off
consumption of one resource versus another. The proof of Lemma 3.1.1 gives
some insight into how to quantify this trade-off: an optimal dual solution η∗ can
be interpreted as a vector of unit costs for resources, such that for every arm
the expected reward is less than or equal to the expected cost of resources con-
sumed. Since our goal is to match the optimum value of the LP as closely as
possible, we must minimize the shortfall between the expected reward of the
arms we pull and their expected resource cost as measured by η∗. Thus, our al-
gorithm will try to learn an optimal dual vector η∗ in tandem with learning the
latent structure µ.
Borrowing an idea from [3, 29, 46], we will use the multiplicatives weights
update method to learn the optimal dual vector. This method raises the cost of a
resource exponentially as it is consumed, which ensures that heavily demanded
resources become costly, and thereby promotes balanced resource consumption.
Meanwhile, we still have to ensure (as in any multi-armed bandit problem) that
our algorithm explores the different arms frequently enough to gain adequately
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accurate estimates of the latent structure. We do this by estimating rewards
and resource consumption as optimistically as possible, i.e. using upper confi-
dence bound (UCB) estimates for rewards and lower confidence bound (LCB)
estimates for resource consumption. Although both of these techniques — mul-
tiplicative weights and confidence bounds — have both successfully applied in
previous online learning algorithms, it is far from obvious that this particular
hybrid of the two methods should be effective. In particular, the use of multi-
plicative updates on dual variables, rather than primal ones, distinguishes our
algorithm from other bandit algorithms that use multiplicative weights (e.g. the
Exp3 algorithm [5]) and brings it closer in spirit to the literature on stochastic
packing algorithms (especially [21]).
The pseudocode for the algorithm is presented as Algorithm 2, which we call
PD − BwK. When we refer to the UCB or LCB for a latent parameter (the reward of
an arm, or the amount of some resource that it utilizes), these are computed as
follows. Letting νˆ denote the empirical average of the observations of that ran-
dom variable3 and letting N denote the number of times the random variable
has been observed, the lower confidence bound (LCB) and upper confidence
bound (UCB) are the left and right endpoints, respectively, of the confidence in-
terval [0, 1]∩ [νˆ−rad(νˆ,N), νˆ+rad(νˆ,N)]. The UCB or LCB for a vector or matrix
are defined component-wise.
In step 8, the pseudocode asserts that the set argminz∈∆[A]{ y
ᵀ
t Ltz
uᵀt z
} contains at
least one of the point-mass distributions {e1, . . . , em}. This is true, because if
ρ = minz∈∆[A]{(yᵀt Ltz)/(uᵀt z)} then the linear inequality yᵀt Ltz ≤ ρuᵀt D holds at some
point z ∈ ∆[A], and hence it holds at some extreme point, i.e. one of the point-
3Note that we initialize the algorithm by pulling each arm once, so empirical averages are
always well-defined.
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mass distributions.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm PD − BwK
1: Set  =
√
ln(d)/B.
2: In the first m rounds, pull each arm once.
3: v1 = 1
4: for t = m + 1, . . . , τ (i.e., until resource budget exhausted) do
5: Compute UCB estimate for reward vector, ut.
6: Compute LCB estimate for resource consumption matrix, Lt.
7: yt = vt/(1ᵀvt).
8: Pull arm a j from distribution zt which minimizes
yᵀt Ltz
uᵀt z
.
(Note that zt = e j is point mass.)
9: vt+1 = Diag{(1 + )e
ᵀ
j Ltzt}vt.
Another feature of our algorithm that deserves mention is a variant of the
Garg-Ko¨nemann width reduction technique [29]. The ratio (yᵀt Ltzt)/(u
ᵀ
t zt) that
we optimize in step 8 may be unboundedly large, so in the multiplicative up-
date in step 9 we rescale this value to yᵀt Ltzt, which is guaranteed to be at most 1.
This rescaling is mirrored in the analysis of the algorithm, when we define the
dual vector y¯ by averaging the vectors yt using the aforementioned scale factors.
(Interestingly, unlike the Garg-Ko¨nemann algorithm which applies multiplica-
tive updates to the dual vectors and weighted averaging to the primal ones,
in our algorithm the multiplicative updates and weighted averaging are both
applied to the dual vectors.)
The following theorem expresses the regret guarantee for PD − BwK. The proof is
in Section 3.3.
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Theorem 3.2.1. For any instance of the BwK problem, the regret of Algorithm PD − BwK
satisfies
OPT − REW ≤ O
( √
log(dmT )
) (√
m OPT + OPT
√
m
B
+ m
√
log(dmT )
)
. (3.6)
Comparing this bound to Theorem 3.4.1, when d = O(1) and MLP = O(OPT) the
two guarantees are the same up to logarithmic factors. The regret guarantee for
the primal-dual algorithm scales better with the number of resources, d, and it
can be vastly superior in cases where OPT  MLP.
3.3 Analysis of PD − BwK
In this section we present the analysis of the PD − BwK algorithm. We begin by
recalling the Hedge algorithm from online learning theory, and its performance
guarantee. Next, we present a simplified analysis of PD − BwK in a toy model in
which the outcome vectors are deterministic. (This toy model of the BwK prob-
lem is uninteresting as a learning problem since the latent structure does not
need to be learned, and the problem reduces to solving a linear program. We
analyze PD − BwK first in this context because the analysis is simple, yet its main
ideas carry over to the general case which is more complicated.)
3.3.1 Warm-up: The deterministic case
To present the application of Hedge to BwK in its purest form, we first present an
algorithm for the case in which the rewards of the various arms are determinis-
tically equal to the components of a vector r ∈ Rm, and the resource consumption
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vectors are deterministically equal to the columns of a matrix C ∈ Rd×m.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm PD − BwK, adapted for deterministic outcomes
1: In the first m rounds, pull each arm once.
2: Let r, C denote the reward vector and resource consumption matrix revealed
in Step 1.
3: v1 = 1
4: t = 1
5: for t = m + 1, . . . , τ (i.e., until resource budget exhausted) do
6: yt = vt/(1ᵀvt).
7: Pull arm a j from distribution zt which minimizes
yᵀt Cz
rᵀz .
(Note that zt = e j is point mass.)
8: vt+1 = Diag{(1 + )e
ᵀ
jCzt}vt.
9: t = t + 1.
This algorithm is an instance of the multiplicative-weights update method
for solving packing linear programs. Interpreting it through the lens of online
learning, as in the survey [3], it is updating a vector y using the Hedge algo-
rithm. The payoff vector in round t is given by Cat. Note that these payoffs
belong to [0, 1], by our assumption that C has [0, 1] entries.
Now let ξ∗ denote an optimal solution of the primal linear program (P) from
Section 3.1.1, and let OPTLP = rᵀξ∗ denote the optimal value of that LP. Let REW =∑τ−1
t=m+1 r
ᵀzt denote the total payoff obtained by the algorithm after its start-up
phase (the first m rounds). By the stopping condition for the algorithm, we
know there is a vector y ∈ ∆[R] such that yᵀC (∑τt=1 zt) ≥ B so fix one such y. Note
that the algorithm’s start-up phase consumes at most m units of any resource,
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and the final round τ consumes at most one unit more, so
yᵀC
 ∑
m<t<τ
zt
 ≥ B − m − 1. (3.7)
Finally let
y¯ =
1
REW
∑
m<t<τ
(rᵀzt)yt.
Now we have
B ≥ y¯ᵀCξ∗ = 1
REW
∑
m<t<τ
(rᵀzt)(y
ᵀ
t Cξ
∗)
≥ 1
REW
∑
m<t<τ
(rᵀξ∗)(yᵀt Czt)
≥ OPTLP
REW
(1 − ) ∑
m<t<τ
yᵀCzt − ln d


≥ OPTLP
REW
[
B − B − m − 1 − ln d

]
.
The first inequality is by primal feasibility of ξ∗, the second is by the definition
of zt, the third is the performance guarantee of Hedge, the fourth is by (3.7).
Putting these inequalities together we have derived
REW
OPTLP
≥ 1 −  − m + 1
B
− ln d
B
.
Setting  =
√
ln d
B we find that the algorithm’s regret is bounded above by OPTLP ·
O
(√
ln d
B +
m
B
)
.
3.3.2 Analysis modulo error terms
We now commence the analysis of Algorithm PD − BwK. In this section we show
how to reduce the problem of bounding the algorithm’s regret to a problem of
estimating two error terms that reflect the difference between the algorithm’s
confidence-bound estimates of its own reward and resource consumption with
42
the empirical values of these random variables. The analysis of those error terms
will be the subject of Section 3.3.3.
By Theorem 3.1.3 and our choice of Crad, it holds with probability at least
1 − T−1 that the confidence interval for every latent parameter, in every round
of execution, contains the true value of that latent parameter. We call this high-
probability event a clean execution of PD − BwK. Our regret guarantee will hold
deterministically assuming that a clean execution takes place. The regret can be
at most T when a clean execution does not take place, and since this event has
probability at most T−1 it contributes only O(1) to the regret. We will henceforth
assume a clean execution of PD − BwK.
Claim 3.3.1. In a clean execution of Algorithm PD − BwK, the algorithm’s total reward
satisfies the bound
REW ≥ OPTLP −
2OPTLP 
√
ln d
B
+
m + 1
B
 + m + 1 − OPTLPB
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ∑m<t<τ Etzt
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∞ −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑m<t<τ δᵀt zt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
(3.8)
where Et and δt are defined by
Et = Ct − Lt, δt = ut − rt. (3.9)
Proof. The claim is proven by mimicking the analysis of Algorithm 3 in the pre-
ceding section, incorporating error terms that reflect the differences between
observable values and latent ones. As before, let ξ∗ denote an optimal solu-
tion of the primal linear program (P), and let OPTLP = rᵀξ∗ denote the optimal
value of that LP. Let REWUCB =
∑
m<t<τ u
ᵀ
t zt denote the total payoff the algorithm
would have obtained, after its start-up phase, if the actual payoff at time t were
replaced with the upper confidence bound. By the stopping condition for the
algorithm, we know there is a vector y ∈ ∆[R] such that yᵀ (∑τt=1Ctzt) ≥ B, so fix
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one such y. As before,
yᵀ
 ∑
m<t<τ
Ctzt
 ≥ B − m − 1. (3.10)
Finally let
y¯ =
1
REWUCB
∑
m<t<τ
(uᵀt zt)yt.
Assuming a clean execution, we have
B ≥ y¯ᵀCξ∗ (ξ∗ is primal feasible)
=
1
REWUCB
∑
m<t<τ
(uᵀt zt)(y
ᵀ
t Cξ
∗)
≥ 1
REWUCB
∑
m<t<τ
(uᵀt zt)(y
ᵀ
t Ltξ
∗) (clean execution)
≥ 1
REWUCB
∑
m<t<τ
(uᵀt ξ
∗)(yᵀt Ltzt) (definition of zt)
≥ 1
REWUCB
∑
m<t<τ
(rᵀξ∗)(yᵀt Ltzt) (clean execution)
≥ OPTLP
REWUCB
(1 − )yᵀ  ∑
m<t<τ
Ltzt
 − ln d
 (Hedge guarantee)
=
OPTLP
REWUCB
(1 − )yᵀ  ∑
m<t<τ
Ctzt
 − (1 − )yᵀ  ∑
m<t<τ
Etzt
 − ln d

≥ OPTLP
REWUCB
(1 − )B − m − 1 − (1 − )yᵀ  ∑
m<t<τ
Etzt
 − ln d
 (definition of y; see eq. (3.10))
REWUCB ≥ OPTLP
1 −  − m + 1B − 1B
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ∑m<t<τ Etzt
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∞ −
ln d
B
 . (3.11)
The algorithm’s actual payoff, REW =
∑τ
t=1 r
ᵀ
t zt, satisfies the inequality
REW ≥ REWUCB −
∑
m<t<τ
(ut − rt)ᵀzt = REWUCB −
∑
m<t<τ
δ
ᵀ
τ zt.
Combining this inequality with (3.11), we obtain the bound (3.8), as claimed. 
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3.3.3 Error analysis
In this section we complete the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 by deriving upper
bounds on the terms
∥∥∥∑m<t<τ Etzt∥∥∥∞ and ∣∣∣∑m<t<τ δtzt∣∣∣ appearing on the right side
of (3.8). Both bounds are special cases of a more general statement, presented
as Lemma 3.3.3 below. Before stating the lemma, we need to establish a simple
fact about confidence radii.
Lemma 3.3.2. For any two vectors w,N ∈ Rm+ , we have
m∑
j=1
rad(w j,N j)N j ≤
√
Cradm(wᵀN) +Cradm. (3.12)
Proof. The definition of rad(·, ·) implies that rad(w j,N j)N j ≤
√
Crad w jN j + Crad.
Summing these inequalities and applying Cauchy-Schwarz,
m∑
j=1
rad(w j,N j)N j ≤
m∑
j=1
√
Crad w jN j +Cradm ≤
√
m ·
√∑
j∈A
Crad w jN j +Cradm,
and the lemma follows by rewriting the expression on the right side. 
The next lemma requires some notation and definitions. Suppose that
w1, . . . ,wτ is a sequence of vectors in [0, 1]m and that z1, . . . , zτ is a sequence of
vectors in {e1, . . . , em}. Assume that the latter sequence begins with a permuta-
tion of the elements of {e1, . . . , em} so that, for every s ≥ m, the diagonal matrix∑s
t=1 ztz
ᵀ
t is invertible. The vector
ws =
 s∑
t=1
ztz
ᵀ
t
−1  s∑
t=1
ztz
ᵀ
t wt

can be interpreted as the vector of empirical averages: the entry ws, j is equal to
the average of wt, j over all times t ≤ s such that zt = e j. Let Ns = ∑st=1 zt denote the
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vector whose entry Ns, j indicates the number of times e j occurs in the sequence
z1, . . . , zs. A useful identity is
ws
ᵀNt =
t∑
s=1
wᵀs zs.
Lemma 3.3.3. Suppose we are given sequences of vectors w1, . . . ,wτ and z1, . . . , zτ as
above. Suppose we are additionally a sequence of vectors b1, . . . , bτ in [0, 1]m and another
vector w0 such that for m < t < τ and j ∈ A,
|bt, j − w0, j| ≤ 2 rad(wt, j,Nt, j) ≤ 6 rad(w0, j,Nt, j).
Let s = τ − 1 and suppose that for all j ∈ A, |ws, j − w0, j| ≤ rad(ws, j,Ns, j). Then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑m<t<τ(bt − wt)ᵀzt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O ( √CradmW +Cradm) , (3.13)
where W = (wτ−1)ᵀNτ−1 =
∑τ−1
t=1 w
ᵀ
t zt.
Proof. The proof decomposes the left side of (3.13) as a sum of three terms,
∑
m<t<τ
(bt − wt)ᵀzt =
m∑
t=1
(wt − bt)ᵀzt +
τ−1∑
t=1
(bt − w0)ᵀzt +
τ−1∑
t=1
(w0 − wt)ᵀzt, (3.14)
then bounds the three terms separately. The first sum is clearly bounded above
by m. We next work on bounding the third sum. Let s = τ − 1.
s∑
t=1
(w0 − wt)ᵀzt = wᵀ0Nt −
s∑
t=1
wᵀt zt = (w0 − ws)ᵀNs∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
t=1
(w0 − wt)ᵀzt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = |(w0 − ws)ᵀNs| ≤∑j∈A rad(ws, j,Ns, j)Ns, j
≤ √CradmW +Cradm,
where the last line follows from Lemma 3.3.2.
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Finally we bound the middle sum in (3.14).∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
s∑
t=1
(bt − w0)ᵀzt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 6
s∑
t=1
∑
j∈A
rad(w0, j,Nt, j)zt, j
= 6
∑
j∈A
Ns, j∑
`=1
rad(w0, j, `)
= O
∑
j∈A
rad(w0, j,Ns, j)Ns, j

≤ O
(√
Crad nw
ᵀ
0Ns +Cradm
)
.
We would like to replace the expression wᵀ0Ns on the last line with the expres-
sion ws
ᵀNs = W. To do so, recall from earlier in this proof that |(w0 − ws)ᵀNs| ≤
√
CradmW +Cradm, and now apply the following calculation:
wᵀ0Ns ≤ wsᵀNs +
√
CradmW +Cradm = W +
√
CradmW +Cradm ≤
(√
W +
√
Cradm
)2√
Cradmw
ᵀ
0Ns ≤
√
Cradm
(√
W +
√
Cradm
)
=
√
CradmW +Cradm.
Summing up the upper bounds for the three terms on the right side of (3.14),
we obtain (3.13). 
Corollary 3.3.4. In a clean execution of PD − BwK,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑m<t<τ δtzt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O ( √CradmREW +Cradm)
and ∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ∑m<t<τ Etzt
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∞ ≤ O
( √
CradmB +Cradm
)
.
Proof. The first inequality is obtained by applying Lemma 3.3.3 with vector se-
quences wt = rt and bt = ut. The second one is obtained by applying the same
lemma with vector sequences wt = eᵀi Ct and bt = eiLt, for each resource i. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.2.1: The theorem asserts that
REW ≥ OPT − O
(√
m log(dmT )
(
OPT√
B
+
√
OPT +
√
m log(dmT )
))
.
Denote the right-hand side by f (OPT). The function max{ f (x), 0} is a non-
decreasing function of x, so to establish the theorem we will prove that REW ≥
f (OPTLP) ≥ f (OPT), where the latter inequality is an immediate consequence of
the fact that OPTLP ≥ OPT (Lemma 3.1.1).
To prove REW ≥ f (OPTLP), we begin by recalling inequality (3.8) and observing
that
2OPTLP

√
ln d
B
+
m + 1
B
 = O (√m log(dmT ) OPTLP√
B
)
by our assumption that m ≤ B. The term m + 1 on the right side of Equa-
tion (3.8) is bounded above by m log(dmT ). Finally, using Corollary 3.3.4 we
see that the sum of the final two terms on the right side of (3.8) is bounded
by O
(√
Cradm
(
OPTLP√
B
+
√
OPTLP +
√
Cradm
))
. The theorem follows by plugging in
Crad = Θ(log(dmT )). 
3.4 Algorithm: Mixture Elimintation
The design principle behind Mixture Elimintation is to explore as much as
possible while avoiding obviously suboptimal strategies. On a high level, the
algorithm is very simple. The goal is to converge on an LP-perfect distribu-
tion. The time is divided in phases of |A| rounds each. In the beginning of each
phase p, the algorithm prunes away all distributions D over arms that with
high confidence are not LP-perfect given the observations so far. The remaining
distributions over arms are called potentially perfect. Throughout the phase, the
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algorithm chooses among the potentially perfect distributions. Specifically, for
each arm a, the algorithm chooses a potentially perfect distribution Dp,a which
approximately maximizes Dp,a(a), and “pulls” an arm sampled independently
from this distribution. This choice of Dp,a is crucial; we call it the balancing step.
The algorithm halts as soon as the time horizon is met, or any of the constraints
is exhausted. See Algorithm 4 for the pseudocode.
Algorithm 4: Mixture Elimintation
1: For each phase p = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
2: Recompute the set ∆p of potentially perfect distributionsD over arms.
3: Over the next |A| rounds, for each a ∈ A:
4: pick any distributionD = Dp,a ∈ ∆p such thatD(a) ≥ 12 maxD∈∆pD(a).
5: choose an arm to “pull” as an independent sample fromD.
6: halt if time horizon is met or one of the resources is exhausted.
We believe that Mixture Elimintation, like UCB1 [4], is a very general de-
sign principle and has the potential to be a meta-algorithm for solving stochastic
online learning problems.
Theorem 3.4.1 (BwK: Mixture Elimintation). Consider an instance of BwK with d
resources, m = |A| arms, and the smallest budget B = mini Bi. Let MLP be the maximum
of OPTLP, for given time horizon and budgets, over all problem instances in a given BwK
domain. Algorithm Mixture Elimintation achieves total expected regret
OPT − REW ≤ O(log(dmT ) log(T/m))
√dm MLP + MLP 
√
dm
B
+
dm
B
 + dm . (3.15)
Let us fill in the details in the specification of Mixture Elimintation. In the
beginning of each phase p, the algorithm recomputes a “confidence interval”
49
Ip for the latent structure µ, so that (informally) µ ∈ Ip with high probability.
Then the algorithm determines which distributionsD over arms can potentially
be LP-perfect given that µ ∈ Ip. Specifically, let ∆p be set of all distributions D
that are LP-perfect for some latent structure µ′ ∈ Ip; such distributions are called
potentially perfect (for phase p).
It remains to define the confidence intervals Ip. For phase p = 0, the con-
fidence interval I0 is simply Mfeas, the set of all feasible latent structures. For
each subsequent phase p ≥ 1, the confidence interval Ip is defined as follows.
For each arm a, consider all rounds before phase p in which this arm has been
chosen. Let Np(a) be the number of such rounds, let r̂p(a) be the time-averaged
reward in these rounds, and let ĉp,i(a) be the time-averaged consumption of re-
source i in these rounds. We use these averages to estimate r(a, µ) and ci(a, µ) as
follows:
|r(a, µ) − r̂p(a)| ≤ rad
(
r̂p(a),Np(a)
)
(3.16)
|ci(a, µ) − ĉp,i(a)| ≤ rad
(
ĉp,i(a),Np(a)
)
for each resource i (3.17)
The confidence interval Ip is the set of all latent structures µ′ ∈ Ip−1 that
are consistent with these estimates. This completes the specification of
Mixture Elimintation.
For each phase of Mixture Elimintation, the round in which an arm is sam-
pled from distribution Dp,a will be called designated to arm a. We need to use
approximate maximization to choose Dp,a, rather than exact maximization, be-
cause an exact maximizer argmaxD∈∆pD(a) is not guaranteed to exist.
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3.5 Analysis of Mixture Elimintation
Let us summarize various properties of the confidence radius which we use
throughout the analysis.
Claim 3.5.1. The confidence radius rad(ν,N), defined in Equation (3.3), satisfies the
following properties:
(a) monotonicity: rad(ν,N) is non-decreasing in ν and non-increasing in N.
(b) concavity: rad(ν,N) is concave in ν, for any fixed N.
(c) max(0, ν − rad(ν,N)) is non-decreasing in ν.
(d) ν − rad(ν,N) ≥ 14 ν whenever 4CradN ≤ ν ≤ 1.
(e) rad(ν,N) ≤ 3CradN whenever ν ≤ 4CradN .
(f) rad(ν, αN) = 1
α
rad(αν, N), for any α ∈ (0, 1].
(g) 1N
∑N
`=1 rad(ν, `) ≤ O(logN) rad(ν,N).
3.5.1 Deterministic properties of Mixture Elimintation
First, we show that any two latent structures in the confidence interval Ip cor-
respond to similar consumptions and rewards, for each arm a. This follows
deterministically from the specification of Ip.
Claim 3.5.2. Fix any phase p, any two latent structures µ′, µ′′ ∈ Ip, an arm a, and a
resource i. Then
|ci(a, µ′) − ci(a, µ′′)| ≤ 6 rad
(
ci(a, µ′),Np(a)
)
(3.18)
|r(a, µ′) − r(a, µ′′)| ≤ 6 rad
(
r(a, µ′),Np(a)
)
. (3.19)
Proof. We prove Equation (3.18); Equation (3.19) is proved similarly.
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Let N = Np(a). By specification of Mixture Elimintation, any µ′ ∈ Ip is
consistent with estimate (4.5):
|ci(a, µ′) − ĉp,i(a)| ≤ rad
(
ĉp,i(a),N
)
.
It follows that
|ci(a, µ′) − ci(a, µ′′)| ≤ 2 rad
(̂
cp,i(a),N
)
.
Finally, we observe that by Claim 3.1.4,
rad
(̂
cp,i(a),N
)
≤ 3 rad (ci(a, µ′),N) . 
For each phase p and arm a, let D¯p,a = 1p
∑
q<pDq,a(a) be the average of prob-
abilities for arm a among the distributions in the preceding phases that are des-
ignated to arm a. Because of the balancing step in Mixture Elimintation, we
can compare this quantity to D(a), for any D ∈ ∆p. (Here we also use the fact
that the confidence intervals Ip are non-increasing from one phase to another.)
Claim 3.5.3. D¯p,a ≥ 12 D(a) for each phase p, each arm a and any distributionD ∈ ∆p.
Proof. Fix arm a. Recall that D¯p,a = 1p
∑
q<pDq,a(a), where Dq,a is the distribution
chosen in the round in phase q that is designated to arm a. Fix any phase q < p.
Because of the balancing step, Dq,a(a) ≥ 12 D′(a) for any distribution D′ ∈ ∆q.
Since the confidence intervals Iq are non-increasing from one phase to another,
we have Ip ⊂ Iq for any q ≤ p, which implies that ∆p ⊂ ∆q. Consequently,
Dq,a(a) ≥ 12 D(a) for each q < p, and the claim follows. 
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3.5.2 High-probability events
We keep track of several quantities: the averages r̂p(a) and ĉp,i(a) defined in
Section 3.4, as well as several other quantities that we define below.
Fix phase p. For each arm a, consider all rounds in phases q < p that are
designated to arm a. Let np(a) denote the number of times arm a has been chosen
in these rounds. Let D̂p,a = nt(a)/p be the corresponding empirical probability
of choosing x. We compare this to D¯p,a.
Further, consider all rounds in phases q < p. There are N = p|A| such
rounds. The average distribution chosen by the algorithm in these rounds is
D¯p = 1N
∑
q<p, a∈ADq,a. We are interested in the corresponding quantities r(D¯p, µ)
and ci(D¯p, µ), We compare these quantities to r̂p = 1N
∑N
t=1 rt and ĉp,i =
1
N
∑N
t=1 ct,i,
the average reward and the average resource-i consumption in phases q < p.
We consider several high-probability events which follow from applying
Theorem 3.1.3 to the various quantities defined above. All these events have
a common shape: ν̂ is an N-strong estimate for ν, for some quantities ν, ν̂ ∈ [0, 1]
and N ∈ N.
Lemma 3.5.4. For each phase p, arm a, and resource i, with probability e−Ω(Crad) it holds
that:
(a) r̂p(a) is an Np(a)-strong estimator for r(a, µ), and ĉp,i(a) is an Np(a)-strong esti-
mator for ci(a, µ).
(b) D¯p,a is an p-strong estimator for D̂p,a.
(c) r(D¯p, µ) is an (p|A|)-strong estimator for r̂p, and ci(D¯p, µ) is an (p|A|)-strong
estimator for ĉp,i.
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3.5.3 Clean execution of Mixture Elimintation
A clean execution of the algorithm is one in which all events in Lemma 3.5.4 hold.
It is convenient to focus on a clean execution. In the rest of the analysis, we
assume clean execution without further notice. Also, we fix an arbitrary phase
p in such execution.
Since a clean execution satisfies the event in Claim 3.5.4(a), it immediately
follows that:
Claim 3.5.5. The confidence interval Ip contains the (actual) latent structure µ. There-
fore,D∗ ∈ ∆p for any distributionD∗ that is LP-perfect for µ.
Claim 3.5.6. Fix any latent structures µ′, µ′′ ∈ Ip and any distribution D ∈ ∆p. Then
for each resource i,
|ci(D, µ′) − ci(D, µ′′)| ≤ O(1) rad (ci(D, µ′), p/d) (3.20)
|r(D, µ′) − r(D, µ′′)| ≤ O(1) rad (r(D, µ′), p/d) . (3.21)
Proof. We prove Equation (3.20); Equation (3.21) is proved similarly. Let us first
prove the following:
∀a ∈ A, D(a) |ci(a, µ′) − ci(a, µ′′)| ≤ O(1) rad(D(a) ci(a, µ′), p). (3.22)
Intuitively, in order to argue that we have good estimates on quantities related
to arm a, it helps to prove that this arm has been chosen sufficiently often. Using
the definition of clean execution and Claim 3.5.3, we accomplish this as follows:
1
p Np(a) ≥ 1p np(a) = D̂p,a
≥ D¯p,a − rad(D¯p,a, p) (by clean execution)
≥ 12 D(a) − rad( 12 D(a), p) (by Claim 3.5.3 and Claim 3.5.1(c)).
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Consider two cases depending on D(a). For the first case, assume D(a) ≥ 8Cradp .
Using Claim 3.5.1(d) and the previous equation, it follows that Np(a) ≥ 18 pD(a).
Therefore:
D(a) |ci(a, µ′) − ci(a, µ′′)| ≤ 6 D(a) rad(ci(a, µ′), Np(a)) (by Claim 3.5.2)
≤ 6 D(a) rad(ci(a, µ′), 18 pD(a)) (by monotonicity of rad)
= 48 rad(D(a) ci(a, µ′a), p) (by Claim 3.5.1(f)).
The second case is that D(a) < 8Cradp . Then Equation (3.22) follows simply be-
cause Cradp ≤ rad(· , p).
We have proved Equation (3.22). We complete the proof of Equa-
tion (3.20) using concavity of rad(·, p) and the fact that, by the specification of
Mixture Elimintation,D has support of size at most d + 1.
|ci(D, µ′) − ci(D, µ′′)| ≤ ∑a∈AD(a) |ci(a, µ′) − ci(a, µ′′)|
≤ ∑a∈A,D(a)>0O(1) rad(D(a) ci(a, µ′), p)
≤ O(d) rad
(
1
d+1
∑
a∈AD(a) ci(a, µ′), p
)
= O(d) rad
(
1
d+1 ci(D, µ′), p
)
≤ O(1) rad
(
ci(D, µ′), pd
)
(by Claim 3.5.1(f)). 
Claim 3.5.7. Fix any latent structures µ′, µ′′ ∈ Ip and any distributionD ∈ ∆p. Then
|LP(D, µ′) − LP(D, µ′′)| ≤ O(T ) rad
(
MLP/T,
p
d
)
+ O(MLP TB ) rad
(
B
T ,
p
d
)
. (3.23)
Proof. Since D ∈ ∆p, it is LP-perfect for some latent structure µ. Then LP(D, µ) =
T r(D, µ). Therefore:
LP(D, µ′) − LP(D, µ) ≤ T (r(D, µ′) − r(D, µ))
≤ O(T ) rad
(
r(D, µ), pd
)
(by Claim 3.5.6). (3.24)
55
We need a little more work to bound the difference in the LP values in the
other direction.
Consider t0 = LP(D, µ′)/r(D, µ′); this is the optimal value of variable t in linear
program (3.1). Let us obtain a lower bound on this quantity. Assume t0 < T .
Then one of the budget constraints in (3.1) must be tight, i.e. t0 ci(D, µ′) = B for
some resource i.
ci(D, µ′) ≤ ci(D, µ) + O(1) rad
(
ci(D, µ), pd
)
(by Claim 3.5.6)
≤ BT + O(1) rad
(
B
T ,
p
d
)
Let Ψ = rad
(
B
T ,
p
d
)
. It follows that t0 = B/ci(D, µ′) ≥ T (1 − O(TB Ψ)). Therefore:
LP(D, µ) − LP(D, µ′) = T r(D, µ) − t0 r(D, µ′)
≤ T r(D, µ) −
[
T (1 − O(TB Ψ))
]
r(D, µ′)
≤ T [r(D, µ) − r(D, µ′)] + O(TB Ψ)T r(D, µ)
≤ O(T ) rad
(
r(D, µ), pd
)
+ O(TB Ψ)T r(D, µ) (by Claim 3.5.6).
Using Equation (3.24) and noting that r(D, µ) = LP(D, µ)/T ≤ MLP/T , we con-
clude that
|LP(D, µ) − LP(D, µ′)| ≤ O(T ) rad
(
MLP/T,
p
d
)
+ O(MLP TB ) rad
(
B
T ,
p
d
)
.
We obtain the same upper bound on |LP(D, µ)−LP(D, µ′′)|, and the claim follows.

We will carry the upper bound in Equation (3.23) through the rest of the
analysis. To simplify the equations, we will denote it Φp.
Claim 3.5.8. Let Φp denote the right-hand side of Equation (3.23).
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(a) Fix any latent structure µ∗ ∈ Ip, and any distributionsD′,D′′ ∈ ∆p. Then
|LP(D′, µ∗) − LP(D′′, µ∗)| ≤ 2Φp.
(b) LP(Dp,a, µ) ≥ OPTLP − 2Φp, for each distribution Dp,a chosen by the algorithm in
phase p.
Proof. (a). Since D′,D′′ ∈ ∆p, it holds that D′ and D′′ are LP-perfect for some
latent structures µ′ and µ′′. Further, pick a distribution D∗ that is LP-perfect for
µ∗. Then:
LP(D′, µ∗) ≥ LP(D′, µ′) − Φp (by Lemma 3.5.7 withD = D′)
≥ LP(D∗, µ′) − Φp
≥ LP(D∗, µ∗) − 2Φp (by Lemma 3.5.7 withD = D∗)
≥ LP(D′′, µ∗) − 2Φp. 
(b). Follows from part (a) because Dp,a ∈ ∆p by the specification of
Mixture Elimintation, and OPTLP = LP(D∗, µ) for some distributionD∗ ∈ ∆p.
The following corollary lower-bounds the average reward; once we have it,
it essentially remains to lower-bound the stopping time of the algorithm.
Corollary 3.5.9. r̂p ≥ 1T (OPTLP −O(Φp log p)), where Φp denotes the right-hand side of
Equation (3.23).
Proof. By Claim 3.5.8(b), for each distribution Dq,a chosen by the algorithm in
phase q < p it holds that
r(Dq,a, µ) ≥ 1T LP(Dq,a, µ) ≥ 1T (OPTLP − 2Φq).
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Averaging the above equation over all rounds in phases q < p, we obtain
r(D¯p, µ) ≥ 1T
(
OPTLP − 2p
∑
q<p Φq
)
≥ 1T
(
OPTLP − O(Φp log p)
)
.
For the last inequality, we used Claim 3.5.1(fg) to average the confidence radii
in Φq.
Using the high-probability event in Claim 3.5.4(c):
r̂p ≥ r(D¯p, µ) − rad(r(D¯p, µ), p|A|).
Now using the monotonicity of ν − rad(ν,N) (Claim 3.5.1(c)) we obtain
r̂p ≥ 1T (OPTLP − O(Φp)) − rad
(
1
T (OPTLP − O(Φp)), p|A|
)
≥ 1T (OPTLP − O(Φp)) − rad ( MLP/T, p|A| )
≥ 1T (OPTLP − O(Φp)).
For the last equation, we use the fact that Φp/T ≥ Ω(rad(MLP/T ), pd )) ≥
Ω(rad( MLP/T, p|A| )). 
The following two claims help us to lower-bound the stopping time of the
algorithm.
Claim 3.5.10. ci(Dp,a, µ) ≤ BT + O(1) rad
(
B
T ,
p
d
)
for each resource i.
Proof. By the algorithm’s specification, Dp,a ∈ ∆p, and moreover there exists a
latent structure µ′ ∈ Ip such that Dp,a is LP-perfect for µ′. Apply Claim 3.5.6,
noting that ci(Dp,a, µ′) ≤ BT by LP-perfectness. 
Corollary 3.5.11. ĉp,i ≤ BT + O(log p) rad( BT , pd ) for each resource i.
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Proof. Using a property of the clean execution, namely the event in
Claim 3.5.4(c), we have
ĉp,i ≤ ci(D¯, µ) + rad
(
ci(D¯, µ), p
)
. (3.25)
Consider all rounds preceding phase p.
ci(D¯p, µ) = 1p|A|
∑
q<p, a∈A
ci(Dq,a, µ)
≤ B
T
+
O(1)
p|A|
∑
q<p, a∈A
rad
(B
T
,
p
d
)
(by Claim 3.5.10)
≤ BT + O(log p) rad
(
B
T ,
p
d
)
(by Claim 3.5.1(fg)). (3.26)
For the last inequality, we used Claim 3.5.1(fg) to average the confidence radii.
Using the upper bound on ci(D¯, µ) that we derived above,
rad
(
ci(D¯, µ), pd
)
≤ O(log p) rad
(
B
T + rad
(
B
T ,
p
d
)
, pd
)
.
Using a general property of the confidence radius that
rad(ν + rad(ν,N), N) ≤ O(rad(ν,N)),
we conclude that
rad
(
ci(D¯, µ), pd
)
≤ O(log p) rad( BT , pd ). (3.27)
We obtain the claim by plugging the upper bounds (3.26) and (3.27) into (3.25).

We are ready to put the pieces together and derive the performance guaran-
tee for a clean execution of Mixture Elimintation.
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Lemma 3.5.12. Consider a clean execution of Mixture Elimintation. Letting Φp
denote the right-hand side of Equation (3.23), the total reward of the algorithm is REW ≥
OPTLP − O (ΦT/|A| log(T/|A|)) .
Proof. Let p be the last phase in the execution of the algorithm, and let T0 be the
stopping time. Letting m = |A|, note that pm < T0 ≤ (p + 1)m.
We can use Corollary 3.5.9 to bound REW from below:
REW = T0 r̂p+1 > pm r̂p+1 ≥ pmT (OPTLP − O(Φp log p)). (3.28)
Let us bound pmT from below. The algorithm stops either when it runs out of
time or if it runs out of resources during phase p. In the former case, p = bT/mc.
In the latter case, B = T0 ĉp+1, i for some resource i, so B ≤ m(p + 1) ĉp+1, i. Using
Corollary 3.5.11, we obtain the following lower bound on p:
pm
T
≥ 1 − O
(
pm log p
B
)
rad
(B
T
,
p
d
)
.
Plugging this into Equation (3.28), we conclude:
REW ≥ OPTLP − O
(
pm log p
B
)
rad
(B
T
,
p
d
)
OPTLP − O
(
pm log p
T
)
Φp
≥ OPTLP − O
(
pm log p
T
) (
Φp +
T
B
rad
(B
T
,
p
d
)
OPTLP
)
≥ OPTLP − pm log pT O(Φp).
To complete the proof, we observe that (pΦp log p) is increasing in p (by defini-
tion of Φp), and plug in a trivial upper bound p ≤ T/m. 
Using Claim 3.5.1(c), we can write
ΦT/|A| = O(1)
(
rad(MLP, 1d |A| ) +
MLP
B
rad(B, 1d |A| )
)
.
Rearranging the term, we obtain the bound claimed in Theorem 3.4.1.
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3.6 Lower Bound
We prove that regret (1.1) obtained by algorithm PD − BwK is optimal up to poly-
log factors.
Theorem 3.6.1. Informally, any algorithm for BwK must incur regret
Ω
(
min
(
OPT, OPT
√
m
B
+
√
m OPT
))
, (3.29)
where m = |A| is the number of arms and B = mini Bi is the smallest budget.
More precisely, fix any m ≥ 2, d ≥ 1, OPT ≥ m, and (B1 , . . . , Bd) ∈ [2,∞). Let F be
the family of all BwK problem instances with m arms, d resources, budgets (B1 , . . . , Bd)
and optimal reward OPT. Then any algorithm for BwK must incur regret (3.29) in the
worst case over F .
We treat the two summands in Equation (3.29) separately:
Claim 3.6.2. Consider the family F from Theorem 3.6.1, and let ALG be some algorithm
for BwK.
(a) ALG incurs regret Ω
(
min
(
OPT,
√
m OPT
))
in the worst case over F .
(b) ALG incurs regret Ω
(
min
(
OPT, OPT
√m
B
))
in the worst case over F .
Theorem 3.6.1 follows from Claim 3.6.2(ab). For part (a), we use a standard
lower-bounding example for MAB. For part (b), we construct a new example,
specific to BwK, and analyze it using KL-divergence.
Proof of Claim 3.6.2(a). Fix m ≥ 2 and OPT ≥ m. Let F0 be the family of all MAB
problem instances with m arms and time horizon T = b2 OPTc, where the “best
61
arm” has expected reward µ∗ = T/OPT and all other arms have reward µ∗ − 
with  = 14
√
m/T . Note that µ∗ ∈ [ 12 , 34 ] and  ≤ 14 . It is well-known [5] that any
MAB algorithm incurs regret Ω(
√
m OPT ) in the worst case over F0.
To ensure that F0 ⊂ F , let us treat each MAB instance in F0 as a BwK instance
with d resources, budgets (B1 , . . . , Bd), and no resource consumption. 
3.6.1 The new lower-bounding example: proof of Claim 3.6.2(b)
Our lower-bounding example is very simple. There are m arms. Each arm gives
reward 1 deterministically. There is a single resource with budget B.4 The re-
source consumption, for each arm and each round, is either 0 or 1. The expected
resource consumption is p−  for the “best arm” and p for all other arms, where
0 <  < p < 1. There is time horizon T < ∞. Let F(p,) denote the family of all
such problem instances, for fixed parameters (p, ). We analyze this family in
the rest of this section.
Infinite time horizon. It is convenient to consider the family of problem in-
stances which is the same as F(p,) except that it has the infinite time horizon;
denote it F ∞(p,). We will first prove the desired lower bound for this family, then
extend it to F(p,).
The two crucial quantities that describe algorithm’s performance on an in-
stance in F ∞(p,) is the stopping time and the total number of plays of the best arm.
(Note that the total reward is equal to the stopping time minus 1.) The following
claim connects these two quantities.
4More formally, other resources in the setting of Theorem 3.6.1 are not consumed. For sim-
plicity, we leave them out.
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Claim 3.6.3 (Stopping time). Fix an algorithm ALG for BwK and a problem instance
in F ∞(p,). Consider an execution of ALG on this problem instance. Let τ be the stopping
time of ALG. For each round t, let Nt be the number of rounds s ≤ t in which the best
arm is selected. Then
pE[τ] −  E[Nτ] = bB + 1c.
Proof. Let Ct be the total resource consumption after round t. Note that E[Ct] =
pt − Nt. We claim that
E[Cτ] = E[pτ − Nτ]. (3.30)
Indeed, let Zt = Ct − (pt − Nt). It is easy to see that Zt is a martingale with
bounded increments, and moreover that Pr[τ < ∞] = 1. Therefore the Optional
Stopping Theorem applies to Zt and τ, so that E[Zτ] = E[Z0] = 0. Therefore we
obtain Equation (3.30).
To complete the proof, it remains to show that Cτ = bB + 1c. Recall that ALG
stops if and only if Ct > B. Since resource consumption in any round is either 0
or 1, it follows that Cτ = bB + 1c. 
Corollary 3.6.4. Consider the setting in Claim 3.6.3. Then:
(a) If ALG always chooses the best arm then E[τ] = bB + 1c/(p − ).
(b) OPT = bB + 1c/(p − ) − 1 for any problem instance in F ∞(p,).
(c) pE[τ] −  E[Nτ] = (p − ) (1 + OPT).
Proof. For part(b), note that we have E[τ] ≤ bB + 1c/(p − ), so OPT ≤ bB + 1c/(p −
) − 1. By part (a), the equality is achieved by the policy that always selects the
best arm. 
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The heart of the proof is a KL-divergence argument which bounds the num-
ber of plays of the best arm. This argument is encapsulated in the following
claim, whose proof is deferred to Section 3.6.2.
Lemma 3.6.5 (best arm). Assume p ≤ 12 and p ≤ 116
√m
B . Then for any BwK algorithm
there exists a problem instance in F ∞(p,) such that the best arm is chosen at most 34 OPT
times in expectation.
Armed with this bound and Corollary 3.6.4(c), it is easy to lower-bound re-
gret over F ∞(p,).
Claim 3.6.6 (regret). If p ≤ 12 and p ≤ 116
√m
B then any BwK algorithm incurs regret

4p OPT over F ∞(p,).
Proof. Fix any algorithm ALG for BwK. Consider the problem instance whose
existence is guaranteed by Lemma 3.6.5. Let τ be the stopping time of ALG, and
let Nt be the number of rounds s ≤ t in which the best arm is selected. By
Lemma 3.6.5 we have E[Nτ] ≤ 34 OPT. Plugging this into Corollary 3.6.4(c) and
rearranging the terms, we obtain E[τ] ≤ (1+OPT)(1− 4p ). Therefore, regret of ALG
is OPT − (E[τ] − 1) ≥ 4p OPT. 
Thus, we have proved the lower bound for the infinite time horizon.
Finite time horizon. Let us “translate” a regret bound for F ∞(p,) into a regret
bound for F(p,).
We will need a more nuanced notation for OPT. Consider the family of prob-
lem instances in F(p,) ∪ F ∞(p,) with a particular time horizon T ≤ ∞. Let OPT(p,,T )
be the optimal expected total reward for this family (by symmetry, this quantity
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does not depend on which arm is the best arm). We will write OPTT = OPT(p,,T )
when parameters (p, ) are clear from the context.
Claim 3.6.7. For any fixed (p, ) and any T > OPT∞ it holds that OPTT ≥ OPT∞ −
OPT2∞/T .
Proof. Let τ∗ be the stopping time of a policy that always plays the best arm on
a problem instance in F ∞(p,).
OPT∞ − OPTT = E[τ∗] − E[min(τ∗,T )]
=
∑
t>T (t − T ) Pr[τ∗ = t]
=
∑
t>T Pr[τ∗ ≥ t]
≤ E[τ∗]/T 2 = OPT2∞/T.
The inequality is due to Fact 2.4.1. 
Claim 3.6.8. Fix (p, ) and fix algorithm ALG. Let REGT be the regret of ALG over the
problem instances in F(p,) ∪ F ∞(p,) with a given time horizon T ≤ ∞. Then REGT ≥
REG∞ − OPT2∞/T.
Proof. For each problem instance I ∈ F ∞(p,), let REWT (I) be the expected total
reward of ALG on I, if the time horizon is T ≤ ∞. Clearly, REW∞(I) ≥ REWT (I).
Therefore, using Claim 3.6.7, we have:
REGT = OPTT − infI REWT (I)
≥ OPTT − infI REW∞(I)
= REG∞ + OPTT − OPT∞
≥ REG∞ − OPT2∞/T. 
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Lemma 3.6.9 (regret: finite time horizon). Fix p ≤ 12 and  = p16
√
min(m,B)
B . Then
for any time horizon T > 2 OPT∞ and any BwK algorithm ALG there exists a problem
instance in F(p,) with time horizon T for which ALG incurs regret Ω(OPTT )
√
min(m,B)
B .
Proof. By Claim 3.6.6, ALG incurs regret Ω( p OPT∞) for some problem instance in
F ∞(p,). By Claim 3.6.8, ALG incurs regret Ω( p OPT∞) for the same problem instance
in F(p,) with time horizon T . Finally, it is clear that OPT∞ ≥ OPTT . 
Let us complete the proof of Claim 3.6.2(b). Recall that Claim 3.6.2(b) spec-
ifies the values for (m, B, OPT) that our problem instance must have. Since we
have already proved Claim 3.6.2(a) and OPT
√m
B ≤ O(
√
m OPT) for OPT < 3B, it
suffices to assume OPT ≥ 3B.
Let us set  as prescribed by Lemma 3.6.9. Then we obtain the desired regret
for any parameter p ≤ 12 and any time horizon T > 2 OPT(p,,∞). Recall that
OPT(p,,∞) = Γp , where Γ = bB + 1c/
(
1 − 116
√
min(m,B)
B
)
.
Thus, it remains to pick such p and T so that OPT(p,,T ) = OPT.
Let f (p,T ) = OPT(p,,T ). By Claim 3.6.7, for any p ≤ 12 and T > 2Γ/p we have
Γ
p ≥ f (p,T ) ≥ Γ2p . (3.31)
Since OPT ≥ 3B, there exists p0 ≤ 12 such that Γ/p0 ≤ OPT ≤ 2Γ/p0. Let T = 8Γ/p0.
Then Equation (3.31) holds for all p ∈ [p0/4, 12 ]. In particular,
f (p0,T ) ≤ Γ/p0 ≤ OPT ≤ 2Γ/p0 ≤ f (p0/4,T ).
Since f (p,T ) is continuous in p, there exists p ∈ [p0/4, 12 ] such that f (p,T ) = OPT.
This completes the proof of Claim 3.6.2(b) and Theorem 3.6.1.
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3.6.2 The KL-divergence argument: proof of Lemma 3.6.5
Fix some BwK algorithm ALG and fix parameters (p, ). Let Ia be the problem
instance in F ∞(p,) in which the best arm is a. For the analysis, we also consider
an instance I0 which coincides with Ia but has no best arm: that is, all arms
have expected resource consumption p. Let τ(I) be the stopping time of ALG for
a given problem instance I, and let Na(I) be the expected number of times a
given arm a is chosen by ALG on this problem instance.
Consider problem instance I0. Since all arms are the same, we can apply
Corollary 3.6.4(a) (suitably modified to the non-best arm) and obtain E[τ(I0)] =
bB + 1c/p. We focus on an arm a with the smallest Na(I0). For this arm it holds
that
Na(I0) ≤ 1m
∑
a∈A Na(I0) = 1m E[τ(I0)] ≤ bB+1cpm . (3.32)
In what follows, we use this inequality to upper-bound Na(Ia). Informally, if
arm a is not played sufficiently often in I0, ALG cannot tell apart I0 and Ia.
The transcript of ALG on a given problem instance I is a sequence of pairs
{(at, ct)}t∈N, where for each round t ≤ τ(I) it holds that at is the arm chosen by
ALG in round t, and ct is the realized resource consumption in this round. For
all t > τ(I), we define (at, ct) = (null, 0). To map this to the setup in Section 2.3,
denote Ω = (A∪{null})×{0, 1}. Then the set of all possible transcripts is a subset
of Ω∞.
Every given problem instance I induces a distribution over Ω∞. Let µ, ν be
the distributions over Ω∞ that are induced by I0 and Ia, respectively. We will
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use the following shorthand:
diff[T0,T∗] ,
T∗∑
t=T0
ν(at = a) − µ(at = a), where 1 ≤ T0 ≤ T∗ ≤ ∞.
For any T ∈ N (which we will fix later), we can write
Na(Ia) − Na(I0) = diff[1,∞] = diff[1,T ] + diff[T + 1,∞]. (3.33)
We will bound diff[1,T ] and diff[T + 1,∞] separately.
Upper bound on diff[1,T ]. This is where we use KL-divergence. Namely, by
Equation (2.3) we have
diff[1,T ] ≤ T2 ‖µT − νT ‖1 ≤ T
√
1
2 KL(µT ‖ νT ). (3.34)
Now, by the chain rule (Equation (2.4)), we can focus on upper-bounding the
conditional KL-divergence KLt(µ ‖ ν) at each round t ≤ T .
Claim 3.6.10. For each round t ≤ T it holds that
KLt(µ ‖ ν) = µ(at = a)
(
p log( pp− ) + (1 − p) log( 1−p1−p+ )
)
. (3.35)
Proof. The main difficulty here is to carefully “unwrap” the definition of
KLt(µ ‖ ν).
Fix t ≤ T and let ~wt ∈ Ωt be the partial transcript up to and including round
t. For each arm y, let f (y|~wt) be the probability that ALG chooses arm y in round t,
given the partial transcript ~wt. Let c(y|I) be the expected resource consumption
for arm y under a problem instance I. The transcript for round t + 1 is a pair
wt+1 = (at+1, ct+1), where at+1 is the arm chosen by ALG in round t + 1, and ct+1 ∈
{0, 1} is the resource consumption in that round. Therefore if ct+1 = 1 then
µ(wt+1 |~wt) = f (at+1|~wt) c(at+1|I0) = f (at+1|~wt) p,
ν(wt+1 |~wt) = f (at+1|~wt) c(at+1|Ia) = f (at+1|~wt) (p −  1{at+1=a}) .
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Similarly, if ct+1 = 0 then
µ(wt+1 |~wt) = f (at+1|~wt) (1 − c(at+1|I0)) = f (at+1|~wt) (1 − p),
ν(wt+1 |~wt) = f (at+1|~wt) (1 − c(at+1|Ia)) = f (at+1|~wt) (1 − p +  1{at+1=a}) .
It follows that
log
µ(wt+1 |~wt)
ν(wt+1 |~wt) = 1{at=a}
(
log( pp− ) 1{ct+1=1} + log(
1−p
1−p+ ) 1{ct+1=0}
)
.
Taking expectations over wt+1 = (at, ct) ∼ µ(· |~wt), we obtain
KL(µ(· |~wt) ‖ ν(· |~wt)) = f (x|~wt)
(
p log( pp− ) + (1 − p) log( 1−p1−p+ )
)
.
Taking expectations over ~wt ∼ µt, we obtain the conditional KL-divergence
KLt(µ ‖ ν). Equation (3.35) follows because
E
~wt∼µt
f (x|~wt) = µ(at = a). 
Now we can put everything together and derive an upper bound on
diff[1,T ].
Claim 3.6.11. Assume p ≤ 12 and p ≤ 12 . Then diff[1,T ] ≤ T p
√
B+1
m .
Proof. By Claim 3.6.10 and Fact 2.4.2, for each round t ≤ T we have
KLt(µ ‖ ν) ≤ 2
2
p
µ(at = a).
By the chain rule (Equation (2.4)), we have
KL(µT ‖ νT ) ≤ 2
2
p
T∑
t=1
µ(at = a) ≤ 2
2
p
Na(I0) ≤ 2 B + 1m
(

p
)2
.
The last inequality is the place where we use our choice of a, as expressed by
Equation (3.32).
Plugging this back into Equation (3.34), we obtain diff[1,T ] ≤ T p
√
B+1
m . 
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Upper bound on diff[T,∞]. Consider the problem instance Ia, and consider
the policy that always chooses the best arm. Let ν∗ be the corresponding distri-
bution over transcripts Ω∞, and let τ be the corresponding stopping time. Note
that ν∗(at = a) if and only if τ > t. Therefore:
diff[T,∞] ≤
∞∑
t=T
ν(at = a) ≤
∞∑
t=T
ν∗(at = a) =
∞∑
t=T
ν∗(τ > t) ≤ OPT2/T.
The second inequality can be proved using a simple “coupling argument”. The
last inequality follows from Fact 2.4.1, observing that E[τ] = OPT.
Putting the pieces together. Assume p ≤ 12 and p ≤ 12 . Denote γ = p
√
B+1
m .
Using the upper bounds on diff[1,T ] and diff[T + 1,∞] and plugging them
into Equation (3.33), we obtain
Na(Ia) − Na(I0) ≤ γT + OPT2/T ≤ OPT√γ
for T = OPT/
√
γ. Recall that Na(I0) < OPT/m. Thus, we obtain
Na(Ia) ≤ ( 1m +
√
γ) OPT.
Recall that we need to conclude that Na(Ia) ≤ 34OPT. For that, it suffices to have
γ ≤ 116 .
3.7 Applications
Owing to its generality, the BwK problem admits applications in many different
domains. We describe some of these applications below. Instantiating specific
regret bounds is straightforward for most of these applications, as soon as one
precisely defines the setting.
70
BwK with discretization. In many applications of BwK the action space A is very
large or infinite, so the algorithms developed in the previous sections are not
immediately applicable. However, in these applications the action space has
some structure that our algorithms can leverage. For example, in dynamic pric-
ing (with one type of good) every possible action (arm) corresponds to a price –
i.e., a number in some fixed interval.
To handle such applications, we use a simple approach called uniform dis-
cretization: we select a subset S ⊂ A of arms which are, in some sense, uniformly
spaced in A, and apply a BwK algorithm for this subset. In the dynamic pricing
application, S can consist of all prices in the allowed interval that are of the form
`, ` ∈ N, for some fixed discretization parameter  > 0. We call this subset the
additive -mesh. The granularity of discretization (i.e., the value of ) is adjusted
in advance so as to minimize regret.
This generic approach has been successfully used in past work on MAB on
metric spaces (e.g., [34, 32, 36, 42]) and dynamic pricing (e.g., [35, 15, 13, 7]) to
provide worst-case optimal regret bounds. To carry it through to the setting of
BwK, we need to define an appropriate notion of discretization (which would
generalize the additive -mesh for dynamic pricing), and argue that it does not
cause too much damage. Compared to the usage of discretization in prior work,
we need to deal with two technicalities. First, we need to argue about distribu-
tions over arms rather than individual arms. Second, in order to compare an
arm with its “image” in the discretization, we need to consider the difference in
the ratio of expected reward to expected consumption, rather than the difference
in rewards.5 We flesh out the details in Section 3.8.
5Because of these technicalities, our approach to discretization does not immediately extend
to some of the generalizations of dynamic pricing and dynamic procurement that we consider
in the subsequent subsections.
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For dynamic pricing, we show that if we use the additive -mesh S  , and
R(S ) is the regret on the problem instance restricted to S  , then regret on the
original problem instance is at most  d B + R(S ), where d is the number of con-
straints. More generally, we prove this for any BwK domain, and any subset
S  ⊂ A which satisfies some axioms for a given parameter ; we call such S 
an -discretization. Once we define an -discretization S  for every  > 0, then
in order to optimize the regret bound  d B + R(S ) up to constant factors it suf-
fices to pick  such that  dB = R(S ). We need to consider regret bounds R(S )
that are in terms of the maximal possible expected total reward MLP rather than
the (possibly smaller) OPT, since the value of OPT is not initially known to the
algorithm.6
3.7.1 Dynamic pricing with limited supply
Basic version: unit demands. In the basic version of the dynamic pricing prob-
lem, the algorithm is a seller which has k identical items for sale and is facing n
agents (potential buyers) that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested
in buying one item. The algorithm offers a take-it-or-leave-it price pt to each ar-
riving agent t. The agent has a fixed value vt ∈ [0, 1] for an item, which is private:
not known to the algorithm. The agent buys an item if and only if pt ≥ vt. We
assume that each vt is an independent sample from some fixed (but unknown)
distribution, called the buyers’ demand distribution. The goal of the algorithm is
to maximize his expected revenue.
6For problem instances with OPT  MLP, additional information about the problem instance
may help the algorithm: it may effectively reduce the problem to a smaller BwK domain with
a smaller value of MLP, which would allow the algorithm to choose  more efficiently so as to
reduce the number of arms in the -discretization and hence reduce the resulting regret.
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This problem has been studied in [35, 15, 13, 7]. The best result is an algo-
rithm which achieves regret O˜(k2/3) compared to the best fixed price [7];7 this
regret rate is proved to be worst-case optimal. For demand distributions that
satisfy a standard (but limiting) assumption of regularity, the best fixed price is
essentially as good as the best dynamic policy.
Dynamic pricing is naturally interpreted as a BwK domain: arms correspond
to prices, rounds correspond to arriving agents (so there is a time horizon of n),
and there is a single type of resource: the k items. One can think of the agents
as simply units of time, so that n is the time horizon. Let S (p) be the probability
of a sale at price p. The latent structure µ is determined by the function S (·):
the expected reward is r(p, µ) = p S (p), and expected resource consumption is
simply c(x, µ) = S (p). Since there are only k items for sale, it follows that OPT ≤ k.
(To analyze Mixture Elimintation, note that the LP-values are bounded above
by k, so we can take MLP = k.) Prices can be discretized using the -uniform
mesh over [0, 1], resulting in 1

arms.
We recover the optimal O˜(k2/3) regret result from [7] with respect to offering
the same price to each buyer, and moreover extend this result to regret with
respect to the optimal dynamic policy. We observe that the expected revenue of
the optimal dynamic policy can be twice the expected revenue of the best fixed
price (see Section 3.9). The crucial technical advance compared to the prior work
is that our algorithms strive to converge to an optimal distribution over prices,
whereas the algorithms in prior work target the best fixed price. Technically, the
result follows by applying Theorem 3.8.2 for the uniform -mesh, in conjunction
with either of the two main algorithms, and optimizing the .
7The O˜(·) notation hides poly-log factors.
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Extension: non-unit demands. Agents may be interested in buying more than
one unit of the product. Accordingly, let us consider an extension where an
algorithm can offer each agent multiple units. More specifically: in each round
t, the algorithm offers up to λt units at a fixed price pt per unit, where the pair
(pt, λt) is chosen by the algorithm. The t-th agent then chooses how many units
to buy. Agents’ valuations may be non-linear in kt, the number of units they
receive. Each agent chooses kt that maximizes her utility. We restrict λt ≤ Λ,
where Λ is an a-priori chosen parameter.
Let us solve this generalization via BwK. We model it as a BwK domain with
a single resource and action space A = [0, 1] × {0, 1 , . . . ,Λ}. Note that for each
arm a = (pt, λt) the expected reward is r(a, µ) = pt E[kt], and the expected con-
sumption is c(a, µ) = E[kt]. As before, we can use the additive -mesh on [0, 1]
for discretization; this results in Λ/ arms. Optimizing the , we obtain regret
O˜(kΛ)2/3. 8
It is also interesting to consider a more restricted version where λt = Λ. Then
in each round t the algorithm only chooses the price pt, so that the action space
is A. A similar argument gives regret O˜(k2/3Λ1/3).
Other extensions. The generality of BwK allows to handle several other exten-
sions. For these extensions, it appears more difficult to bound the “damage” due
to discretization. We will assume that the action space is restricted to a specific
finite subset S ⊂ A that is given to the algorithm, such as the additive -mesh for
some specific . We bound the S -regret: regret with respect to the value of OPTLP
8Formally, the definition of BwK requires that the per-round reward and the per-round re-
source consumption are at most 1. Therefore we scale down the rewards and the consumption
by the factor of Λ; effectively, the supply constraint is divided by Λ, and regret is multiplied by
Λ. After the re-scaling, the LP-values are upper-bounded by k, so that we can take MLP = k.
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on the restricted action space. Such regret bounds depend on |S |.
• Multiple products. The algorithm has d products for sale, with ki units of each
product i. (To simplify regret bounds, let us assume ki = k.) In each round t, an
agent arrives. This agent is interested in buying only one unit of each product.
The agent is characterized by the vector of values (vt,1 , . . . , vt,d) ∈ [0, 1]d, one for
each product i. This vector is private: not known to the algorithm. We assume
that it is an independent sample from a fixed but unknown distribution over
[0, 1]d; note that arbitrary correlations between values of different products are
allowed. The algorithm offers a vector of prices (pt,1 , . . . , pt,d) ∈ [0, 1]d, one for
each product i. The agent buys one unit of each product i such that pt,i ≥ vt,i.
This problem corresponds to a BwK domain with d resources, one for each
product. Arms are price vectors, so that A = [0, 1]d. We assume that the algo-
rithm is given a restricted action space S ⊂ A, such as an additive -mesh for
some specific . We obtain S -regret O˜(d
√
k |S |). 9
Similarly, we can handle a version where the t-th agent buys only one item;
that is, she buys one unit of type i∗ = argmaxi vi − pi, if and only if vi∗ ≥ pi∗ . We
obtain S -regret O˜(
√
d k |S |).
• Network revenue management. More generally, an algorithm may have d prod-
ucts for sale which may be produced on demand from limited primitive re-
sources, so that each unit of each product i consumes a fixed and known amount
ci j ∈ [0, 1] of each primitive resource j. This generalization is known as network
revenue management problem (see [14] and references therein). All other de-
9To ensure that the maximal per-round reward is at most 1, as required by BwK, we re-scale
all rewards down by the factor of d; effectively, regret is increased by the factor of d. After the
re-scaling, OPT ≤ MLP ≤ k.
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tails are the same as above; for simplicity, let us focus on a version in which
each agent buys at most one item.
This corresponds to a BwK domain with the same action space as above:
A = [0, 1]d. For any given restricted action space S ⊂ A with m arms, we obtain S -
regret given by Equation (1.1). In particular, if all resource constraints (including
the time horizon) are scaled up by factor γ, regret scales as
√
γ. This improves
over the main result in [14], where (essentially) regret is stated in terms of γ and
scales as γ2/3.
• Bundling and volume pricing. When selling to agents with non-unit demands,
an algorithm may use discounts and/or surcharges for buying multiple units of
a product (the latter may make sense for high-valued products such as tickets
to events at the Olympics). More generally, an algorithm can may use discounts
and/or surcharges for some bundles of products, where each bundle can include
multiple units of multiple products (e.g.: two beers and one snack). In full gen-
erality, there is a collection F of allowed bundles. In each round an algorithm
offers a menu of options which consists of a price for every allowed bundle in
F . Each buyer has a private valuation for every bundle; for each product, she
chooses the bundle which maximizes her utility. The vector of private valua-
tions over bundles comes from a fixed but unknown distribution.
This corresponds to a BwK domain where arms correspond to the feasible
menus. In other words, each arm is a price vector over all possible bundles in
F , so that the (full) action space is A = [0, 1]F . We assume that the algorithm is
given a restricted action space S ⊂ A. If each feasible bundle contains at most `
units, we obtain S -regret O˜(
√
d ` k |S |).
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We can reduce the “dimensionality” of the action space by restricting the
bundle pricing. For example, the algorithm can offer a volume discounts of x%
compared to the price of a single item, where x depends only on the number of
items in the bundle, but not on the specific products in this bundle and not on
the prices of a single unit of these products.
• Buyer targeting. Suppose there are ` different types of buyers (say men and
women), and the demand distribution of a buyer depends on her type. The buyer
type is modeled as a sample from a fixed but unknown distribution. In each
round the seller observes the type of the current buyer (e.g., using a cookie or a
user profile), and can choose the price depending on this type.
This can be modeled as a BwK domain where arms correspond to functions
from buyer types to prices. For example, with ` buyer types and a single prod-
uct, the (full) action space is A = [0, 1]`. Assuming we are given a restricted
action space S ⊂ A, we obtain S -regret O˜(√k |S |).
Our regret guarantees for the above extensions are with respect to the opti-
mal dynamic policy on the restricted action space. It is worth emphasizing that
the benchmark equivalence result (the best fixed action is almost as good as the
best dynamic policy, for regular demand distributions) applies only to the basic
version of dynamic pricing. For example, no such result is known for multi-
ple types of goods, even if the demand distribution for each individual type is
regular. (See Section 3.9 for a related discussion.)
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3.7.2 Dynamic procurement and crowdsourcing
Basic version: unit supply. A “dual” problem to dynamic pricing is dynamic
procurement, where the algorithm is buying rather than selling. The algorithm
has a budget B to spend, and is facing n agents (potential sellers) that are ar-
riving sequentially. Each seller is interested in selling one item. Each seller’s
value for an item is an independent sample from some fixed (but unknown) dis-
tribution with support [0, 1]. The algorithm offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to
each arriving agent. The goal is to maximize the number of items bought. This
problem has been studied in [9]; they achieve a multiplicative constant-factor
approximation with respect to the optimal dynamic policy.
Application to crowdsourcing. The problem is particularly relevant to the
emerging domain of crowdsourcing, where agents correspond to the (relatively
inexpensive) workers on a crowdsourcing platform such as Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk, and “items” bought/sold correspond to simple jobs (“microtasks”)
that can be performed by these workers. The algorithm corresponds to the “re-
quester”: an entity that submits jobs and benefits from them being completed.
The (basic) dynamic procurement model captures an important issue in crowd-
sourcing that a requester interacts with multiple users with unknown values-
per-item, and can adjust its behavior (such as the posted price) over time as
it learns the distribution of users. While this basic model ignores some realis-
tic features of crowdsourcing environments, some of these limitations are ad-
dressed by the generalizations which we present below.
Dynamic procurement via BwK. Let us cast dynamic procurement as a BwK
domain. As in dynamic pricing, agents correspond to time rounds, and n is the
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time horizon. The only resource is money. Arms correspond to prices: A = [0, 1].
Letting S (p) be the probability of a sale at price p, the expected reward (items
bought) is r(p, µ) = S (p), and the expected resource consumption is c(p, µ) =
pS (p). The best a-priori upper bound on the LP-value is MLP = n.
We find that arbitrarily small prices are not amenable to discretization. In-
stead, we focus on prices p ≥ p0, where p0 ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter to be adjusted,
and construct an -discretization on the set [p0, 1]. We find that the additive
δ-mesh (for a suitably chosen δ) is not the most efficient way to construct an -
discretization in this domain. Instead, we use a mesh of the form { 11+ j : j ∈ N}
(we call it the hyperbolic -mesh). Then we obtain an -discretization with sig-
nificantly fewer arms. Optimizing the parameters p0 and , we obtain regret
O˜
(
n/B1/4
)
; see Section 3.8.1 for more details.
Our result is meaningful, and improves over the constant-factor approxima-
tion in [9], as long as OPT is not too small compared to n/B1/4. Recall that our
result is with respect to the optimal dynamic policy. We observe that in this do-
main the optimal dynamic policy can be vastly superior compared to the best
fixed price (see Section 3.9 for a specific example).
Extension: non-unit supply. As in dynamic pricing, we consider an extension
where each agent may be interested in more than one item. For example, a
worker may be interested in performing several jobs. In each round t, the al-
gorithm offers to buy up to λt units at a fixed price pt per unit, where the pair
(pt, λt) is chosen by the algorithm. The t-th agent then chooses how many units
to sell. Agents’ valuations may be non-linear in kt, the number of units they sell.
Each agent chooses kt that maximizes her utility. We restrict λt ≤ Λ, where Λ is
an a-priori chosen parameter.
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We model it as a BwK domain with a single resource (money) and action
space A = [0, 1] × {0, 1 , . . . ,Λ}. Note that for each arm a = (pt, λt) the expected
reward is r(a, µ) = E[kt], and the expected consumption is c(a, µ) = pt E[kt]. As
in the basic dynamic procurement problem, we focus on prices p ≥ p0 and use
the hyperbolic -mesh on [p0, 1] for discretization, for some parameters p0,  ∈
(0, 1). Optimizing the , we obtain regret O˜(Λ3/2n/B1/4); see Section 3.8.1 for more
details.
In a more restricted version with λt = Λ, we obtain regret O˜(Λ5/4n/B1/4).
Other extensions. Further, we can model and handle a number of other exten-
sions. As in “other extensions” for dynamic pricing, will assume that the action
space is restricted to a specific finite subset S ⊂ A that is given to the algorithm,
and bound the S -regret – regret with respect to the restricted action space.
• Multiple types of jobs. There are ` types of jobs requested on the crowdsourcing
platform. Each agent t has a private cost vt,i ∈ [0, 1] for each type i; the vector
of private costs comes from a fixed but unknown distribution (i.e., arbitrary
correlations are allowed). The algorithm derives utility ui ∈ [0, 1] from each job
of type i. In each round t, the algorithm offers a vector of prices (pt,1 , . . . , pt,`),
where pt,i is the price for one job of type i. For each type i, the agent performs
one job of this type if and only if pt,i ≥ vt,i, and receives payment pt,i from the
algorithm.
Here arms correspond to the `-dimensional vectors of prices, so that the (full)
action space is A = [0, 1]`. Given the restricted action space S ⊂ A, we obtain S -
regret O˜(`)(
√
n |S | + n√` |S |/B).
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• Additional features. We can also model more complicated “menus” so that each
agent can perform several jobs of the same type. Then in each round, for each
type i, the algorithm specifies the maximal offered number of jobs of this type
and the price per one such job.
We can also incorporate constraints on the maximal number of jobs of each
type that is needed by the requester, and/or the maximal amount of money
spend on each type.
• Competitive environment. There may be other requesters in the system, each
offering its own vector of prices in each round. (This is a realistic scenario in
crowdsourcing, for example.) Each seller / worker chooses the requester and
the price that maximize her utility. One standard way to model such compet-
itive environment is to assume that the “best offer” from the competitors is a
vector of prices which comes from a fixed but unknown distribution. This can
be modeled as a BwK instance with a different distribution over outcomes which
reflects the combined effects of the demand distribution of agents and the “best
offer” distribution of the environment.
3.7.3 Other applications to Electronic Markets
Ad allocation with unknown click probabilities. Consider pay-per-click (PPC)
advertising on the web (in particular, this is a prevalent model in sponsored
search auctions). The central premise in PPC advertising is that an advertiser
derives value from her ad only when the user clicks on this ad. The ad platform
allocates ads to users that arrive over time.
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Consider the following simple (albeit highly idealized) model for PPC ad
allocation. Users arrive over time, and the ad platform needs to allocate an ad to
each arriving user. There is a set A of available ads. Each ad a is characterized by
the payment-per-click pia and click probability µa; the former quantity is known
to the algorithm, whereas the latter is not. If an ad a is chosen, it is clicked
on with probability µa, in which case payment pia is received. The goal is to
maximize the total payment. This setting, and various extensions thereof that
incorporate user/webpage context, has received a considerable attention in the
past several years (starting with [44, 45, 40]). In fact, the connection to PPC
advertising has been one of the main motivations for the recent surge of interest
in MAB.
We enrich the above setting by incorporating advertisers’ budgets. In the
most basic version, for each ad a there is a budget Ba — the maximal amount of
money that can be spent on this ad. More generally, an advertiser can have an
ad campaign which consists of a subset S of ads, so that there is a per-campaign
budget S . Even more generally, an advertiser can have a more complicated bud-
get structure: a family of overlapping subsets S ⊂ A and a separate budget BS
for each S . For example, BestBuy can have a total budget for the ad campaign,
and also separate budgets for ads about TVs and ads about computers. Finally,
in addition to budgets (i.e., constraints on the number of times ads are clicked),
an advertiser may wish to have similar constraints on the number of times ads
are shown. BwK allows us to express all these constraints.
Adjusting a repeated auction. An auction is held in every round, with a fresh
set of participants. The number of participants and a vector of their types come
from a fixed but unknown distribution. The auction is adjustable: it has some
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parameter that can be adjusted by the auctioneer. For example, [18] studies a
repeated second price auction with adjustable reserve price. The auctioneer has
a limited inventory and wishes to optimize revenue.
The prior work [18] considers the case of a single type of good and unlimited
inventory. They design an algorithm with O(
√
n log n) regret, where n is the
number of rounds; this regret is proved optimal.
BwK allows us to model limited inventory. For example, for the setting in
[18] our algorithm achieves O(k log n)2/3 regret, where k is the number of items.
Moreover, we can incorporate any auction design with adjustable parameter
that admits discretization (as defined in Section 3.8). Further, we can handle
multiple types of goods; such extension would correspond to multiple resource
constraints in BwK.
Repeated bidding. A bidder participates in a repeated auction, such as a spon-
sored search auction. In each round t, the bidder can adjust her bid bt based on
the past performance. The outcome for this bidder is a vector (pt, ut), where pt
is the payment and ut is the utility received. We assume that this vector comes
from a fixed but unknown distribution. The bidder has a fixed budget.
We model this as a BwK problem where arms correspond to the possible bids,
and the single resource is money. Note that (the basic version of) dynamic pro-
curement corresponds to this setting with two possible outcome vectors (pt, ut):
(0, 0) and (bt, 1).
The BwK setting also allows to incorporate more complicated constraints. For
example, an action can result in several different types of outcomes that are
useful for the bidder (e.g., an ad shown to a male or an ad shown to a female),
83
but the bidder is only interested in a limited quantity of each outcome.
3.7.4 Application to network routing and scheduling
In addition to applications to Electronic Markets, we describe two applications
to network routing and scheduling. In both applications an algorithm choose
between different feasible policies to handle arriving “service requests”, such as
connection requests in network routing and jobs in scheduling.
Adjusting a routing protocol. Consider the following stylized application to
routing in a communication network. Connection requests arrive one by one. A
connection request consists of a pair of terminals; assume the pair comes from
a fixed but unknown distribution. The system needs to choose a routing proto-
col for each connection, out of several possible routing protocols. The routing
protocol defines a path that connects the terminals; abstractly, each protocol is
simply a mapping from terminal pairs to paths. Once the path is chosen, a
connection between the terminals is established. Connections persist for a sig-
nificant amount of time. Each connection uses some amount of bandwidth. For
simplicity, we can assume that this amount is fixed over time for every con-
nection, and comes from a fixed but unknown distribution (although even a
deterministic version is interesting). Each edge in the network (or perhaps each
node) has a limited capacity: the total bandwidth of all connections that pass
though this edge or node cannot exceed some value. A connection which vi-
olates any capacity constraint is terminated. The goal is to satisfy a maximal
number of connections.
We model this problem as BwK as follows: arms correspond to the feasible
84
routing protocols, each edge/node is a limited resource, each satisfied connec-
tion is a unit reward.
Further, if the time horizon is partitioned in epochs, we can model dif-
ferent bandwidth utilization in each phase; then a resource in BwK is a pair
(edge,epoch).
Adjusting a scheduling policy. An application with a similar flavor arises in
the domain of scheduling long-running jobs to machines. Suppose jobs arrive
over time. Each job must be assigned to one of the machines (or dropped); once
assigned, a job stays in the system forever (or for some number of “epochs”),
and consumes some resources. Jobs have multiple “types” that can be observed
by the scheduler. For each type, the resource utilization comes from a fixed but
unknown distribution. Note that there may be multiple resources being con-
sumed on each machine: for example, jobs in a datacenter can consume CPU,
RAM, disk space, and network bandwidth. Each satisfied job of type i brings
utility ui. The goal of the scheduler is to maximize utility given the constrained
resources.
The mapping of this setting to BwK is straightforward. The only slightly sub-
tle point is how to define the arms: in BwK terms, arms correspond to all possible
mappings from job types to machines.
One can also consider an alternative formulation where there are several
allowed scheduling policies (mappings from types and current utilization of
resources to machines), and in every round the scheduler can choose to use one
of these policies. Then the arms in BwK correspond to the allowed policies.
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3.8 BwK with discretization
In this section we flesh out our approach to BwK with uniform discretization, as
discussed early in Section 3.7. The technical contribution here is a definition
of the appropriate structure, and proof that discretization does not do much
damage.
Definition 3.8.1. We say that arm a -covers arm y if the following two properties
are satisfied for each resource i and every latent structure µ in a given BwK
domain:
(i) r(a, µ)/ci(a, µ) ≥ r(y, µ)/ci(y, µ) − .
(ii) ci(a, µ) ≥ ci(y, µ).
A subset S ⊂ A of arms is called an -discretization of A if each arm in A is -
covered by some arm in S .
Note that we consider the difference in the ratio of expected reward to ex-
pected consumption, whereas for MAB in metric spaces it suffices to consider
the difference in expected rewards. For a typical application of uniform dis-
cretization it holds that A ⊂ R` for some ` ∈ N, and a suitably chosen mesh on
A is an -discretization. There are several types of meshes one could consider,
depending on the particular BwK domain: additive δ-mesh δN`, multiplicative δ-
mesh {(1−δ) j : j ∈ N}`, and hyperbolic δ-mesh { 11+ jδ : j ∈ N}`. For a particular mesh
M ⊂ R`, the “mesh on A” is simply A ∪ M.
Once we construct an -discretization S of A, we can run a BwK algorithm
on S and obtain expected total reward competitive with OPTLP(S ), the value of
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OPTLP if the action space is restricted to S . This makes sense if OPTLP(S ) is not
much worse than OPTLP(A).
Theorem 3.8.2 (BwK: discretization). Fix a BwK domain with action space A. Con-
sider an algorithm ALG which achieves expected total reward REW ≥ OPTLP(S ) − R(S )
if applied to the restricted action space S ⊂ A, for any given S ⊂ A. If S is an -
discretization of A, for some  ≥ 0, then
REW ≥ OPTLP(A) −  d B − R(S ).
The technical content in Theorem 3.8.2 is that OPTLP(S ) is not much worse
than OPTLP(A). Such result is typically trivial in MAB settings where the bench-
mark is the best fixed arm, but requires some work in our setting because we
need to consider distributions over arms.
Lemma 3.8.3. Consider an instance of BwK with action space A. Let S ⊂ A be an
-discretization of A, for some  ≥ 0. Then OPTLP(S ) ≥ OPTLP(A) −  d B
Proof. Let D be the distribution over arms in A which maximizes LP(D, µ). We
useD to construct a distributionDS over S which is nearly as good.
Let µ be the (actual) latent structure. For brevity, we will suppress µ from
the notation: ci(a) = ci(a, µ) and ci(D) = ci(D, µ) for arms a, distributions D and
resources i. Similarly, we will write r(a) = r(a, µ) and r(D) = r(D, µ).
We define DS as follows. Since S is an -discretization of A, there exists a
family of subsets (cov(a) ⊂ A : x ∈ A) so that each arm a -covers all arms
in cov(a), the subsets are disjoint, and their union is A. Fix one such family of
subsets, and define
DS (a) =
∑
y∈cov(a)
D(y) min
i
ci(y)
ci(a)
, x ∈ S .
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Note that
∑
x∈S DS (S ) ≤ 1 by Definition 3.8.1(ii). With the remaining probability,
the null arm is chosen (i.e., the algorithm skips a given round).
To argue that LP(DS , µ) is large, we upper-bound the resource consumption
ci(DS ), for each resource i, and lower-bound the reward r(DS ).
ci(DS ) = ∑x∈S ci(a)DS (a)
≤
∑
x∈S
ci(a)
∑
y∈cov(a)
D(y)ci(y)
ci(a)
=
∑
x∈S
∑
y∈cov(a)
D(y) ci(y) =
∑
y∈A
D(y)ci(y)
= ci(D) (3.36)
(Note that the above argument did not use the property (i) in Definition 3.8.1.)
r(DS ) = ∑x∈S r(a)DS (a)
=
∑
x∈S
r(a)
∑
y∈cov(a)
D(y) min
i
ci(y)
ci(a)
=
∑
x∈S
∑
y∈cov(a)
D(y) min
i
ci(y) r(a)
ci(a)
≥
∑
x∈S
∑
y∈cov(a)
D(y) min
i
r(y) − ci(y) (by Definition 3.8.1(i))
=
∑
y∈AD(y) mini r(y) − ci(y)
≥ ∑y∈AD(y) (r(y) −  ∑i ci(y))
= r(D) − ∑i ci(D). (3.37)
Let τ(D) = mini Bci(D) be the stopping time in the linear relaxation, so that
LP(D, µ) = τ(D) r(D). By Equation (3.36) we have τ(DS ) ≥ τ(D). We are ready
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for the final computation:
LP(DS , µ) = τ(DS ) r(DS )
≥ τ(D) r(DS )
≥ τ(D) (r(D) − ∑i ci(D)) (by Equation (3.37))
≥ r(D) τ(D) −  τ(D)∑i ci(D)
≥ LP(D, µ) −  d B. 
3.8.1 Discretization for dynamic procurement
A little more work is needed to apply uniform discretization for dynamic pro-
curement. Consider dynamic procurement with non-unit supply, as defined in
Section 3.7. Throughout this subsection, assume n agents, budget B, and ceil-
ing Λ. Recall that in each round t the algorithm makes an offer of the form
(pt, λt), where pt ∈ [0, 1] is the posted price per unit, and λt ≤ Λ is the max-
imal number of units offered for sale in this round. The action space here is
A = [0, 1] × {1 , . . . ,Λ}, the set of all possible (p, λ) pairs.
For each arm a = (p, λ), let S (a) be the expected number of items sold. Recall
that expected consumption is c(a) = p S (a), and expected reward is S (a). It
follows that r(a)c(a) =
1
p . By Definition 3.8.1 price p -covers price q < p if and only
if 1p ≥ 1q − .
It is easy to see that the hyperbolic -mesh S on [0, 1] is an -discretization:
namely, each arm (q, λ) is -covered by (q, λ), where p is the smallest price in S
such that p ≥ q. Unfortunately, such S has infinitely many points. In fact, it is
easy to see that any -discretization on A must be infinite (even for Λ = 1). To ob-
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tain a finite -discretization, we only consider prices p ≥ p0, for some parameter
p0 to be tuned later. We argue that this restriction is not too damaging:
Claim 3.8.4. Consider dynamic procurement with non-unit supply. Then for any p0 ∈
(0, 1) it holds that
OPTLP({0} ∪ [p0, 1]) ≥ OPTLP − Λ2p0n2/B.
Proof. When p0 > B/(nΛ) the bound is trivial and for the rest of the proof we
assume that p0 ≤ B/(nΛ). LetD be the distribution over arms which maximizes
LP(D, µ) to get OPTLP. By Claim 3.1.2, we can further assume thatD is LP-perfect.
Thus, D has a support set of size at most 2, say arms ai = (pi, λi), i = 1, 2, where
pi is the posted price and λi is the maximal allowed number of items. W.l.o.g.
assume p1 ≤ p2. Note that p1 can be 0, which would correspond to the “null
arm”. Moreover, letting si denote the expected number of items bought for arm
(pi, λi), then by LP-perfectness the expected consumption is
c(D, µ) = ∑2i=1D(ai) pisi ≤ B/n. (3.38)
(Formally, to apply Claim 3.1.2 one needs to divide the rewards and consump-
tions (and hence the budget) by Λ, so that consumptions and rewards in each
round are at most 1.)
Let us define a distributionD′ which has support in {0} ∪ [p0, 1].
• If p1 ≥ p0 then defineD′ = D and we get OPTLP({0} ∪ [p0, 1]) ≥ OPTLP.
• From here on, assume p1 < p0. If D is a distribution of support 1 (i.e
D′(a2) = 0) then define D′(B/(nΛ), λ1) = 1 and we get OPTLP({0} ∪ [p0, 1]) ≥
OPTLP.
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• If D is a distribution of support 2 then by LP-perfectness Equation (3.38)
is satisfied with equality. Therefore p2 ≥ B/(ns2) ≥ B/(nΛ). Define
D′(p0, λ1) = D(p1, λ1)
D′(p2, λ2) = max(0,D(p2, λ2) − p0Λp2 )
D′(0) = 1 −D′(p0) −D′(p2).
Then D′ forms a feasible solution to the linear program (3.1), with sup-
port in {0} ∪ [p0, 1], and with value LP(D′, µ) ≥ OPTLP − Λp0n/p2 ≥ OPTLP −
Λ2p0n2/B.

Let ALG be a BwK algorithm which achieves regret bound (1.1). Suppose ALG
is applied to a discretized instance of dynamic procurement, with m arms, n
agents and budget B. For unit supply (Λ = 1), ALG has regret R(m, n, B) =
O˜(
√
mn + n
√
m/B). For non-unit supply, in order to apply ALG we need to nor-
malize the problem instance so that per-round rewards and consumptions are
at most 1. That is, we need to divide all rewards, consumptions, and the bud-
get, by the factor of Λ. Thus we obtain regret R(m, n, B/Λ) on the normalized
instance, and therefore regret ΛR(m, n, B/Λ) on the original problem instance.
Using Lemma 3.8.3 and Claim 3.8.4 (and normalizing / re-normalizing) we ob-
tain the following regret bound:
Corollary 3.8.5. Consider dynamic procurement with non-unit supply. Fix , p0 ∈
(0, 1), and let S be the hyperbolic -mesh on [p0, 1]. Then running ALG on arms S ×
{1 , . . . ,Λ} achieves regret
ΛR(Λ|S |, n, B/Λ) + B + p0 Λ2 n2/B.
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Optimizing the parameters , p0 in Corollary 3.8.5, we obtain the final regret
bound.
Theorem 3.8.6. Consider dynamic procurement with non-unit supply. Assume n
agents, budget B and ceiling Λ. Let ALG be a BwK algorithm which achieves re-
gret bound (1.1). Applying ALG with a suitably chosen discretization yields regret
O˜(Λ3/2 n/B1/4).
3.9 Optimal dynamic policy beats the best fixed arm
Let us provide some examples of BwK problem instances in which the best dy-
namic policy (in fact, the best fixed distribution over arms) beats the best fixed
arm. We start with a very simple (but perhaps contrived) example of this phe-
nomenon. Then we provide more realistic examples that arise in the domains of
dynamic pricing and dynamic procurement.
Simple example. There are d arms; pulling arm i deterministically produces a
reward of 1, consumes one unit of resource i, and does not consume any other
resources. We are given an initial endowment of B units of each resource. Any
policy that plays a fixed arm i in each period is limited to a total reward of B
before running out of its budget of resource i. A policy that always plays a
uniformly random arm achieves an expected reward of nearly d ·B before its
resource budget runs out.
Dynamic pricing. Consider the basic setting of “dynamic pricing with limited
supply”: in each round a potential buyer arrives, and the seller offers him one
item at a price; there are k items and n > k potential buyers. One can easily con-
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struct distributions for which offering a mixture of two prices is strictly superior
to offering any fixed price. In fact this situation arises whenever the “revenue
curve” (the mapping from prices to expected revenue) is non-concave and its
value at the quantile k/n lies below its concave hull.
Let us provide a specific example. Fix any constant δ > 0, and let  = kδ−1/2.
Each buyer has the following two-point demand distribution: the buyer’s value
for item is v = 1 with probability 1n k
1/2+δ, and v =  with the remaining probabil-
ity.
To analyze this example, let REW(D) be the expected total reward (i.e., the
expected total revenue) from using a fixed distribution D over prices in each
round; let REW(p) be the same quantity when D deterministically picks a given
price p.
• Clearly, if one offers a fixed price in all rounds, it only makes sense to offer
prices p =  and p = 1. It is easy to see that REW() = k ·  ≤ k1/2+δ. and
REW(1) = 1 · Pr[sale at price 1 ] ≤ k1/2+δ.
• Now consider a distributionDwhich picks price  with probability k−k1/2+δn ,
and picks price 1 with the remaining probability. It is easy to show that
REW(D) ≥ (2 − o(1)) k1/2+δ.
So, REW(D) is essentially twice as large compared to the total expected rev-
enue of the best fixed arm.
Dynamic procurement. A similar example can be constructed in the domain
of dynamic procurement. Consider the basic setting thereof: in each round a
potential seller arrives, and the buyer offers to buy one item at a price; there are
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T sellers and the buyer is constrained to spend at most budget B. The buyer
has no value for left-over budget and each sellers value for the item is drawn
i.i.d from an unknown distribution. Then a mixture of two prices is strictly
superior to offering any fixed price whenever the “sales curve” (the mapping
from prices to probability of selling) is non-concave and its value at the quantile
B/T lies below its concave hull.
Let us provide a specific example. Fix any constant δ > 0, and let  = B1/2+δ.
Each seller has the following two-point demand distribution: the seller’s value
for item is v = 1 with probability BT , and v = 0 with the remaining probability.
We use the notation REW(D) and REW(p) as defined above.
• Clearly, if one offers a fixed price in all rounds, it only makes sense
to offer prices p = 0 and p = 1. It is easy to see that REW(0) <=
T · E[Probability of selling at price 0] = B. and REW(1) = B.
• Now consider a distributionDwhich picks price 0 with probability 1− B−T ,
and picks price 1 with the remaining probability. It is easy to show that
REW(D) ≥ (2 − o(1)) B.
Again, REW(D) is essentially twice as large compared to the total expected
sales of the best fixed arm.
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CHAPTER 4
RESOURCE CONSTRAINED CONTEXTUAL BANDITS
In this chapter we consider the generalization of the BwK problem which we
call “Resourceful contextual bandits”. In the previous chapter we introduced
two algorithms for the BwK problem and we generalize one of them to get an
algorithm for the contextual version in this chapter.
In section 4.1 we introduce the tools needed for our result. Then in sec-
tion 4.2 we will give will generalize the algorithm Mixture Elimintation for
BwK to Contexutal Mixture Elimination for the contextual version and present
its analysis in sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.8. We show that our bounds are tight in
some regimes with a lowerbound in section 4.6. We detail some of the dis-
cretization issue for certain applications in section 4.5 and discuss about the
applications in detail in section 4.7.
4.1 Tools
4.1.1 Linear approximation and the benchmark
We set up a linear relaxation that will be crucial throughout the paper. As a by-
product, we (effectively) reduce our benchmark to the best fixed distribution
over policies.
A given distribution P over policies defines an algorithm ALGP: in each round
a policy pi is sampled independently from P, and the action a = pi(x) is chosen.
The value of P is the total reward of this algorithm, in expectation over the out-
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come distribution.
As the value of P is difficult to characterize exactly, we approximate it (gen-
eralizing the approach from [7, 10] for the non-contextual version). We use a lin-
ear approximation where all rewards and consumptions are deterministic and
the time is continuous. Let r(P, µ) and ci(P, µ) be the expected per-round reward
and the expected per-round consumption of resource i for policy pi ∼ P, given
expected-outcomes tuple µ. Then the linear approximation corresponds to the
solution of a simple linear program:
Maximise t r(P, µ) in t ∈ R
subject to t ci(P, µ) ≤ B for each i
t ≥ 0.
(4.1)
The solution to this LP, which we call the LP-value of P, is
LP(P, µ) = r(P, µ) mini B/ci(P, µ). (4.2)
Denote OPTLP = supP LP(P, µ), where the supremum is over all distributions P
over Π.
Lemma 4.1.1. OPTLP ≥ OPT(Π).
Therefore, it suffices to compete against the best fixed distribution over Π
(as approximated by OPTLP), even though our benchmark OPT(Π) allows unre-
stricted changes over time.
A distribution P over Π that attains the supremum value OPTLP is called LP-
optimal. Such P is called LP-perfect if furthermore |support(P)| ≤ d + 1 and
ci(P, µ) ≤ B/T for each resource i. We find it useful to consider LP-perfect distri-
butions throughout the paper.
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Lemma 4.1.2. An LP-perfect distribution exists for any instance of RCB.
Lemma 4.1.1 and Lemma 4.1.2 hold for the non-contextual version of RCB
[10]. The general case can be reduced to the non-contextual version via a stan-
dard reduction where actions in the new problem correspond to policies in Π in
the original problem.
4.2 The algorithm: Contexutal Mixture Elimination
The algorithm’s goal is to converge on a LP-perfect distribution over policies.
The general design principle is to explore as much as possible while avoiding
obviously suboptimal decisions.
Overview of the algorithm. In each round t, the following happens.
1. Compute estimates. We compute high-confidence estimates for the per-round
reward r(pi) and per-round consumption ci(pi), for each policy pi ∈ Π and each
resource i. The collection I of all expected-outcomes tuple that are consistent
with these high-confidence estimates is called the confidence region.
2. Avoid obviously suboptimal decisions. We prune away all distributions P over
policies in Π that are not LP-perfect with high confidence. More precisely, we
prune all P that are not LP-perfect for any expected-outcomes tuple in the confi-
dence region I; the remaining distributions are called potentially LP-perfect. Let
F be the convex hull of the set of all potentially LP-perfect distributions.
3. Explore as much as possible. We choose a distribution P ∈ F which is balanced,
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in the sense that no action is starved; see Equation (4.3) for the precise definition.
Note that balanced distributions are typically not LP-perfect.
4. Select an action. We choose policy pi ∈ Π independently from P. Given context
x, the action a is chosen as a = pi(x). The algorithm adds some random noise:
with probability q0, the action a is instead chosen uniformly at random, for some
parameter q0.
The algorithm halts as soon as the time horizon is met, or one of the resources
is exhausted.
The pseudocode can be found in Algorithm 5.
Some details. After each round t, we estimate the per-round consumption ci(pi)
and the per-round reward r(pi), for each policy pi ∈ Π and each resource i, using
the following unbiased estimators:
ĉi(pi) =
ci 1{a=pi(x)}
P[a = pi(x) | x] and r̂(pi) =
r 1{a=pi(x)}
P[a = pi(x) | x] .
The corresponding time-averages up to round t are denoted
cˆt,i(pi) = 1t−1
t−1∑
s=1
ĉs,i(pi) and rˆt(pi) = 1t−1
t−1∑
s=1
r̂s(pi).
We show that with high probability these time-averages are close to their
respective expectations. To express the confidence term in a more lucid way, we
use the following shorthand, called confidence radius: radt(ν) =
√
Crad ν/t, where
Crad = Θ(log(dK T |Π|)) is a parameter which we will fix later. We show that
w.h.p. the following holds:
|r(pi) − rˆt(pi)| ≤ radt (K/αpi) , (4.4)
|ci(pi) − cˆt,i(pi)| ≤ radt (K/αpi) for all i. (4.5)
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Algorithm 5: Contexutal Mixture Elimination
1: Parameters: #actions K, time horizon T , budget B,
benchmark set Π, context distributionDX.
2: Data structure: “confidence region”
I ← { all feasible expected-outcomes tuples }.
3: For each round t = 1 . . . T do
4: ∆ = {distributions P over Π: P is LP-perfect for some µ′ ∈ I}.
5: Let F be the convex hull of ∆.
6: Let αpi = maxP∈F P(pi), ∀pi ∈ Π.
7: Choose a “balanced” distribution P ∈ F : any P such that ∀pi ∈ Π
E
x∼DX
[
1
(1 − q0) P(pi(x)|x) + q0K
]
≤ 2K
αpi
, where q0 = min
(
1
2 ,
√
K
T log(K T |Π|)
)
.
(4.3)
8: Observe context x; choose action a to ”play”:
9: with probability q0, draw a u.a.r. in A; else, draw pi ∼ P and let a = pi(x).
10: Observe outcome vector (r, c1 , . . . , cd).
11: Halt if one of the resources is exhausted.
12: Eliminate expected-outcomes tuples from I according to
equations (4.4-4.5)
(Here αpi = maxP∈F P(pi), as in Algorithm 5.)
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4.3 Correctness of the algorithm
We need to prove that in each round t, some P ∈ F satisfies (4.3), and Equa-
tions (4.4-4.5) hold for all policies pi ∈ Π with high probability.
Notation. Let αpi,t denote the αpi, pi ∈ Π computed in round t, and let Pt be the
distribution over Π chosen in this round. Let q0 be the noise probability. The
“noisy version” of Pt is defined as
P′t(a|x) = (1 − q0) Pt(a|x) + q0/K (∀x ∈ X, a ∈ A).
Then action a in round t is drawn from distribution P′t(·|xt).
Lemma 4.3.1. In each round t, some P ∈ F satisfies (4.3).
Proof. We extend the minimax argument from [23]. Let FΠ be the set of all dis-
tributions over Π. Our proof works for any q0 ∈ [0, 12 ] and any compact and
convex set F ⊂ FΠ.
Equation (4.3) holds for a given P ∈ F if and only if for every distribution
Z ∈ FΠ we have that
f (P,Z) , E
x∼DX
E
pi∼Z
[
αpi
P′(pi(x)|x)
]
≤ 2K,
where P′ is the noisy version of P. It suffices to show that
min
P∈F
max
Z∈FΠ
f (P,Z) ≤ 2K. (4.6)
We use a min-max argument: noting that f is a convex function of P and a
concave function of Z, by the Sion’s min-max theorem we have that
min
P∈F
max
Z∈FΠ
f (P,Z) = max
Z∈FΠ
min
P∈F
f (P,Z). (4.7)
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For each policy pi ∈ Π, let βpi ∈ argmaxβ∈F β(pi) be a distribution which maximizes
the probability of selecting pi. Such distribution exists because β 7→ β(pi) is a
continuous function on a convex set F . Recall that αpi = βpi(pi).
Given any Z ∈ FΠ, define distribution PZ ∈ FΠ by PZ(pi) = ∑φ∈Π Z(φ) βφ(pi).
Note that PZ is a convex combination of distributions in F . Since F is convex,
it follows that PZ ∈ F . Also, note that PZ(a|x) ≥ ∑pi∈Π: pi(x)=a Z(pi)αpi. Letting P′Z be
the noisy version of PZ, we have:
min
P∈F
f (P,Z) ≤ f (PZ,Z) = E
x∼DX
∑
pi
Z(pi)αpi
P′Z(pi(x)|x)

= E
x∼DX
∑
a∈A
∑
pi∈Π: pi(x)=a
Z(pi)αpi
P′Z(a|x)
 = Ex∼DX
∑
a∈X
∑
pi∈Π: pi(x)=a Z(pi)αpi
(1 − q0)P′Z(a|x) + q0/K

≤ E
x∼DX
∑
a∈X
1
1 − q0
 = K1 − q0 ≤ 2K.
Thus, by Equation (4.7) we obtain Equation (4.6). 
To analyze Equations (4.4-4.5), we will use concentration bound stated in
lemma 2.2.4.
Lemma 4.3.2. With probability at least 1 − 1T , Equations (4.4-4.5) hold for all rounds t
and policies pi ∈ Π.
Proof. Let us prove Equation (4.4). (The proof of (4.5) is similar.) Fix round t and
policy pi ∈ Π. We bound the conditional variance of the estimators r̂t(pi). Specif-
ically, let Gt be the σ-algebra induced by all events up to (but not including)
round t. Then
E
[̂
rt(pi)2 | Gt
]
= E
x∼DX, a∼P′t
[
r2t 1{pi(x)=a}
P′t(a|x)2
]
≤ E
x∼DX
[
1
P′t(pi(x)|x)
]
≤ 2K
αpi,t
.
The last inequality holds by the algorithm’s choice of distribution Pt. Since the
confidence region I in our algorithm is non-increasing over time, it follows that
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αpi,t is non-increasing in t, too. We conclude that Var
[̂
rs(pi) | Gt] ≤ 2K/αpi,t for
each round s ≤ t. Therefore, noting that r̂t(pi) ≤ 1/P′(pi(xt)|xt) ≤ K/q0, we obtain
Equation (4.4) by applying Lemma 2.2.4 with Xt = r̂t(pi) − r(pi). 
4.4 Regret analysis: proof of Theorem 1.5.4
We provide the key steps of the proof; the remaining pieces can be found in
Section 4.8.
Let It and ∆t be respectively, the confidence region I and the set ∆ of poten-
tially LP-perfect distributions computed in round t. Let Conv(∆t) be the convex
hull of ∆t.
First we bound the deviations within the confidence region.
Lemma 4.4.1. For any two expected-outcomes tuples µ′, µ′′ ∈ It and a distribution
P ∈ Conv(∆t):
|ci(P, µ′) − ci(P, µ′′)| ≤ radt (dK) for each resource i (4.8)
|r(P, µ′) − r(P, µ′′)| ≤ radt (dK) (4.9)
Proof. Let us prove Equation (4.9). (Equation (4.8) is proved similarly.) By defi-
nition of It:
|r(P, µ′) − r(P, µ′′)| ≤ ∑pi∈Π P(pi) |r(pi, µ′) − r(pi, µ′′)|
≤ ∑pi∈Π P(pi) radt (K/αpi,t) .
It remains to prove that the right-hand side is at most radt(dK). By linearity, it
suffices to prove this for P ∈ ∆t. So let us assume P ∈ ∆t from here on. Recall
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that |support(P)| ≤ d since P is LP-perfect, and P(pi) ≤ αpi,t for any policy pi ∈ Π.
Therefore:
∑
pi∈Π P(pi) radt
(
K/αpi,t
) ≤ ∑pi∈Π radt (KP(pi))
≤ radt (dK∑pi∈Π P(pi)) = radt (dK) . 
Using Lemma 4.4.1 and a long computation (fleshed out in Section 4.8), we
prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.4.2. For any two expected-outcomes tuples µ′, µ′′ ∈ It and a distribution
P ∈ Conv(∆t):
LP(P, µ′) − LP(P, µ′′) ≤ ( 1B LP(P, µ′) + 2) · T · radt(dK).
Lemma 4.4.3. For any distribution P′ ∈ Conv(∆t) and any expected-outcomes tuple
µ ∈ It,
min
P∈∆t
LP(P, µ) ≤ LP(P′, µ) ≤ max
P∈∆t
LP(P, µ). (4.10)
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. The second inequality in Equation (4.10)
follows easily because the distribution which maximizes LP(P, µ) by definition
belongs to ∆t, and so
LP(P′, µ) ≤ max
P∈Conv(∆t)
LP(P, µ) = max
P∈∆t
LP(P, µ).
To prove the first inequality in Equation (4.10), we first argue that LP(P, µ)
is a quasi-concave function of P. Denote ηi(P, µ) = B · r(P, µ)/ci(P, µ) for each
resource i. Then ηi is a quasi-concave function of P since each level set (the set of
distributions P that satisfy ηi(P, µ) ≥ α for some α ∈ R) is a convex set. Therefore
LP(P, µ) = mini ηi(P, µ) is a quasi-concave function of P as a minimum of quasi-
concave functions.
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Since P′ ∈ Conv(∆t), it is a convex combination P′ = ∑Q∈∆t αQ Q with∑
Q∈∆t αQ = 1. Therefore:
LP(P′, µ) = LP
∑
Q∈∆t
αQ Q, µ

≥ min
Q∈∆t ,αQ>0
LP(Q, µ) By definition of quasi-concave functions
≥ min
Q∈∆t
LP(Q, µ). 
Let REWt and Ct,i be, respectively, the (realized) total reward and average con-
sumption of resource i up to and including round t. Recall that P′t is the noisy
version of distribution Pt chosen by the algorithm in round t. Given Pt, the ex-
pected revenue and resource-i consumption in round t is, respectively, r(P′t , µ)
and ci(P′t , µ). Denote rt =
1
t
∑t
i=1 r(P
′
t , µ) and ci,t =
1
t
∑t
i=1 ci(P
′
t , µ).
Henceforth we assume a clean executionwhere several high-probability con-
ditions are satisfied. Formally, the algorithm’s execution is clean if in each round
t Equations (4.4-4.5) are satisfied, and moreover min
(
| 1t REWt − rt|, |Ct,i − ct,i|
)
≤
radt(1).
In particular, the set ∆t of potentially LP-perfect distributions indeed con-
tains a LP-perfect distribution. By Lemma 4.3.2 and Azuma-Hoeffding Inequal-
ity, clean execution happens with probability at least 1 − 1T . Thus, it suffices to
lower-bound the total reward REWT for a clean execution.
The following lemma captures a crucial argument. Denote
Φt =
(
2 + 1B
[
max
P∈FΠ, µ∈It
LP(P, µ)
])
· T · radt(dK)
Ψt = (2 + 1B OPTLP) · T · radt(dK).
Lemma 4.4.4. For any expected-outcomes tuple µ∗, µ∗∗ ∈ It and distributions P′, P′′ ∈
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Conv(∆t):
|LP(P′, µ∗) − LP(P′′, µ∗∗)| ≤ 3Φt. (4.11)
Proof. Assume P′, P′′ ∈ ∆t. In particular, P′, P′′ are LP-perfect for some expected-
outcomes tuples µ′, µ′′ ∈ It, respectively. Also, some distribution P∗ ∈ ∆t is
LP-perfect for µ∗. Therefore:
LP(P′, µ∗) ≥ LP(P′, µ′) − Φt (by Lemma 4.4.2: P = P′)
≥ LP(P∗, µ′) − Φt
≥ LP(P∗, µ∗) − 2Φt (by Lemma 4.4.2: P = P∗)
≥ LP(P′′, µ∗) − 2Φt.
We proved Equation (4.11) for P′, P′′ ∈ ∆t. Thus:
min
P∈∆t
LP(P, µ∗) −max
P∈∆t
LP(P, µ∗) ≤ 2Φt. (4.12)
Next we generalize to P′, P′′ ∈ Conv(∆t).
LP(P′, µ∗) ≥ min
P∈∆t
LP(P, µ∗) (by Lemma 4.4.3)
≥ max
P∈∆t
LP(P, µ∗) − 2Φt (by Equation (4.12))
≥ LP(P′′, µ∗) − 2Φt (by Lemma 4.4.3).
We proved Equation (4.11) for µ∗ = µ∗∗. We obtain the general case by plugging
in Lemma 4.4.2. 
Corollary 4.4.5. Φt ≤ 2Ψt, assuming that B ≥ 6 · T · radt(dK).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 4.4.4 via a simple computation. 
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Corollary 4.4.6. LP(Pt, µ) ≥ OPTLP − 12Ψt, where µ is the actual expected-outcomes
tuple.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 4.4.4 and Corollary 4.4.5, observing that Pt ∈
Conv(∆t) and OPTLP = LP(P∗, µ) for some P∗ ∈ ∆t. 
In the remainder of the proof (which is fleshed out in Section 4.8) we build
on the above lemmas and corollaries to prove the following sequence of claims:
REWt ≥ tT (OPTLP − O(Ψt))
Ct,i ≤ B/T + O(radt(dK)) (4.13)
REWT ≥ OPTLP − O(ΨT ).
To complete the proof of Theorem 1.5.4, we re-write the last equation as
REWT ≥ f (OPTLP) for an appropriate function f (), and observe that f (OPTLP) ≥
f (OPT) because function f () is increasing.
4.5 Discretization issues
In order to immediately apply Theorem 1.5.4, the set of all actions used by poli-
cies in Π, denote it A(Π), should be finite and small compared to T . However,
in some applications, such as dynamic pricing and dynamic procurement, the
set of all possible actions is infinite, so A(Π) may be prohibitively large or in-
finite, too. One way to handle such problem instances is discretization. Below,
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we outline the general approach, and work out the paradigmatic special case of
contextual dynamic pricing with a single product.
In particular, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 4.5.1. Consider contextual dynamic pricing with a limited supply B of a
single product. Let Π be the policy set and T be the time horizon. Then there exists a
policy set Π′ such that algorithm Contexutal Mixture Elimination satisfies
REW(Π′) ≥ OPT(Π) − O
(
(TB)1/3 · log (TB|Π|)
)
. (4.14)
Here REW(Π′) is the algorithm’s total expected reward if it is given policy set Π′.
Note that if B is at least a constant fraction of T , we obtain regret O˜(T 2/3),
which matches the lower bound (even) for the non-contextual version [7]. How-
ever, the optimal regret for the non-contextual version is O˜(B2/3) regret, and we
do not match that. With an upper bound of O˜(BT 1/3) and a lower bound of
Ω(B2/3), it is not clear what is the optimal regret here.
The general approach is as follows. For each  > 0 we define a -discretized
policy set Π that approximates Π so that |A(Π)| decreases with . The  con-
trols the tradeoff between the learning rate and the discretization error. We use
Theorem 1.5.4 to obtain a performance guarantee that depends on . Further,
we need a separate result that upper-bounds the discretization error of Π com-
pared to Π. Then we can optimize the choice of  to provide an algorithm with
a specific regret bound.
In what follows we apply this approach to dynamic pricing with B copies of
a single product. Recall that in this setting actions are prices, and the action set
is [0, 1] ∪ {∞}, the set of all possible prices. Here p = ∞ is the special price that
corresponds to skipping a round.
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First, let us introduce some notation. Let Π be an arbitrary (finite) policy set.
Let S (p|x) be the probability of a sale for price p and context x. For a randomized
policy pi, define S (pi|x) = Ep∼pi(x)[ S (p|x) ]. Let f(p), p ≥ 0 be the largest price p′ ≤ p
such that p′ ∈ N.
Second, for each policy pi ∈ Π we define a randomized policy pi : for each
context x,
pi(x) =

f(pi(x)) with probability S (pi|x)S ( f (pi(x)) |x)
∞ with the remaining probability.
(4.15)
The -discretized policy set is defined as Π = {pi : pi ∈ Π}.
Observe that the pi satisfies the following useful properties:
(i) A(pi) ⊂ N ∩ [0, 1], so that |A(Π)| ≤ 1 .
(ii) pi(x) ≥ pi(x) ≥ pi(x) −  for all contexts x,
(iii) S (pi |x) = S (pi|x) for all contexts x.
Third, let us bound the discretization error.
Lemma 4.5.2. OPTLP(Π) − OPTLP(Π) ≤ B, for each  > 0.
Proof. Fix  > 0 and a distribution P over policies in Π. Define the -discretized
distribution P over Π in a natural way: for each policy pi ∈ Π, select pi with
probability P(pi). It suffices to prove that LP(P) ≥ LP(P) − B.
Let r(P) and c(P) denote the expected per-round reward and the expected
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per-round consumption for distribution P. Then
c(P) = E
x,pi
[ S (pi |x) ] = E
x,pi
[ S (pi |x) ] = c(P)
r(P) = E
x,pi
[
f(pi(x)) · S (pi |x) ]
≥ E
x,pi
[ (pi(x) − ) · S (pi |x) ]
≥ E
x,pi
[ pi(x) · S (pi|x) ] −  E
x,pi
[ S (pi |x) ]
= r(P) −  c(P).
LP(P) = r(P)
B
c(P)
≥ r(P) B
c(P)
− B.
≥ LP(P) − B. 
Fourth, let us formulate an appropriate version Theorem 1.5.4. Recall that we
actually prove a somewhat stronger statement that is with respect to OPTLP(Π)
rather than OPT(Π). Namely, the algorithm’s expected total reward REW(Π) satis-
fies
REW(Π) ≥ OPTLP(Π) − O
(
1 + 1B OPTLP(Π)
) √
dKT log (dKT |Π|).
For this particular setting we have d = 1 (single constraint) and OPTLP(Π) ≤ B,
which implies
REW(Π) ≥ OPTLP(Π) − O
( √
KT log (KT |Π|)
)
.
Finally, plugging in Lemma 4.5.2, we obtain regret
REW(Π) ≥ OPTLP(Π) − B − O
(√
T

log
(
T

|Π |
))
, for each  > 0. (4.16)
We choose the  so as to optimize Equation (4.16).
In particular, we obtain Corollary 4.5.1 if we plug in |Π | ≤ |Π| (rather than
consider how |Π | decreases with ) and pick  = ( dTB2 )1/3.
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4.6 Lower bound: proof of Theorem 1.5.5
We will use the following lemma (which follows from simple probability argu-
ments).
Lemma 4.6.1. Consider two collections of n balls I1 and I2, each numbered from 1 to
n. Let I1 consists of all red balls, while I2 consist of n−1 red balls and 1 green ball (with
labels chosen uniformly at random). In this setting, let an algorithm is given access to
random samples from one of Ii with replacement. The algorithm is allowed to first look
at the ball’s number and then decide whether to inspect it’s color. Then any algorithm
A which with probability at least 1/2 can distinguish between I1 and I2 must inspect
color of at least n/2 balls in expectation.
Let us define a family of problem instances as follows. Let the set of arms be
{a1, a2, . . . , ak}. There are T/B different contexts labelled {x1, ..., xT/B} and there is
a uniform distribution over contexts. There are T (K −1)/B policies. Let them be
indexed as pii, j for 2 ≤ i ≤ K and 1 ≤ j ≤ T/B. Define them as follows: pii, j(xl) = ai
for l = j, and pii, j(xl) = a1 for l , j.
There is just one resource constraint. Pulling arm a1 always costs 0 and arm
ai, i , 1 always costs 1. Now consider the following problem instances:
• Let F0 be the instance in which every arm always gives a reward 0. Note that
OPT(F0) = 0.
• Let Fi, j be the instance in which arm a j on context x j gives reward 1, otherwise
every arm on every context gives reward 0. Note that in this case the optimal
distribution over policies is just to follow pii, j and gets reward ≈ B.
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Now consider any algorithmA and let the expected number of times it pulls
arm ai be pi on input F0. Let i′, i′ , 1 be the arm for which this is minimum.
Then by simple linearity of expectation we get that B ≥ (K − 1)pi′ . It is also
simple to see that for the algorithm to get a regret better than Ω(OPT) it should
be able to distinguish between F0 and Fi′,. at least with probability 1/2. From
lemma 4.6.1 this can be done iff pi′ ≥ T/(2B). Combining the two equations we
get B ≥ (K − 1)T/(2B). Solving for B we get B ≥ √KT/2.
4.7 RCB: applications and special cases
In this section we discuss the application domains of resource-constrained (con-
textual) bandits in more detail. We focus on the three main application do-
mains: dynamic pricing, dynamic procurement, and dynamic ad allocation. A
more extensive discussion of these and other application domains (in the non-
contextual version) can be found in [10, 11].
Dynamic pricing with limited supply. The algorithm is a monopolistic seller
with a limited inventory. In the basic version, there is a limited supply of iden-
tical items. In each round, a new customer arrives, the algorithm picks a price,
and offers one item for sale at this price. The customer then either buys the item
at this price, or rejects the offer and leaves. The “context” represents the avail-
able information about the current customer, such as demographics, location,
etc. The probability of selling at a given price for a given context (a.k.a. the
demand distribution) is fixed over time, but not known to the algorithm. The al-
gorithm optimizes the revenue; it does not derive any utility from the left-over
items.
111
We represent this problem as an instance of RCB as follows. “Actions” are the
possible prices, and the “resource constraint” is the number of items. In each
round, the outcome vector is a pair (reward, items sold); if the offered price is p,
the outcome vector is (p, 1) if there is a sale, and (0, 0) otherwise.
Many generalizations of dynamic pricing have been studied in the litera-
ture. In particular, RCB subsumes a number of extensions. First, an algorithm
can sell multiple items to the same customer, possibly with volume discounts
or surcharges. Second, an algorithm can have multiple products for sale, with
limited inventory of each. Third, it may be advantageous to offer bundles con-
sisting of different products, possibly with non-additive pricing (mirroring the
non-additive valuations of the customers).
Dynamic procurement on a budget. The algorithm is a monopolistic buyer
with a limited budget. The basic version is as follows. In each round, a new
customer arrives, the algorithm picks a price, and offers to buy one item at this
price. Then the customer either accepts the offer and sells the item at this price,
or rejects the offer and leaves. The “context” is the available information on
the current customer. The probability of buying at a given price for a given
context (a.k.a. the “supply distribution”) is fixed over time, but not known to
the algorithm. The algorithm maximizes the number of items bought; it has no
utility for the left-over money.
An alternative interpretation is that the algorithm is a contractor which hires
workers to perform tasks, e.g. in a crowdsourcing market. In each round, a new
worker arrives, the algorithm picks a price, and offers the worker to perform
one task for this price; the worker then either accepts and performs the task
at this price, or rejects and leaves. The relevant “context” for a worker in a
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crowdsourcing market may include, for example, age, location, language, and
task preferences.
Here, “actions” correspond to the possible prices, and the “resource con-
straint” is the buyer’s budget. In each round, the outcome vector is a pair (items
bought, money spent); if the offered price is p, then the outcome vector is (1, p)
if the offer is accepted, and (0, 0) otherwise.
Dynamic procurement is a rich problem space, both for buying items and
for hiring workers (see [48] for a discussion of the application to crowdsourc-
ing markets). In particular, RCB subsumes a number of extensions of this basic
setting. First, the algorithm may offer several tasks to the same worker, pos-
sibly at a discount. Second, there may be multiple types of tasks, each having
a different value for the contractor; moreover, there may be additional budget
constraints on each task type, or on various subsets of task types. Third, a given
worker can be offered a bundle of tasks, consisting of tasks of multiple types,
possibly with non-additive pricing. Fourth, there is a way to model the presence
of competition (other contractors).
Dynamic ad allocation with budgets. The algorithm is an advertising plat-
form. In the basic version, there is a fixed collection of ads to choose from. In
each round, a user arrives, and the algorithm chooses one ad to display to this
user. The user either clicks on this ad, or leaves without clicking. The algorithm
receives a payment if and only if the ad is clicked; the payment for a given ad
is fixed over time and known to the algorithm. The “context” is the available
information about the user and the page on which the ad is displayed. The click
probability for a given ad and a given context is constant over time, but not
known to the algorithm.
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Each ad belongs to some advertiser (who is the one paying the algorithm
when this ad is clicked). Each advertiser may own multiple ads, and has a
budget constraint: a maximal amount of money that can be spent on all his ads.
Moreover, an advertiser may specify additional budget constraints on various
subsets of the ads. The algorithm maximizes its revenue; it derives no utility
from the left-over budgets.
Here, “actions” correspond to ads, and each budget corresponds to a sep-
arate resource. In a round when the chosen ad a is clicked, the reward is the
corresponding payment v, and the resource consumption is v for each budget
that involves a, and 0 for all other budgets. If the ad is not clicked, the reward
and the consumption of each resource is 0.
RCB also subsumes more advanced versions in which multiple non-zero out-
comes are possible in each round. For example, the ad platform may record
what happens after the click, e.g. the time spent on the page linked from the ad
and whether this interaction has resulted in a sale.
4.8 Regret analysis: missing proofs
Here we provide the remaining pieces for the regret analysis in Section 4.4.
4.8.1 Proof of Lemma 4.4.2
We restate the lemma for convenience.
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Lemma For any two expected-outcomes tuples µ′, µ′′ ∈ It and a distribution
P ∈ Conv(∆t):
LP(P, µ′) − LP(P, µ′′) ≤ ( 1B LP(P, µ′) + 2) · T · radt(dK).
Proof. For brevity, we will denote:
LP′ = LP(P, µ′) and LP′′ = LP(P, µ′′)
r′ = r(P, µ′) and r′′ = r(P, µ′′)
c′i = ci(P, µ
′) and c′′i = ci(P, µ
′′).
By symmetry, it suffices to prove the upper bound for LP′ − LP′′. Henceforth,
assume LP′ > LP′′.
We consider two cases, depending on whether
T ≤ B/c′′i for all resources i. (4.17)
Case 1. Assume Equation (4.17) holds. Then LP′′ = T r′′. Therefore by
Lemma 4.4.1
LP′ − LP′′ ≤ T r′ − T r′′ ≤ T radt(dK).
Case 2. Assume Equation (4.17) fails. Then LP′′ = B r′′/c′′i for some resource
i. We consider two subcases, depending on whether
T ≤ B/c′j for all resources j. (4.18)
Subcase 1. Assume Equation (4.18) holds. Then:
LP′ = T r′ (4.19)
LP′′ ≤ T ·min(r′, r′′) ≤ LP′ (4.20)
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Equation (4.20) follows from (4.19) and LP′ > LP′′.
For δ ∈ [0, c′′i ), define
r(δ) = r′′ + δ
ci(δ) = c′′i − δ
f (δ) = B r(δ)/ci(δ).
Then f () is monotonically and continuously increasing function, with f (δ)→ ∞
as δ→ c′′i . For convenience, define f (c′′i ) = ∞.
Let δ0 = min(c′′i , radt(dK)). By Lemma 4.4.1, we have f (δ0) ≥ Br′/c′i . There-
fore:
f (0) = LP′′ < LP′ ≤ Br′/c′i ≤ f (δ0).
Thus, by Equation (4.20), we can fix δ ∈ [0, δ0) such that f (δ) = T ·min(r′, r′′).
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LP′′ = B
r′′
c′′i
= B
r(δ) − δ
ci(δ) + δ
≥ B r(δ) − δ
ci(δ)
(
1 − δ
ci(δ)
)
.
f (δ) − LP′′ ≤ B
ci(δ)
δ + B
r(δ)
ci(δ)2
δ
=
(
1 +
r(δ)
ci(δ)
)
B δ
ci(δ)
=
(
1 +
f (δ)
B
)
f (δ) δ
r(δ)
≤
(
1 +
T r′
B
)
T r′′ δ
r(δ)
≤
(
1 +
LP′
B
)
T δ
≤ (LP′/B + 1) · T · radt(dK).
LP′ − f (δ) = T r′ − T min(r′, r′)
≤ T · radt(dK)
LP′ − LP′′ = (LP′ − f (δ)) + ( f (δ) − LP′′)
≤ (LP′/B + 2) · T · radt(dK).
Subcase 2. Assume Equation (4.18) fails. Then LP′ = B r′/c′j for some re-
source j. Note that c′i ≤ c′j and c′′j ≤ c′′i by the choice of i and j.
From these inequalities and Lemma 4.4.1 we obtain c′′i ≤ c′j+radt(dK). There-
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fore,
B
r′′
c′′i
≥ B r
′ − radt(dK)
c′j + radt(dK)
(by Lemma 4.4.1)
≥ B r
′ − radt(dK)
c′j
1 − radt(dK)c′j
 .
LP′ − LP′′ = Br
′
c′j
− Br
′′
c′′i
≤
 Bc′j + B r
′
(c′′j )2
 radt(dK)
≤
(
T + LP′
T
B
)
radt(dK)
≤ (LP′/B + 1) · T · radt(dK). 
4.8.2 The remainder of the proof after Lemma 4.4.4
We start with Corollary 4.4.5, which we restate here for convenience.
Corollary Φt ≤ 2Ψt, assuming that B ≥ 6 · T · radt(dK).
Proof. Let γ = maxP∈FΠ,µ∈It LP(P, µ). Note that γ ≤ T . Then from Lemma 4.4.4 we
obtain:
γ − OPTLP ≤ 3( γB + 2) · T · radt(dK) ≤ γ2 + 6 · T · radt(dK). (4.21)
Using (4.21) and Lemma 4.4.4 we get the desired bound:
Φt ≤ ( γB + 2) · T · radt(dK)
≤
(
2 OPTLP + 12 · T · radt(dK)
B
+ 2
)
· T · radt(dK)
≤
(
2 OPTLP
B
+ 4
)
· T · radt(dK) = 2Ψt. 
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In the remainder of this section, we prove the claims in Equation (4.13) one
by one.
Corollary 4.8.1. REWt ≥ tT (OPTLP − O(Ψt)) for each round t ≤ τ.
Proof. From Lemma 4.4.6 we obtain
T r(P′t , µ) ≥ (1 − q0) LP(Pt, µ)
≥ (1 − q0) (OPTLP − 12Ψt)
≥ OPTLP − 13Ψt.
Summing up and taking average over rounds, we obtain:
T rt ≥ OPTLP − 13t
∑t
s=1 Ψs ≥ OPTLP − O(Ψt).
By definition of clean execution, we obtain:
REWt ≥ t(rt − radt(rt)) ≥ tT (OPTLP − O(Ψt)).
Corollary 4.8.2. Ct,i ≤ B/T + O(radt(dK)) for each round t ≤ τ.
Proof. Let µ be the (actual) expected-outcomes tuple, and recall that Pt is LP-
optimal for some expected-outcomes tuple µ′ ∈ ∆t. Then, by Lemma 4.4.1, it
follows that ci(Pt, µ) ≤ ci(Pt, µ′) + radt(dK). Furthermore since Pt is LP-optimal
for µ′ we have ci(Pt, µ′) ≤ BT . Therefore:
ci(Pt, µ) ≤ BT + radt(dK)
ci(P′t , µ) ≤ (1 − q0) ci(Pt, µ) + q0
≤ BT + O(radt(dK)).
Now summing and taking average we obtain ct,i ≤ BT + O(radt(dK)). Using the
definition of clean execution, it follows that
Ct,i ≤ ct,i + radt(ct,i) ≤ BT + O(radt(dK)). 
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Lemma 4.8.3. REWT ≥ OPTLP − O(ΨT ).
Proof. Either τ = T or some resource i gets exhausted, in which case (using
Corollary 4.8.2)
τ =
B
Cτ,i
≥ BB
T + radτ(dK)
⇒ τ BT + τradτ(dK) ≥ B
⇒ τ BT + TradT (dK) ≥ B
⇒ τ ≥ T
(
1 − TB radT (dK)
)
. (4.22)
Using this lower bound and Corollary 4.8.1, we obtain the desired bound on the
total revenue REWT .
REWT = REWτ ≥ τT ( OPTLP − O(Ψτ) )
≥ OPTLP(1 − TB radT (dK)) −
O(τΨτ)
T
≥ OPTLP − ΨT − O(τΨτ)T .
In the above, the first inequality holds by Corollary 4.8.1, the second by Equa-
tion (4.22), and the third by definition of ΨT .
Finally, we note that τΨτ is an increasing function of τ, and substitute τΨτ ≤
TΨT . 
We complete the proof of Theorem 1.5.4 as follows. Re-writing Lemma 4.8.3
as REWT ≥ f (OPTLP), for an appropriate function f (), note that REWT ≥ f (OPT)
because function f () is increasing.
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CHAPTER 5
DYNAMIC PROCUREMENT
In this chapter we consider the special case of dynamic procurement and its
generalizations. In section 5.1 we consider symmetric submodular procurement
and propose a novel random walk based mechanism which achieves a constant
factor approximation. Then in section 5.2 we consider the general submodu-
lar procurement and propose a guessing based mechanism which is a O(log n)
approximation.
5.1 Posted Price Mechanisms for Unknown Distributions
In this section we assume that the utility function f is a a symmetric submodu-
lar function, and we design a O(1)-competitive posted price mechanism for the
i.i.d. model. Our focus throughout most of this section is on the special case
f (S ) = |S |. In this special case, our goal can be restated as follows: we must
show how a buyer with a budget of B can purchase approximately as many
services as possible using a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers to sellers with
i.i.d. costs, without knowing the distribution of costs in advance. Later, in Sub-
section 5.1.2, we show how this result for the function f (S ) = |S | easily implies
a constant-factor approximation for general symmetric submodular f . The case
of non-symmetric submodular functions is deferred to Sections 5.2 and 5.3. We
emphasize that in this section we target only a constant-factor approximation,
and we do not optimize for this constant.
It is instructive to compare our setting to an online single-item posted-price
auction with i.i.d. bidders. For this problem [6] shows a Ω( log hlog log h ) lower bound.
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Here h is the ratio between maximum possible value and minimum possible
value. Our result illustrates that the hardness of posted pricing in the i.i.d.
model with an unknown distribution does not extend to budgeted procure-
ment with a symmetric submodular utility function. To achieve a constant-
approximation, we need to develop a novel algorithm that is quite different
from existing algorithms in the literature on online posted pricing. Specifically,
rather than reducing to a multi-armed bandit problem and using a general-
purpose bandit algorithm (which is inapplicable in our setting because of the
budget constraint) we design an algorithm that is quite different from bandit al-
gorithms: in effect, it emulates a stochastic search for the optimal price using a
multiplicative-increase multiplicative-decrease rule, with a simple sample-and-
average policy guiding the multiplicative updates. We show, via a somewhat
intricate analysis, that the stochastic search inflicts only a constant-factor loss
relative to a buyer with foreknowledge of the optimal price. In effect, this in-
volves showing that the algorithm has such a strong bias toward the optimal
price that (with constant probability) a constant fraction of all the prices it offers
are at or near the optimal price.
5.1.1 Algorithm for the Special Case f (S ) = |S |
Before describing the details of the algorithm and its analysis, it will be useful
to outline the main ideas. To begin with, consider what would happen if the
algorithm were to offer a fixed price p to every agent. The budget constraint
ensures that it cannot procure more than B/p services at this price, while the
limitation on the number of agents ensures it cannot procure more than n · s(p)
services in expectation, where s(p) is the probability of a random agent accept-
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ing an offer at price p. It is approximately optimal to offer a price that balances
these two terms, i.e. a price p such that B/p = Θ(n · s(p)). Lemma 5.1.1 justifies
this intuition.
Our algorithm descretizes the price range into a geometric progression
p1, . . . , pm and the main loop of the algorithm emulates a Markov chain whose
state set is the set {p1, . . . , pm}. As explained in the preceding paragraph, states
p that satisfy B/p = Θ(n · s(p)) play a special role in the analysis, and below we
define a set of good states consisting of either one state or two consecutive states
satisfying this relation.
The algorithm’s goal is to search for a good state and then remain in a good
state as often as possible thereafter. Since a good state is one in which s(p) · npB =
Θ(1), we can test if a state p is good by making Θ
(
np
B
)
offers at price p and seeing
if Θ(1) of them are accepted. This test is implemented in a subroutine denoted
by TEST(i) in the algorithm description below. If the test produces significantly
fewer than the anticipated number of successes, we know that the price is too
low and we move to the next price in the geometric progression. Similarly, if
the test produces significantly more than the anticipated number of successes,
we know that the price is too high and we move to the preceding price in the
geometric progression.
The foregoing discussion motivates Lemma 5.1.2 below, in which we show
that the algorithm has a strong bias to drift toward the set of good states. Ap-
plying standard techniques from the analysis of random walks, this means that
after finding a good state, it makes only very brief excursions away from the
set of good states: each excursion occupies only a constant number of TEST(·)
phases in expectation, and the distribution of the excursion lengths has an ex-
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ponential tail. Lemma 5.1.4 capitalizes on this fact to prove bounds on the ex-
pected number of offers made and the expected amount of money spent dur-
ing any such excursion. The bounds state that for each of these two resources
(offers and money) the expected amount consumed during an excursion is O(1)
times the expected amount consumed during a single good phase (i.e., a TEST(·)
phase carried out in a good state). The initialization phase, before the first time
that the algorithm reaches a good state, can also be treated as an excursion for
present purposes; see Corollary 5.1.5 below. The theorem that our algorithm is
constant-competitive (Theorem 5.1.6) now follows by combining these observa-
tions: the analysis of random-walk excursions ensures that (in expectation) a
constant fraction of our resources are consumed in good states, and the defini-
tion of good states ensures that resources consumed in good states are converted
into accepted offers at the (approximately) optimal rate.
We present our algorithm in pseudo-code in Algorithm 6. We also explain
our algorithm in plain english below.
The algorithm uses states 1, 2, . . . ,m with associated prices p1, p2, . . . , pm that
form a geometric progression with common ratio r. The progression starts at
B/n, so that p1 = B/n, B/(z · r) < pm ≤ B/z, and pi+1 = r · pi for 0 ≤ i < m. The main
loop of the algorithm is a loop that, in state i, runs a subroutine TEST(i) whose
output is an element of {i − 1, i, i + 1}. The output of TEST(i) becomes the new
state.
Subroutine TEST(i) operates as follows. It offers price p = pi to anp/B bid-
ders, for some constant a. If the number of accepted offers is ever greater than
a(1+δ) it quits the subroutine immediately and outputs state i−1. If the number
of successes is less than a(1 − δ), then it outputs state i + 1. Otherwise it outputs
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Algorithm 6: RAND WALK
δ = 1/10, r = 2, a = 4000, z = 300000.
With probability 1/2:
Consider states p1, p2, . . . , pm where p1 = Bn , pi+1 = r · pi for 1 ≤ i < m, and
B
rz < pm ≤ Bz .
Initialize state i = m.
TEST(i): Set price p = pi.
1. Offer price p to the next anpB sellers, or until the sellers or budget runs
out.
In case more than a(1 + δ) offers are accepted, then stop offering and
move to step 2.
2. Let t be the number of sellers who accept.
i. If a(1 − δ) ≤ t ≤ a(1 + δ) then go to TEST(i).
ii. If t > a(1 + δ) then update i to i − 1 and go to TEST(i − 1).
iii. If t < a(1 − δ) then update i to i + 1 and go to TEST(i + 1).
With probability 1/2:
Allocate to the first agent with cost ci ≤ B
state i.
Analysis of the algorithm. Let ` be the index such that B/p`−1 ≥ n · s(p`−1) and
B/p` < n · s(p`) where s(p) is the probability that a seller sells while offering
at price p. (Note that B/p is a decreasing function of p whereas s(p) is non-
decreasing, hence p` is undefined if and only if B/pm ≥ n · s(pm). But in such a
case the second half of our algorithm — which with probability 1/2 sells to a
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single player — is a 4rz approximation according to Lemma 5.1.1.)
Lemma 5.1.1. E(|OPT |) ≤ 2r · B/p`
Proof. Consider any specific realization of the random variables representing
the costs of each seller. Define
O1 = {i|ci ≤ p`−1 and i ∈ OPT }
O2 = {i|ci > p`−1 and i ∈ OPT }
O3 = {i|ci ≤ p`−1}.
We obtain our upper bound on E(|OPT |) by comparison with the expected car-
dinalities of O1,O2,O3 as follows.
E(|OPT |) = E(|O1| + |O2|)
≤ E(|O3|) + E(|O2|)
= ns(p`−1) + E(|O2|)
≤ ns(p`−1) + Bp`−1 ≤ Bp`−1 + Bp`−1 = 2r Bp`

Define the set of good states to be GS = {pi|i ≤ ` and s(pi) ≥ B(1−2δ)npi }. Note that
p` ∈ GS ⊆ {p`−1, p`}. In a good state pi, the expected number of accepted offers
during TEST(i) is
anpis(pi)
B ≥ (1 − 2δ)a.
This partially justifies the term “good states”, since the algorithm is designed to
find a state in which the expected number of accepted offers equals a.
Lemma 5.1.2. If p = pi satisfies p < p′,∀p′ ∈ GS then TEST(i) outputs i + 1 with
probability at least 1 − (1 − 2δ)/(δ2a). If p > p′,∀p′ ∈ GS then TEST(i) outputs i − 1
with probability at least 1 − (1 − 2δ)/(δ2a).
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Proof. We will use the fact that the variance of a Bernoulli random variable is
bounded above by its expectation; consequently the same property holds for
sums of independent Bernoulli random variables. By an application of Cheby-
shev’s Inequality, then, if the expectation of a sum of Bernoulli random variables
is y, then the probability that the sum differs from its expectation by more than
w is at most y/w2.
If s(p) < (1−2δ)Bnp then the expected number of successes in TEST(i) is less than
anp
B · (1−2δ)Bnp = (1 − 2δ)a. Let y ∈ [0, (1 − 2δ)a] be the expected number of successes.
The probability that the number of successes is greater than or equal to a(1 − δ)
is at most y(a(1−δ)−y)2 ≤ (1−2δ)aδ2a2 = 1−2δδ2a .
If s(p) ≥ s(pl) > Bnpl ≥ rBnp > B(1−2δ)np then the expected number of successes in
TEST(i) is greater than anpB · B(1−2δ)np = (1− 2δ)−1a. The probability that the number
of successes is less than or equal to a(1 + δ) is at most a/(1−2δ)(δ+2δ2)2a2/(1−2δ)2 ≤ 1−2δδ2a . 
Informally, Lemma 5.1.2 says that when the current price is far from the good
states, the random walk is biased to drift in the direction of the good states.
Analyzing this biased random walk is the crux of our proof. To simplify the
analysis, we couple the algorithm’s random walk with a simpler random walk
in which the bias to drift toward the good states is exactly equal to the lower
bound asserted in Lemma 5.1.2. Denote this bias by β = 1 − (1 − 2δ)/(δ2a). The
algorithm’s Markov chainM1 is defined to have states 1, 2, . . . ,m, and the tran-
sition probability from state i to state j ∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1} is equal to the probability
that an execution of TEST(i) finishes by calling TEST( j). (Conditional on hav-
ing a nonzero budget and number of sellers remaining at the end of TEST(i).)
We compare this Markov chain to another one, M2, defined on the set of non-
negative integers. State 0 is an absorbing state of M2 and in every other state
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. . . ` ` + 1
α`+1
` + 2
α`+2
. . .
α`+3
Figure 5.1: Actual Markov chain with αi ≥ β for i ≥ l + 1
. . . 0 1
β
2
β
1 − β
. . .
β
1 − β
Figure 5.2: New Markov chain
i > 0, the transition probabilities to states i−1 and i+1 are β and 1−β, respectively.
The two Markov chains are depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let ∆(i) denote the distance from state i to the set of good states,
i.e.
∆(i) = min
j∈GS |i − j|.
The following lemma, stated informally, says the Markov chain M2 starting
from state ∆(i) provides an upper bound on the stochastic process describing
the distance from GS when one starts M1 in state i and runs it until it reaches
GS .
Lemma 5.1.3. Let i be any state ofM1. There is a coupling ofM1 andM2 such that
M1 starts in state i0 = i,M2 starts in state k0 = ∆(i), and at any time t ≥ 0 if the first
Markov chain’s state sequence i0, i1, . . . , it−1 does not include any element of GS , then
the current pair of states (it, kt) satisfies kt ≥ ∆(it).
Proof. The coupling is easy to describe. When the two Markov chains are in
states (i, k), respectively, if i ∈ GS we couple them arbitrarily, e.g. by updating i
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and k independently using the transition probability of their respective Markov
chains. If i < GS let i′ denote the neighboring state that is closer to GS than i:
i′ = i + 1 if i < j for all j ∈ GS , and i′ = i − 1 if i > j for all j ∈ GS . Let αi denote
the transition probability from i to i′ in M1, and let σi denote the transition
probability from i to itself inM1. Our coupling in state (i, k) works as follows.
With probability β we update i to i′ and k to k − 1. With the remaining 1 − β
probability, we update k to k + 1 and update i as follows: it transitions to i′ with
probability αi − β, to i with probability σi, and to 2i − i′ (the other neighboring
state) with probability 1 − αi − σi. It is immediate from our definition of the
coupling that if (it−1, kt−1) and (it, kt) are two consecutive state pairs such that
it−1 < GS , then
∆(it) − ∆(it−1) ≤ kt − kt−1. (5.1)
The lemma follows by summing Equation (5.1) over all time steps preceding
t. 
Lemma 5.1.4. Consider a sequence of phases in our algorithm’s execution beginning
with TEST(i) where i < GS and ending immediately before the first subsequent instance
of TEST( j) such that j ∈ GS . In total during this sequence of phases, the algorithm
makes no more than (anp`/B)φ(∆(i)) offers in expectation and spends no more than
a(1 + δ)p`φ(∆(i)) of its budget in expectation, where φ(·) is the function
φ(k) =
r
r − β − (1 − β)r2 · (r
k − 1). (5.2)
Proof. Let `′ denote the minimum element of GS (either ` or ` − 1). For a given
value ∆, there are at most two states i such that ∆(i) = ∆, namely i = ` + ∆
and i = `′ − ∆. In state ` + ∆, the algorithm makes anpi/B = anp`r∆/B offers in
expectation, and it spends at most a(1 + δ)pi = a(1 + δ)p`r∆ because subroutine
TEST(i) stops making offers after a(1 + δ) offers have been accepted. In state
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`′ − ∆ the algorithm makes anp`′r−∆/B offers in expectation, and it spends at
most a(1 + δ)p`′r−∆. Thus, for a given value of ∆, the expected number of offers
made and the expected amount spent in state ` + ∆ are both greater than their
counterparts in state `′ − ∆. Accordingly, it suffices to prove the lemma for i =
` + ∆.
To do so, we use the coupling provided by Lemma 5.1.3. Our algorithm pro-
ceeds through a sequence of states i0, i1, . . . , iT such that iT is the first state in the
sequence that belongs to GS . Meanwhile Markov chain M2 proceeds through
a sequence of states k0, k1, . . . , kT such that kt ≥ ∆(it) for all t = 0, . . . ,T . By the
foregoing discussion, the expected number of offers made by our algorithm and
the expected amount spent are respectively bounded above by
E[offers made] ≤
T−1∑
t=0
anp`rkt/B =
anp`
B
T−1∑
t=0
rkt
E[amount spent] ≤
T−1∑
t=0
a(1 + δ)p`rkt = a(1 + δ)
T−1∑
t=0
rkt .
Thus, to complete the lemma, it suffices to bound E
[∑T−1
t=0 r
kt
]
. We do so by in-
troducing another stopping time τ, defined to be the earliest t such that kt = 0.
Note that τ ≥ T , so ∑τ−1t=0 rkt ≥ ∑T−1t=0 rkt . Define
φ(k) = E
 τ−1∑
t=0
rkt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ k0 = k
 .
The function φ satisfies the linear recurrence
φ(k) = rk + βφ(k − 1) + (1 − β)φ(k + 1)
for k > 0, with the initial condition φ(0) = 0. Solving the recurrence we find that
equation Equation (5.2) in the statement of the lemma specifies the solution. 
In the sequel, let c1 = rr−β−(1−β)r2 .
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Corollary 5.1.5. Consider the sequence of phases beginning with the algorithm’s ini-
tialization and ending with the first subsequent instance of TEST( j) such that j ∈ GS .
In total during this sequence of phases, the algorithm makes no more than (ac1/z) · n
offers in expectation and spends no more than (a(1 + δ)c1/z) · B of its budget in expec-
tation.
Proof. The algorithm begins in phase m. Using the fact that rm−1 ≤ n/z, this
implies the bound φ(∆(m)) = c1(rm−` − 1) < (c1r1−`)n/z. By Lemma 5.1.4, the
expected number of offers made before reaching a good state is at most
anp`
B (c1r
1−`)(n/z) = anr
`−1(B/n)
B (c1r
1−`)(n/z) =
(
ac1
z
)
n.
The bound in the expected amount spent follows by an analogous calculation:
a(1 + δ)p`(c1r1−`)(n/z) = a(1 + δ)r`−1(B/n)c1r1−`n/z = (a(1 + δ)c1/z) · B.

Theorem 5.1.6. The algorithm is constant-competitive. In fact, with probability at least
1
2 , the number of offers accepted is at least c · (B/p`), where c is an absolute constant.
Proof. We distinguish two cases. If B/p` ≤ 1.2 × 105 then with probability 1/2,
we expend our full budget on a single agent. When this happens, the number
of offers accepted equals 1, which is at least (2.4 × 10−5)(B/p`).
If B/p` ≥ 1.2× 104 then we will show that with constant probability, the algo-
rithm executes enough calls to TEST(i) for states i ∈ GS that it succeeds in getting
c · (B/p`) offers accepted. We will define five bad events E1, . . . , E5, each having
probability at most 0.1, such that the number of offers accepted is greater than
c · (B/p`) whenever none of the events E1, . . . , E5 occurs. Corollary 5.1.5 presents
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bounds on the expected number of offers made, and the expected amount spent,
during the “startup stage” before the first time the algorithm reaches a good
state. Let E1 (resp. E2) denote the event that the actual number of offers made
(resp. amount spent) in the startup stage exceeds the bound given in Corol-
lary 5.1.5 by a factor of more than 10. By Markov’s inequality, each of E1, E2 has
probability bounded by 0.1.
Imagine running the algorithm for an infinite number of steps, disregarding
the fact that it eventually spends more than its budget and makes more than
its allotted n offers. Define a good phase to be an execution of TEST(i) such that
i ∈ GS . Define an excursion to be the (possibly empty) set of offers made between
two consecutive good phases. Let
x =
B
pl
min
 1 −
ac1
z
a(1 + 10c1(r − 1)) ,
1 − ac1(1+δ)z
a(1 + δ)(1 + 10c1(r − 1))

and consider the first x good phases along with the x excursions that occur im-
mediately after each of them (Note, by our assumption that B/pl ≥ 1.2 × 105
we have x ≥ 1). How many offers, in expectation, are made during these x
phases and excursions? The expected number of offers during the good phases
is bounded above by (anp`/B) · x. According to Lemma 5.1.4 the expected
number of offers during the excursions is bounded above by (anp`/B)c1(r − 1)
and the expected amount spent during the excursions is bounded above by
a(1 + δ)p`c1(r − 1). Let E3 (resp. E4) denote the event that the actual number
of offers (resp. amount spent) made during the excursions does not exceed this
bound by a factor of more than 10. Once again, by Markov’s inequality, each of
E3, E4 has probability bounded by 0.1.
Our choice of the parameters a, r, z, δ has been designed to ensure that, as-
suming events E1, E2, E3, E4 do not occur, the combined number of offers made
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until the end of the xth good phase is less than n and the combined amount spent
until this time is less than B. Let N′ be the number of offers made and let B′ be
the budget spent before x good phases assuming events E1, E2, E3, E4 do not oc-
cur.
N′ = Offers before first good phase+in good phases+in recursions
≤ 10ac1z n + anplB x + 10anplc1(r−1)B x
≤ 10ac1z n + ( anplB + 10anplc1(r−1)B ) Bpl
1− ac1z
a(1+10c1(r−1))
≤ n
B′ = Budget spent before first good phase+in good phases+in recursions
≤ 10ac1(1+δ)z B + apl(1 + δ)x + 10apl(1 + δ)c1(r − 1)x
≤ 10ac1(1+δ)z B + (apl(1 + δ) + 10apl(1 + δ)c1(r − 1)) Bpl
1− ac1(1+δ)z
a(1+δ)(1+10c1(r−1))
≤ B
Thus, all of the offers made during the first x good phases actually took place
during the algorithm’s execution, i.e. before the budget was expended or the
maximum number of offers was reached. In any good phase, the expected num-
ber of offers accepted is at least a(1−2δ). Let E5 denote the event that fewer than
a(1−3δ)x offers are accepted in all of the first x good phases combined. Applying
Chebyshev’s Inequality to this sum of independent Bernoulli random variables
as in the proof of Lemma 5.1.2 implies that Pr(E5) ≤ 1−2δδ2a ≤ 0.1, again by our
choice of a, r, z, δ.
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By the union bound, the probability that none of E1, . . . , E5 occur is at least
1
2 , and when this happens at least a(1 − 3δ)x offers are accepted. The theorem
follows, because x = Ω(B/p`). 
5.1.2 Extension to Symmetric Submodular Functions
When f is a symmetric submodular function, it means that there exists a non-
decreasing concave function g such that f (S ) = g(|S |) for all sets S . It turns out
that the argument from Section 5.1.1 carries through to this case with very few
modifications. As an upper bound on E[ f (OPT )], we use the following lemma
which generalizes Lemma 5.1.1.
Lemma 5.1.7. E[ f (OPT )] ≤ 2r · g(B/p`)
Proof. Consider any specific realization of the random variables representing
the costs of each seller. Define
O1 = {i|ci ≤ p`−1 and i ∈ OPT }
O2 = {i|ci > p`−1 and i ∈ OPT }
O3 = {i|ci ≤ p`−1}.
We obtain our upper bound on E[ f (OPT )] via the following manipulation,
whose first, second, and last lines follow from the fact that g is a concave func-
tion satisfying g(0) = 0.
E[ f (OPT )] = E[g(|OPT |)] ≤ E[g(|O1|) + g(|O2|)]
≤ g(E(|O3|)) + g(E(|O2|))
= g(ns(p`−1)) + g(E(|O2|))
≤ g(ns(p`−1)) + g
(
B
p`−1
)
≤ 2g
(
B
p`−1
)
≤ 2r · g
(
B
p`
)
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By Theorem 5.1.6, with probability at least 12 the number of accepted offers
is at least c5 · (B/p`). Hence, letting S denote the set of accepted offers,
E[ f (S )] ≥ 12c5 · g
(
B
p`
)
≥ c54r · E[ f (OPT )],
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 5.1.7. This completes the proof
that our algorithm is constant-competitive whenever f is a nondecreasing sym-
metric submodular function.
5.2 An O(log n) Posted Price Mechanism for Submodular Mar-
kets
In this section we present a posted price mechanism which is O(log n)-
competitive for any nondecreasing submodular utility function, in the secretary
model. A function f : 2[n] → R+ is submodular if for any subsets S ,T s.t. S ⊆ T
we have f (S ∪ {a})− f (S ) ≥ f (T ∪ {a})− f (T ). The function is called nondecreasing
if S ⊆ T implies f (S ) ≤ f (T ).
Theorem 5.2.1. For any nondecreasing submodular procurement market there is a ran-
domized posted price budget feasible mechanism which is universally truthful and is
O(log n)-competitive.
In proof, we present the following mechanism, and show it respects the men-
tioned properties. In its essence, the mechanism is quite simple: it samples ap-
proximately half of the agents, rejects them and finds the agent with the highest
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value in the sample. It then uses this value to guess a threshold price that can
be used to decide on the allocation of the remaining agents.
Algorithm 7: GUESS POST
With probability 1/2 do ALG1:
ALG1
1. Choose τ ∈ [0, n] with Pr[τ = i] =
(
n
i
)
/2n.
2. Offer p = 0 to the first τ agents that arrive and let v′ = max{ai:i≤τ} f (ai).
3. Choose i u.a.r from {0, 1, 2, . . . , dlog ne}, let t = 2iv′ and B′ = B
4. For each agent a ∈ N \ {a1, . . . , aτ}:
a. Offer the agent p = Bt ·
(
f (S ∪ {a}) − f (S )) if B′ − p ≥ 0
b. If a accepts, add her to S and set B′ = B′ − p.
Otherwise:
ALG2
Run Dynkin’s algorithm and offer B to the winner
The mechanism runs Dynkin’s algorithm with probability 1/2 to allocate to
an agent with a sufficiently high value [24]. That is, with probability 1/2 the
mechanism samples the first n/e agents and then, from the remaining (1 − 1/e)n
agents, allocates to the first agent a′ for which f (a′) ≥ argmaxi∈{1,...,n/e} f (ai). In
expectation over the arrival order of the agents this guarantees that f (a′) ≥ (1/e)·
argmaxa∈N f (a).
Since the mechanism is a randomization over two posted price mechanisms,
it is truthful and individually rational. Budget feasibility is implied from the
condition in (4a) which verifies that the remaining budget B′ is greater than the
payment. Throughout the rest of this paper we will use OPT (N ′) to denote the
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optimal value over the set of agents N ′, N1 to denote the set of agents who are
in the sample andN2 = N \N1. Let S ∗ = OPT (N), S ∗1 = S ∗∩N1 and S ∗2 = S ∗∩N∗2 .
Let v∗ = max{ f (a), a ∈ N}. Consider the case when f (v∗) ≥ f (OPT )/1024. In
this case the algorithm runs Dynkin’s algorithm with probability 1/2 and gets an
approximation ratio of 2048e. So for the rest of the section we will assume that
f (a) < f (OPT )/1024,∀a ∈ N . To prove the competitive ratio of the mechanism,
we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2.2. When f (a) ≤ f (OPT )1024 ,∀a ∈ N then min{ f (S ∗1), f (S ∗2)} ≥ OPT (N)4 with
probability at least p ≥ 910 .
Proof. Let S ∗ = {a1, . . . , a`} be the optimal solution. Without loss of generality,
assume that a1, . . . , a` are sorted according to decreasing marginal contributions,
and let wi denote the marginal contribution of ai.
Since the agents are assumed to arrive in a uniformly random order, and τ
is chosen with a specific probability distribution we have that the sampled set
N1 is a uniformly random set of N . Hence each agent is in N1 with probability
1/2 independently of other agents. Consider the random variables X1, . . . , X`,
s.t. Xi takes the value wi with if agent i belongs to N1 and 0 otherwise. Since
N1 is a uniformly random set this implies that Xi takes value wi with probability
1/2 and 0 with probability 1/2. Such a trick of choosing set N1 so that Xi’s are
independent was first introduced by [37]. Let X =
∑`
i=1 Xi and X¯ = f (S ∗) − X.
Observe that f (S ∗1) ≥ X, and f (S ∗2) ≥ X¯ by submodularity. To show the desired
properties of X and X¯ we will use the Chernoff bound stated in lemma 2.2.3.
Since our assumption that maxiwi ≤ f (S ∗)1024 and that µ = f (S ∗)/2 the above
bound implies that:
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Pr
[
X¯ ≤ f (S
∗)
4
]
= Pr
[
X ≥ 3 f (S
∗)
4
]
≤ 1/20 (5.3)
as well as:
Pr
[
X¯ ≥ 3 f (S
∗)
4
]
= Pr
[
X ≤ f (S
∗)
4
]
≤ 1/20 (5.4)
Let W1 =
∑
i∈S ∗1 wi and W2 =
∑
i∈S ∗2 wi. By union bound, the above inequalities
imply that with probability at least p ≥ 1 − (1/20 + 1/20) = 9/10 we have that:
W2/3 ≤ W1 ≤ 3W2 (5.5)
Since OPT = W1+W2, this implies that both W1 and W2 are greater than OPT/4
with probability p. 
Lemma 5.2.3. When f (a) ≤ f (OPT )1024 ≤
4 f (S ∗2)
1024 , for any realization of t where
f (S ∗2)
64 ≤ t ≤
f (S ∗2)
2 ALG1 is a 128-approximation to f (S
∗
2).
Proof. Let S be the set of all agents that received the mechanism’s offer. Since
agents are rational and the mechanism is incentive compatible, an agent ai
which rejects the mechanism’s offer pi implies that ci > pi. Note that in or-
der to be included in S , an agent ai needs to respect: ci ≤ pi ≤ B′, where B′ is the
remaining budget at stage i in which ai appears. First, consider the case where
every agent ai ∈ S ∗2 \ S rejects the mechanism’s offer in ALG1, i.e. ci > pi. In this
case we have:
∑
a∈S ∗2\S
(
f (S ∪ {a}) − f (S )
)
=
∑
a∈S ∗2\S
( f (S ∪ a) − f (S )
ci
)
· ci <
∑
a∈S ∗2\S
( t
B
)
· ci ≤
f (S ∗2)
2B
· B
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where the first inequality is due to the fact that S ∗2 is a feasible solution
(
∑
ai∈S ∗2 ci ≤ B), and the second inequality is due to the definition of t. This in-
equality implies:
f (S ∗2) − f (S ) = f
(
(S ∪ S ∗2 \ S )
) − f (S ) ≤ ∑
a∈S ∗2\S
(
f (S ∪ a) − f (S )
)
≤ f (S
∗
2)
2
and we have that f (S ) > f (S ∗2) − f (S ∗2)/2 = f (S ∗2)/2. Hence in this case it is a
factor 2 approximation to f (S ∗2).
Consider the second case where there is an agent ai ∈ S ∗2 \S for which ci < pi,
this implies that at stage i, B′ < pi. Let ai be the first agent in S ∗2 \ S which has
this property. Now, there are two (sub)cases to consider. The first case is that
B′ ≤ B/2, i.e. ∑a j∈S p j ≥ B/2:
B
2
<
∑
a j∈S
p j =
∑
a j∈S
B
t
(
f (S j ∪ {a j}) − f (S j)
)
≤ B · 64 f (S )
f (S ∗2)
(5.6)
which implies that f (S ) is a 128 approximation of f (S ∗2). Finally, in the case
where B′ < pi and B′ > B/2, we have:
B
2
< B′ < pi =
B
t
(
f (S j ∪ {ai}) − f (S j)
)
≤ B
t
· f (ai) ≤ 64Bf (S ∗2)
· f (ai) ≤ 64B256 (5.7)
Here equation 5.7 is a contradiction. Hence the case that B′ > B/2 never hap-
pens. 
There are two cases to show that the algorithm is O(log n) competitive ratio.
1. If f (v∗) ≥ f (OPT )/1024 then we ALG2 is a 1024e approximation which is
run with probability 1/2. In this case we get a 2048e approximation as
remarked above.
2. If f (a) ≤ f (OPT )/1024,∀a ∈ N , we consider the approximation ratio of
ALG1 which is run with probability 1/2. With probability 1/2 v∗ is in-
cluded in N1(Event T1) and with probability at least 9/10 we have that
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f (S ∗2) ≥ f (OPT )/4 by lemma 5.2.2(Event T2). Hence by union bound
both these events(Events T1 and T2) happen with probability at least
4/10 = 1 − (1/10 + 1/2). Independently of these events t such that
f (S ∗2)/64 ≤ t ≤ f (S ∗2)/2 is chosen with probability 1/O(log(n)) which re-
sults in an approximation ratio of 128 by lemma 5.2.3. Hence the final
approximation ratio is 12
4
10
1
log(n)
1
4
1
128 =
1
O(log(n)) .
This gives us Theorem 5.2.1 which is the main result of this section.
5.3 A Constant-Competitive Mechanism in the Bidding Model
In this section we present a bidding mechanism for nondecreasing submodular
markets in the secretary model. As each agent arrives, the mechanism collects is
bid and must make an irrevocable decision of whether or not the agent should
be allocated and how much the agent should be rewarded. We will show the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.1. In the bidding model, for any nondecreasing submodular utility
function, there is a universally truthful budget feasible mechanism which is O(1)-
competitive.
The result of the previous section showed that the gap between posted price
mechanisms and bidding mechanisms in nondecreasing procurement markets
in the secretary model is at most O(log n). The above theorem and theorem 5.1.6
which are a special cases of model considered in section 5.2, hint towards the
possibility that the gap in theorem 5.2.1 can be reduced to O(1).
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Like the mechanism from the previous section, the mechanism here will also
sample the agents and use a threshold value to decide on the allocation. In the
process of estimating the threshold, the mechanism will compute an approxi-
mation of the optimal solution of the bids of the first half of the agents. A mod-
ification of the greedy algorithm that sorts agents according to their density –
their marginal contribution normalized by their cost – achieves an approxima-
tion ratio of e/(e− 1) [33, 49] which is known to be optimal [25]. We use A(N1) to
denote the value of this algorithm computed over a subset of agents N1 ⊆ N .
Algorithm 8: Online Bidding
With probability 1/2 do ALG1:
ALG1
1. Choose τ ∈ [0, n] with Pr[τ = i] =
(
n
i
)
/2n.
2. Let N1 be the first τ agents that arrive, N2 = N \ N1, and B′ = B.
3. For each agent ai ∈ N1:
a. Add the ai’s bid to the sample;
b. Reject ai’s bid
4. Compute t = A(N1)/8
5. For each agent ai ∈ N2:
If ci ≤ pi = Bt ·
(
f (S ∪ {a}) − f (S )) and B′ − pi ≥ 0:
add ai to S , pay her pi and set B′ = B − pi.
Otherwise:
ALG2
Run Dynkin’s algorithm and pay the winner B.
The mechanism above is similar to the one from Section 5.2 though it does
not guess a threshold at random, but rather leverages the access it has to agents’
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bids to compute a “good” threshold value t from the sample. We will show that
this threshold estimates OPT well, which allows for a good approximation. First
though, we verify truthfulness.
Lemma 5.3.2. The above mechanism is universally truthful.
Proof. Fix an arrival sequence of the agents. An agent a ∈ N1 is always rejected
by the mechanism, regardless of her bid, and she therefore cannot be better off
by misreporting her cost. For each agent a ∈ N2 the threshold price it is offered
is independent of her bid since agents have no control over their arrival order,
and cannot control their marginal contributions.
Assume for purpose of contradiction that an agent ai benefits from declaring
a bid bi , ci. If the agent is allocated when declaring her true cost ci, she receives
the same price as long as her bid is below the threshold. Therefore she cannot
benefit from declaring a cost which is higher or lower than her true cost and is
below the threshold. Bidding above the threshold excludes the agent from the
allocation and her utility in this case is 0, and she is worst off since the fact that
she is allocated implies that her cost is below the threshold.
In case the agent is not allocated, she cannot benefit from bidding a higher
cost or any cost above the threshold. In case the agent declares a cost which is
below the threshold, she can get allocated. However, since her true cost is above
the threshold, her utility would be negative, and she is better off declaring her
true cost. 
Budget feasibility and individual rationality are maintained by enforcing the
conditions in step (4) of the mechanism. Showing that the mechanism is indeed
constant competitive would there imply the main result of this section.
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Lemma 5.3.3. The mechanism is O(1)-competitive.
Proof. Once again we have two cases to argue about. The first case consider
that f (v∗) ≥ f (OPT )/1024. Then with probability 1/2 we are running dynkin’s
algorithm and getting in expectation 1emaxa∈N f (a). Hence this is a 2 · e · 1024 =
2048e approximation.
As in Lemma 5.2.2 let S ∗ = {a1, . . . , a`} be the optimal solution OPT (N) and
without loss of generality assume that a1, . . . , a` are sorted according to de-
creasing marginal contributions. Let wi denote the marginal contribution of ai,
S ∗1 = S
∗ ∩ N1, S ∗2 = S ∗ \ S ∗1 and W1 =
∑
ai∈S ∗1 wi and W2 =
∑
ai∈S ∗2 wi.
Consider the second case where ∀a ∈ N , f (a) ≤ f (OPT )/1024. In such a case
by lemma 5.2.2 with probability 9/10 we have that min{ f (S ∗1), f (S ∗2)} ≥ OPT (N)4 .
Given this event we will show that
f (S ∗2)
64
≤ t ≤ f (S
∗
2)
2
; (5.8)
Recall that in Lemma 5.2.3, we showed that using a threshold with property
(5.8) to allocate to agents inN2 if and only if the ratio between the threshold and
their marginal contribution exceeds their cost to budget ratio (as described in
step (4) of the mechanism), guarantees that in expectation the set of the allocated
agents is a constant factor approximation of f (S ∗2). Hence, showing property
(5.8) above would imply that with a constant probability the value of the set of
agents allocated by the mechanism is a constant factor approximation of f (S ∗2).
From Lemma 5.2.2 this implies the mechanism is constant competitive.
To compute the threshold t, in step (3) we apply the greedy algorithm for
submodular maximization under a budget constraint on the sample N1. This
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algorithm is guaranteed to provide at least a (1 − 1/e) fraction of OPT (N1). Due
to the decreasing marginal utilities property of the submodular function, we
have that OPT (N1) ≥ f (S ∗1) ≥ W1 and that OPT (N2) ≥ f (S ∗2) ≥ W2. From
Lemma 5.2.2 we know that there is a constant probability for which OPT (N)/4 ≤
min{ f (S ∗1), f (S ∗2)}. The threshold t can be bounded from above:
t =
A(N1)
8
≤ OPT (N1)
8
≤ OPT (N)
8
≤ f (S
∗
2)
2
(5.9)
To bound t from below we use γ = e/(e − 1):
t =
A(N1)
8
≥ OPT (N1)
8γ
≥ f (S
∗
1)
8γ
≥ f (S
∗)
32γ
≥ f (S
∗
2)
32γ
≥ f (S
∗
2)
64
(5.10)
Hence by lemma 5.2.3 and lemma 5.2.2 we get that it is aO(1) approximation. 
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Through examples we showed that sequential learning with resource con-
straints is an area rich in terms of applications. Yet, this area lacked the the-
oretical tools and there were no general models which captured many of these
applications. In this thesis, we have proposed very general models along with
algorithms and lower bounds for dealing with such problems. Specifically we
have proposed the following three results.
1. We proposed the very general model of Bandits with Knapsacks and de-
veloped algorithms with nearly optimal regret guarantees.
2. Then we generalized the results from Bandits with Knapsacks to the con-
textual setting where we can have side information.
3. We also considered the special case of dynamic procurement and achieved
multiplicative approximation when the utility function is submodular.
Above results represent the first and to date most comprehensive under-
standing of models for sequential learning with resource constraints. In the
next section we will outline open problems resulting from our work.
6.1 Open problems
While the work in this thesis resulted in proposing very general models of se-
quential learning with resource constraints, it also opens up several technical as
well as more open ended research programs.
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6.1.1 Bandits with Knapsacks
While we prove that the regret bound for PD − BwK is optimal up to logarithmic
factors, improved results may be possible for various special cases, especially
ones involving discretization over a multi-dimensional action space.
The study of multi-armed bandit problems with large strategy sets has been
a very fruitful line of investigation. It seems likely that some of the techniques
introduced here could be wedded with the techniques from that literature. In
particular, it would be intriguing to try combining our primal-dual algorithm
PD − BwK with confidence-ellipsoid algorithms for stochastic linear optimization
(e.g. see [19]), or enhancing the Mixture Elimintation algorithm with the tech-
nique of adaptively refined discretization, as in the zooming algortihm of [36].
It is tempting to ask about the adversarial version of BwK. However, achieving
sublinear regret bounds for such a version appears hopeless even for the fixed-
arm benchmark. In order to make progress in the positive direction, one may
require a more subtle notion of benchmark, and perhaps also some restrictions
on the power of the adversary.
6.1.2 Resourceful contextual bandits
We define a very general setting for contextual bandits with resource con-
straints. We design an algorithm for this problem, and derive a regret bound
which achieves the optimal
√
T scaling in terms of the time horizon T , and the
optimal
√
log |Π| scaling in terms of the policy set Π. Further, we consider dis-
cretization issues, and derive a specific corollary for contextual dynamic pricing
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with a single product; we obtain a regret bound that is optimal in the regime
B ≥ Ω(T ). Finally, we derive a partial lower bound which establishes a stark
difference from the non-contextual version.
The main open question is combining provable regret bounds and a com-
putationally efficient implementation. Note that achieving
√
T regret in a com-
putationally efficient way is a major open question for contextual bandits with
policy sets, even without the resource constraints.
Several open questions concern our regret bounds. First, it is desirable to
achieve the same regret bounds without assuming a known time horizon T .
However, this might not be feasible due to the fact that in RCB, T is essentially
one of the resource constraints. Second, our main regret bound is not tight for
an arbitrary tuple (B,T, OPT); likewise, our corollary for dynamic pricing with
a single product is not tight for an arbitrary tuple (B,T ). In both cases, both
upper and lower bounds can potentially be improved. Third, it is important
to work out the discretization issues for more general settings of dynamic pric-
ing/procurement. However, these issues are largely unresolved even for the
non-contextual version. Finally, if there are no contexts or resource constraints
then one can achieve O(logT ) regret with an instance dependent constant; it
is not clear whether one can meaningfully extend this result to settings where
either contexts or resource constraints are present.
6.1.3 Non-linear objectives
In our study of procurement markets in chapter 5 we showed that for the spe-
cial case of dynamic procurement one can get a O(log n) approximation ratio
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when the utility function is a submodular function and O(1) approximation ra-
tio when the utility function is a symmetric submodular function. A very inter-
esting question here is if we can show an algorithm with O(1) approximation
for the case of general submodular utility function.
While the above result is for the special case of dynamic procurement we do
not have general models of sequential learning under resource constraints with
non-trivial guarantees when the utility functions are non-linear. A great open
question is to find such general models.
6.1.4 Reactive environments
Our work on sequential learning with resource constraints can be thought of as
a mild reactive environment. In a reactive environment a learning algorithm
faces the challenge of learning while simultaneously trying to maximize re-
wards when its action in the current round can affect the future. With resource
constraints consuming them in the current round makes them unavailable for
the future rounds. But the form of reactivity is mild since we assume the re-
source consumption is at most 1/B fraction of the total budget.
The whole problem of reactive environments seem quite general and there
should be lots of applications which can be modelled so. Coming up with good
models which can capture many of these applications seems like a very inter-
esting direction.
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